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Socrates is said to have thought that what is responsible for seeming cases of akrasia is 
ignorance.  He also seems to have freed himself, in his own life, from the distinctive kind of 
inner resistance that plagues the akratic.  But if ignorance is responsible for seeming cases of 
akrasia, how, if at all, does this ignorance differ from other kinds of ignorance?  And how could 
Socrates have possessed the kind of serene self-control that according to one plausible 
reconstruction of his own views could only belong to a person with the kind of knowledge that 
Socrates claimed not to have?  In this dissertation I try to shed light on these questions and on 
Plato’s Protagoras by presenting my own Socratic-Platonic account of akratic behavior and 
tracing the correspondences between my account and Plato’s text—the whole text, not just the 
most relevant part of it (352a-359a).  The core idea of my account is the concept of a knowledge-
oriented mode of thinking, feeling, and acting: the ‘epistemic frame of mind’.  To fail to inhabit 
this frame of mind with regard to the activity of living a human life is, I suggest, to suffer from a 
kind of ignorance, while to fully inhabit this frame of mind with regard to this activity, though it 
is not yet to possess the kind of knowledge that properly governs a human life, is nevertheless to 
free oneself from the kind of inner resistance that plagues the akratic.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
   
 In this dissertation I present an account of akratic behavior and argue that its ingredients 
are to be found throughout Plato’s Protagoras.  Before I explain what I mean by my talk of 
‘ingredients’, let me first say what I mean by ‘akratic behavior’.   
 People are sometimes described as acting against their knowledge of what is best or as 
acting against their belief about what is best.  Somebody may be described, for example, as 
staying in bed though he knows that it would be best for him to get out of bed, or as having more 
to eat though he believes that it would be best for him to stop eating.  The cause of such behavior 
is commonly supposed to be some sort of inner state of executive weakness (‘weakness of the 
will’, ‘akrasia’,
1
 etc.), and it is commonly with reference to this state that the behavior itself is 
named (‘episode of akrasia’, ‘case of akrasia’, or simply ‘akrasia’).  But such names, 
descriptions, and explanations are not accepted by everyone, for not everyone admits that people 
sometimes act against their knowledge of what is best or against their belief about what is best, 
let alone that such behavior is attributable to a lack of executive virtue; Socrates, for one, appears 
to have thought that such descriptions were based on a misunderstanding.  Yet even people like 
Socrates who find fault with the common descriptions can agree that they are attempts (in their 
view unsuccessful ones) to pick out a kind of erring behavior that really exists and that is worth 
distinguishing from other kinds of erring behavior.
2
  How might one refer to this sort of behavior 
without thereby endorsing the common accounts of it?  Perhaps the clearest way would be to 
                                                
1
 Lit., lack of power or might, lack of self-control.   
2 I use the word ‘kind’ in a loose sense here, not in the sense of a well-defined natural class. 
2 
 
speak of ‘seeming episodes of akrasia’ or ‘apparent displays of weakness of the will’; 
alternatively, one might speak of ‘akratic phenomena’, leaving it open whether any such 
phenomena are actual cases of akrasia.  For stylistic reasons (which I hope outweigh the potential 
for confusion), I will speak instead of ‘akratic behavior’, by which I mean the same thing as I 
meant just now by those other expressions.
1
  By ‘akratic behavior’, in other words, I mean that 
kind of erring behavior which is commonly described as action against one’s knowledge or belief 
about what is best and commonly attributed to a lack of executive virtue—it being left open 
whether such descriptions and explanations are correct.    
 
 The account of akratic behavior that I will present in this dissertation is a Socratic-
Platonic account in the following sense: it leaves no room for action against one’s knowledge of 
what is best, and much of its conceptual structure is borrowed from Plato and Socrates.  It is not, 
however, the same as the account of akratic behavior presented by Socrates in the Protagoras (at 
352a-359a, what I call the ‘section on akrasia’
2
), nor do I believe that through the medium of the 
Protagoras Plato is obliquely presenting a separate account of akratic behavior distinct from 
Socrates’ account and identical with my own.  Nevertheless, because I happen to have developed 
my account of akratic behavior almost as much to help make better sense of the Protagoras as to 
help make better sense of akratic behavior—for over the past several years I happen to have 
pursued these two goals in tandem—my present understanding of akratic behavior bears the 
                                                
1
 According to this usage, Socrates admits that there is such a thing as akratic behavior but denies that there are 
episodes or cases of akrasia. 
2
 The word akrasia does not occur in Plato’s Protagoras, though Socrates does use related words to describe akratic 
behavior (e.g., kratêthênai at 352c5, kratoumenous at 352e2).  Forms of the word akrasia (akrasia, akratia, 
akrateia) as well as agent-noun forms (akratês, akratôr) do occur in Plato and Xenophon (e.g., Gorgias 525a; 
Timaeus 86d; Critias 121a; Mem. I. v. 2; Mem. III. ix. 4; Mem; IV. v. 4-11), but not until Aristotle, it seems, does the 
word get fixed as a ‘technical’ term in philosophy. 
3 
 
marks of extended contact with the Protagoras,1 while my present understanding of the 
Protagoras in turn bears the marks of several years of thinking about akratic behavior.  This 
partly explains what I mean when I say that ‘ingredients’ in my account of akratic behavior are 
to be found throughout Plato’s Protagoras.2   
 
 What, then, is my account of akratic behavior, and how does it differ from Socrates’ 
account?  Most of the rest of this chapter is a response to this question.  Near the end of the 
chapter I state the aim of the dissertation and explain its unusual shape.  I end the chapter by 
summarizing the section on akrasia (352a-359a) and the Protagoras as a whole.  In chapter 2 I 
present my account of akratic behavior more fully.  In chapter 3 I analyze the section on akrasia 
and its immediate context and trace the connections between my account and this section.  In 
chapter 4 I survey the entire dialogue and argue that ingredients in my account of akratic 
behavior are to be found throughout the Protagoras.  
 
1.1. The core of my account 
 
1.1.1. The Socratic denial of akrasia 
 It is not clear whether Socrates denied that anyone ever acts against his belief about what 
is best (i.e., whether there is such a thing as ‘belief-akrasia’), but it is quite clear that he did deny 
that anyone ever acts against his knowledge of what is best (i.e., that there is such a thing as 
                                                
1 And with Plato’s other works, particularly the Republic.   
2
 I discuss this topic further in section 1.2.   
4 
 
‘knowledge-akrasia’).
1
  The strongest evidence we have is Plato’s Protagoras, near the end of 
which Socrates says: 
Come, my good Protagoras, uncover some more of your thoughts: how are you in regard to 
knowledge (epistêmê)?  Do you share the view that most people take of this, or have you some 
other?  The opinion generally held (dokei de tois pollois) of knowledge is something of this sort—
that it is no strong or guiding or governing thing; it is not regarded as anything of that kind, but 
people think that, while a man often has knowledge in him, he is not governed by it, but by 
something else—now by passion, now by pain, at times by love, and often by fear; their feeling 
about knowledge is just what they have about a slave, that it may be dragged about by any other 
force.  Now do you agree with this view of it, or do you consider that knowledge is something 
noble and able to govern man, and that whoever learns what is good and what is bad (eanper 
gignôskê[i] tis tagatha kai ta kaka) will never be swayed by anything to act otherwise than as 
knowledge bids, and that intelligence (tên phronêsin) is a sufficient succor for mankind?2   
 
When Protagoras answers, 
 
Not only does it seem just as you say (hôsper su legeis), Socrates, but further, it would be 
shameful indeed for me above all people to say that wisdom and knowledge (sophian kai 
epistêmên) are anything but the most powerful forces (kratiston) in human activity,3 
 
Socrates agrees with him:  
 
Well and truly spoken. . . . Now you know that most people will not listen to you and me but say 
that many, while knowing what is best, refuse to perform it, though they have the power, and do 
other things instead.
4
 
 
                                                
1
 Cf. Aristotle’s discussion of this distinction at EN 1145b-1146a (Aristotle seems to have thought that Socrates 
denied belief-akrasia generally, not just knowledge-akrasia in particular).  I assume throughout that anyone who 
knows that it would be best to do x also believes that it would be best to do x, and that therefore anyone who acts 
against his knowledge of what is best also acts against his belief about what is best.  It follows that a general denial 
of belief-akrasia includes the specific denial of knowledge-akrasia. (I discuss the knowledge/belief distinction 
further in chapter 3.)  
2
 352a-c (W. R. M. Lamb’s translation, Loeb Classical Library).   
3
 352cd (Stanley Lombardo and Karen Bell’s translation).   
4
 352d, emphases added (W. R. M. Lamb’s translation).   
5 
 
Later, when ‘the many’ (hoi polloi) are being reminded of this earlier point, Socrates describes 
himself, together with Protagoras, as having denied knowledge-akrasia:   
 
You asked it, if you remember, when we [Protagoras and I] were agreeing that there is nothing 
stronger than knowledge, and that knowledge, wherever it may be found, has always the upper 
hand of pleasure or anything else; and then you said that pleasure often masters even the man of 
knowledge, and on our refusing to agree with you, you went on to ask us: Protagoras and Socrates, 
if this experience is not “being overcome by pleasure,” whatever can it be, and what do you call 
it?
1
 
 
Other evidence in Xenophon and Aristotle
2
 suggests that on this point, at least, no distinction 
need be drawn between the historical Socrates and the Socrates in the Protagoras: one may 
simply say that according to Socrates, people who take themselves to be acting against their 
knowledge of what is best do not in fact possess the knowledge they think they possess, but on 
the contrary, what is responsible for their akratic behavior is a kind of ignorance.  Up to this 
point my account of akratic behavior is the same as Socrates’.     
 When one goes on to ask whether there is a distinctive sort of ignorance that causes 
akratic behavior and, if so, how this kind of ignorance differs from the various kinds of 
ignorance that make people go wrong in other ways, then it is no longer clear what Socrates 
thought.  It is true that in the Protagoras Socrates leads ‘the many’ to see that by their own 
admission akratic behavior is due to the lack of a “measuring art” (metrêtikê technê).3  But 
Socrates leaves it an open question what exactly this technê is,4 and he also never indicates that 
he himself endorses all the claims he leads the many to accept.  We are ultimately left to wonder 
                                                
1
 357c.   
2
 See Mem. III. ix. 4-5 and EN 1145b, 1147b (cf. Magna Moralia 1200b).  At  EN 1145b Aristotle seems to have the 
Protagoras in mind, since he uses an image that Plato uses at Prot. 352c, but surely this was not his only source.      
3
 See 357d (epistêmês endeia[i] . . . kai ou monon epistêmês, alla . . . metrêtikês).   
4
 357b: “Well, the nature of this art or science [lit., ‘what art or science this is’] we shall consider some other time 
(hêtis men toinun technê kai epistêmê estin hautê, eis authis skepsometha) . . . .” 
6 
 
whether Socrates distinguished a kind of ignorance that he thought was responsible for akratic 
behavior in particular, and if he did, what kind he thought it was.  
 
 It is here that my account of akratic behavior departs from the one endorsed by Socrates 
in the Protagoras.  Strictly speaking, my account does not contradict what Socrates plainly 
asserts in his own voice in this dialogue (which is not very much); but on topics on which 
Socrates is silent or noncommittal, I say something definite, and in this respect my account does 
differ from his.  Specifically, I acknowledge the existence of a kind of belief-akrasia (it is 
unclear, as I said, whether Socrates did or not), and I give answers to two questions that I said are 
left open by Socrates: “What is the ignorance that causes akratic behavior?” and “How, if it all, 
does this ignorance differ from the kinds of ignorance that cause other sorts of erring behavior?”   
 My account of akratic behavior also differs from a ‘Socratic’ account of akratic behavior 
recently set forth by Terry Penner.
1
  According to Penner’s account, what rids the human soul of 
its akratic flutterings is the conversion of true opinions into knowledge.
2
  While Penner’s account 
has much to recommend it, it fails to make sense of the fact that the historical Socrates, whom 
our sources represent as possessing a kind of serene self-control, evidently managed to free 
himself from the distinctive kind of inner resistance that plagues the akratic, even as Socrates 
                                                
1 In “Socrates on the Strength of Knowledge: Protagoras 351B-357E,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie (79), 
1997, pp. 117-149.  I discuss Terry Penner’s account in chapter 3.   
2
 Penner, as one would expect, makes much of that passage in the Meno (97d-98a) where such a process of 
conversion is described: “[T]rue opinions, as long as they remain, are a fine thing and all they do is good; but they 
are not willing to remain long, and they escape from a man’s mind, so that they are not worth much until one ties 
them down by (giving) an account of the reason why . . . .  After they are tied down, in the first place they become 
knowledge, and then they remain in place.  That is why knowledge is prized higher than correct opinion, and 
knowledge differs from correct opinion in being tied down.” (G. M. A. Grube’s translation.)  Penner relates this 
passage to a part of the Protagoras (356de) in which there is a similar description: “Now if our welfare consisted in 
doing and choosing things of larger dimensions, and avoiding and not doing those of small, what would be our 
salvation in life?  Would it be the art of measurement, or the power of appearance?  Is it not the latter that leads us 
astray, as we saw, and many a time causes us to take things topsy turvy and to have to change our minds both in our 
conduct and in our choice of great and small?  Whereas the art of measurement would have made this appearance 
ineffective, and by showing us the truth would have brought our soul into the repose of abiding by the truth, and so 
would have saved our lives.” (W. R. M. Lamb’s translation, Loeb Classical Library.) 
7 
 
also claimed, apparently sincerely, not to have acquired the kind of knowledge that Penner has in 
mind.  How, according to Penner’s ‘Socratic’ account, could Socrates himself have done what he 
did?  My account has its own set of weaknesses, but one of its strengths, I think, is that it makes 
sense of this fact about Socrates.   
 
1.1.2. The epistemic frame of mind 
 I present my account of akratic behavior more fully in chapter 2, but let me now present 
its core idea: inhabiting the ‘epistemic frame of mind’. 
 If somebody told you his eyes were failing, handed you a set of surgical instruments, and 
asked you to do him the favor of healing his eyes, how would you react?  If you believed that 
you were an eye doctor, perhaps you would actually try to heal this person’s eyes.  Otherwise, it 
is likely that the very thought of you sticking sharp objects into somebody’s eyes would make 
you wince.  You would refuse to do this man this ‘favor,’ explaining that you are not qualified, 
that this is an activity that calls for an expert’s knowledge, that anyone but an expert would 
almost certainly botch the job.  Imagine now that somebody carrying surgical instruments walks 
up to you and says that he intends to heal your eyes.  What will you do?  You will probably panic 
and not let this person get anywhere near your eyes.  If he manages to grab your arm and tries to 
hold you still, the better to ‘heal’ you, you will struggle hard to free yourself.  But if this same 
person approached you in a hospital, and you were convinced that he was an eye doctor who 
knew what he was doing, you might well let him touch your eyes without offering any 
resistance.
1
   
                                                
1
 Cf. Lysis 207d-210d.  See esp. 209e-210a: “[I]f [the Great King’s] son had something the matter with his eyes, 
would he let him meddle with them himself, if he considered him to be no doctor (mê iatron hêgoumenos), or would 
he prevent him?  He would prevent him.  But if he supposed us to have medical skill (hêmas de ge ei hupolambanoi 
iatrikous einai), he would not prevent us, I imagine, even though we wanted to pull the eyes open and sprinkle them 
8 
 
 All of which is to say that you already inhabit the epistemic frame of mind when it comes 
to the activity of operating on people’s eyes.  With regard to this activity you already think and 
feel and act in a characteristic mode: you think that only people who possess a certain kind of 
knowledge are qualified to engage in this activity; you are alarmed at the thought that a layman, 
whether you or anyone else, engage in this activity without the guidance of an expert’s 
knowledge; and you will take action, if you can, to stop this from happening. 
 A person may inhabit the epistemic frame of mind with regard to some activity without 
possessing the knowledge that properly governs that activity.  The activity just mentioned was 
itself a good illustration of this, but let me use a new example.  To consider training horses to be 
an activity that only people who possess a certain kind of knowledge are qualified to engage in; 
to be alarmed at the suggestion that a layman try to tame a horse without an expert’s guidance; to 
take action, when possible, to prevent this from happening—to think and feel and act in these 
ways is not yet to possess a horse trainer’s knowledge.  On the other hand, someone who did not 
inhabit this mode of thinking, feeling, and acting would also not possess a horse trainer’s 
knowledge.  For the knowledge of caring for horses presumably involves a combination of 
intellectual, affective, and practical dispositions, e.g., being aware that extreme heat or cold 
harms horses, being alarmed at the thought that a horse may be exposed to such danger, being 
disposed to act so as to stop this from happening, etc.; and if these sorts of dispositions are part 
of a horse trainer’s knowledge, surely it is also part of a horse trainer’s knowledge to be aware 
that ignorant treatment by human beings1 harms horses, to be alarmed at the thought that a horse 
may be exposed to such treatment, and to be disposed to act so as to stop this from happening—
in other words, to inhabit the epistemic frame of mind with regard to the treatment of horses.  
                                                                                                                                                       
with ashes, so long as he believed our judgment to be sound (hêgoumenos orthôs phronein).  That is true.”   (W. R. 
M. Lamb’s tranlsation, Loeb Classical Library.)     
1
 I.e., treatment not guided by a horse trainer’s knowledge.  
9 
 
Thus inhabiting the epistemic frame of mind, though not a sufficient condition for possessing a 
horse trainer’s knowledge, does seem to be a necessary condition.  In general, inhabiting the 
epistemic frame of mind with regard to some activity, though not a sufficient condition for 
possessing the knowledge that properly governs that activity, is at least in certain cases a part of 
that knowledge.  And in those cases where it is a part of that knowledge, failure to inhabit the 
epistemic frame of mind is a failure of knowledge, i.e., a kind of ignorance.  
 
 Consider a boy who already inhabits the epistemic frame of mind with regard to certain 
activities (taking care of human bodies, training horses, building ships) but not yet with regard to 
the activity of living a human life.  As the boy walks through his native city, he marvels at the 
success of its various artisans and professionals in their specialized fields, then compares their 
excellent work in these fields with his own lackluster efforts to become a better person.  It occurs 
to him that maybe there is an art of living a human life, i.e., a kind of expert knowledge that 
properly governs a human being’s life as a whole, just as there is an expert knowledge that 
governs each of the crafts of the city’s professionals, and that maybe it is for lack of this 
knowledge that he is not as fine a human being as he would like to be.  The thought sticks in his 
mind, for whatever reason, and over the years this way of thinking becomes second nature to 
him.  By the time he is an adult, he firmly believes that living a human life is an activity that 
cannot be engaged in well without the guidance of a certain kind of knowledge; he is distressed 
by the thought that he and other people are living their lives without the help of such knowledge; 
and he does what he can to fix this situation.  In other words, he fully inhabits the epistemic 
frame of mind with regard to the activity of living a human life.  Yet neither he nor anyone else, 
as far as he can determine, possesses the knowledge in question; indeed, the thought that he is 
10 
 
continually bungling a job that calls for an expert’s knowledge fills him with a kind of 
philosophical queasiness.  Nevertheless, he tries hard to ‘learn on the job’, living in accordance 
with what he thinks are the best ideas he has had to date, never losing track of the fact that these 
ideas do not amount to knowledge, and never giving up the search for better ideas that come 
closer to knowledge.  
 The person I have just described underwent a kind of conversion.  If living a human life 
is indeed the sort of activity that a certain kind of knowledge properly governs, then at the 
beginning of this conversion process, this person was ignorant in the following sense: he lacked 
the knowledge that properly governs the activity of living a human life.  What is more to the 
point, he had not yet learned to approach this activity in the way in which he had already learned 
to approach building ships and training horses—though he himself was neither a shipbuilder nor 
a trainer of horses—i.e., he had not yet learned to inhabit the epistemic frame of mind with 
regard to the activity of living a human life.  But if inhabiting the epistemic frame of mind with 
regard to this activity is part of the knowledge by which this activity is to be governed, then this 
person’s failure in his youth to inhabit this frame of mind with regard to this activity was itself a 
kind of ignorance.  Let us call this kind of ignorance (i.e., failure to inhabit the epistemic frame 
of mind with regard to an activity that is properly governed by knowledge) ignorancee, and let us 
call the other kind of ignorance (i.e., failure to possess the knowledge that properly governs an 
activity) ignorancek.
1
  Before his conversion began, this person suffered not only from 
ignorancek but from ignorancee.
2
  By the end of the process, though he continued to suffer from 
ignorancek, he no longer suffered from ignorancee.  That is, though he continued to lack the 
                                                
1
 In this case and in similar cases, whoever suffers from ignorancee necessarily also suffers from ignorancek, since 
in these cases ignorancee is itself a special kind of ignorancek. 
2
 That is, with regard to the activity of living a human life.  With regard to the activities of training horses and 
building ships, he suffered from ignorancek but had already been cured of ignorancee. 
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knowledge that properly governs the activity of living a human life, he had come to fully inhabit 
the epistemic frame of mind with regard to that activity. 
 
 What does such a person have to show for having rid himself of ignorancee?  In what 
sense is he closer than he was before to living a good human life?  On first thought it can seem 
that he is no closer at all, for just as curing oneself of ignorancee with regard to the activity of 
swimming in the sea leaves one no more skilled at swimming than one was before, so curing 
oneself of ignorancee with regard to the activity of living a human life might be thought to leave 
one no more skilled at living than one was before.  Yet there seem to be two senses in which 
such a person is closer to living a good human life.  First, think of a plant that possesses a 
heliotropic instinct, i.e., an instinct to bend and grow towards the light.  While it is true that the 
mere possession of such an instinct does not by itself make the plant more vigorous, and that if 
the plant were trapped in a pitch-dark cellar, even the strongest heliotropic instinct would do it 
no good, nevertheless, if its location does permit it to increase its time in the sun, this instinct is 
the very thing that will cause the plant to get more sun and grow more vigorously.  Similarly, 
while it may be true that being free of ignorancee with regard to the activity of living a human 
life does not by itself make a person more skilled at the details of living, and that if one were 
utterly in the dark about how to live and had no hope of learning, being free of ignorancee would 
do one little good, nevertheless, if a person can make progress towards knowledge of how to 
live, the fact that he is free of ignorancee—and therefore devoted to ‘bending’ and ‘growing’ 
towards knowledge—will be the very thing that causes him to live a better life, i.e., a life that is 
governed by thoughts that come closer to knowledge.    
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 But apart from its worth as a means to acquiring knowledge of how to live, inhabiting the 
epistemic frame of mind with regard to the activity of living a human life seems itself to be 
partly constitutive of what it is to live a good human life.  There seems to be something 
intrinsically good about trusting the guidance of knowledge so deeply that all other rival 
guides—instincts, appetites, social mores, etc.—can be put, as it were, on hold while one freely 
considers whether the promptings of each are or are not in accord with the dictates of knowledge.  
Making such judgments, of course, would be quite a bit easier if one actually possessed the 
knowledge in question; but even a person who merely inhabits the epistemic frame of mind 
without possessing this knowledge is still a free follower of knowledge, if a nearly blind one, and 
not a slave to any other guide.  Perhaps it is this freedom more than anything else that constitutes 
what such a person “has to show” for having rid himself of ignorancee.    
  
 This, then, is the core of my account of akratic behavior, though not the account itself.  
Having distinguished ignorancee from ignorancek, however, I may now present a simple 
formulation of that account:   
 
There are many different kinds of akratic behavior,
1
 and different factors are responsible 
for different kinds, but what is chiefly responsible for typical instances of akratic 
behavior is a kind of ignorancee, i.e., a certain kind of failure to inhabit the epistemic 
frame of mind with regard to the activity of living a human life generally and, in 
particular, with regard to the activity of thinking about what is good.   
 
                                                
1
 E.g., the passionate, helpless kind displayed by Medea in Ovid’s Metamorphoses (VII.17-21: excute virgineo 
conceptas pectore flammas, / si potes, infelix.  si possem, sanior essem; / sed trahit invitam nova vis, aliudque 
cupido, / mens aliud suadet: video meliora proboque, / deteriora sequor!), which is different from the perversely 
willful kind described in Dostoevsky’s Notes from the Underground (“What about all those millions of incidents 
testifying to the fact that men have knowingly, that is in full understanding of their own best interests, put them in 
the background and taken a perilous and uncertain course not because anybody or anything drove them to it, but 
simply because they did not choose to follow the appointed road, as it were, but wilfully and obstinately preferred to 
pursue a perverse and difficult path . . . ?” [Jessie Coulson’s Penguin translation, p. 29]).       
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I describe this kind of ignorancee in greater detail in chapter 2, where (as I have said) I will 
present my account of akratic behavior more fully.  For now, I will simply back up some of the 
claims I have already made, while raising further questions which will have to be answered later.        
 
 I said that according to Socrates, no one ever acts against his knowledge of what is best, 
and that to this extent my account is the same as Socrates’ account.  I also said that unlike the 
account presented by Socrates in the Protagoras, my account of akratic behavior specifies a kind 
of ignorance that is responsible for akratic behavior, as distinguished from other kinds of 
ignorance responsible for other sorts of erring behavior.  I said in addition that while it is unclear 
whether Socrates denied that anyone ever acts against his belief about what is best, my account 
explicitly makes room for a kind of belief-akrasia.  Finally, I said that unlike a similar ‘Socratic’ 
account of akratic behavior presented by Terry Penner, my account makes sense of the fact that 
the historical Socrates, without ever having acquired the knowledge of how to live well, 
evidently made himself immune to the kind of inner resistance that plagues the akratic.  I will 
address each point in order.   
 According to my account of akratic behavior, no one ever acts against his knowledge of 
what is best.  For by ‘knowledge of what is best’ I mean the knowledge of how it would be best 
to continue to live one’s life; and such specific knowledge seems to me to imply a more general 
knowledge, namely the knowledge that properly governs the activity of living of a human life.  
Moreover, just as part of what it is to possess the knowledge that properly governs the activity of 
taking care of human bodies—a physician’s knowledge—is to (fully) inhabit the epistemic frame 
of mind with regard to this activity, so it seems to me that part of what it is to possess the 
knowledge that properly governs the activity of living a human life is to (fully) inhabit the 
14 
 
epistemic frame of mind with regard to this activity.  If so, to know what it would be best for one 
to do (and therefore to possess the knowledge that properly governs the activity of living a 
human life) is already to (fully) inhabit the epistemic frame of mind with regard to the activity of 
living a human life.  But to inhabit this frame of mind with regard to this activity is to believe 
that living a human life is an activity that cannot be engaged in well without the guidance of a 
certain kind of knowledge, to be alarmed at the thought that human lives are being led without 
the help of this knowledge, and to act so as to help people lead their lives in accordance with this 
knowledge—and of course in one’s own life to act in accordance with this knowledge if one 
possesses it.1  So whoever possesses the knowledge that properly governs the activity of living a 
human life will never act against this knowledge.  In other words, no one ever acts against his 
knowledge of what is best.      
 Someone might object that the foregoing argument does not differ substantially from the 
following conditional statement:  “If the phrase ‘knowledge of what is best’ means ‘the kind of 
mental state against which it is impossible to act,’ then no one ever acts against his knowledge of 
what is best.”  It is clear, I hope, that my argument and this statement do differ significantly; but 
where exactly does the difference lie?  Both, after all, employ a definition of ‘knowledge of what 
is best’ according to which it is impossible to act against this knowledge; in both, in other words, 
everything depends upon the definition of this phrase.  Here is where I think the difference lies: 
whereas the conditional statement does not point out a familiar kind of mental state which people 
already recognize as real and are already inclined to call ‘knowledge’, my argument does.  Most 
people already recognize that eye doctors and horse trainers and other such experts possess a 
particular set of cognitive-affective-practical traits that marks them out as the experts they are, 
                                                
1
 Note that whereas workers in other technical fields are sometimes not engaged in their professional activities, no 
living human being is ever not engaged in the activity of living a human life.   
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and most people are already inclined to call such a set of traits a kind of knowledge.  Moreover, 
most people can follow me when I peel away part of this kind of knowledge to reveal the part 
that I am most interested in: inhabiting the epistemic frame of mind.  That is, most people know 
first-hand what it is like in certain contexts to trust nothing but the guidance of an expert’s 
knowledge.  Unlike ‘the kind of mental state against which it is impossible to act’, the epistemic 
frame of mind is not some abstract construct pulled out of thin air, but a humanly possible mode 
of thinking-feeling-acting which many people do in fact inhabit with regard to certain activities.  
In relating this frame of mind to the activity of living a human life I am simply inviting people to 
extend their current ways of thinking about horse trainers, shipbuilders, etc., to human beings in 
general.  In this respect, of course, I am following Socrates.
1
 
 When I said that unlike Socrates I specified a kind of ignorance that is responsible for 
akratic behavior, and that I distinguished it from the kinds of ignorance that are responsible for 
other sorts of erring behavior, I had in mind ignorancee, failure to inhabit the epistemic frame of 
mind with regard to an activity that is properly governed by knowledge, as opposed to 
ignorancek, failure to possess this knowledge.  Ignorancek is responsible for a wide range of 
erring behavior, but in my view it is specifically ignorancee that is chiefly responsible for typical 
cases of akratic behavior.  It might be objected that akratics tend to show remorse, i.e., that they 
tend to say after the fact that they ‘should have’ acted otherwise.  If, as I claim, akratics fail to 
inhabit the epistemic frame of mind with regard to the activity in question and therefore do not 
                                                
1
 Cf. Gorgias 491a [Callicles speaking to Socrates]: “I believe, on my soul, you absolutely cannot ever stop talking 
of cobblers and fullers, cooks and doctors, as though our discussion had to do with them.”  Cf. also Symposium 
221e-222a [Alcibiades speaking of Socrates]: “His talk is of pack-asses, smiths, cobblers, and tanners, and he seems 
always to be using the same terms for the same things; so that anyone inexpert and thoughtless might laugh his 
speeches to scorn.  But when these are opened, and you obtain a fresh view of them by getting inside, first of all you 
will discover that they are the only speeches which have any sense in them; and secondly, that none are so divine, so 
rich in images of virtue, so largely—nay, so completely—intent on all things proper for the study of such as would 
attain both grace and worth (tôi mellonti kalôi kagathôi esesthai).” (W. R. M. Lamb’s translations, Loeb Classical 
Library.)    
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view the knowledge that properly governs the activity as the standard against which their actions 
are to be judged, what standard are they using when they say that they ‘should have’ done 
otherwise, and why do they fail to live up to this standard?  Moreover, people who take 
themselves to be acting not only against their best judgment but against their knowledge of what 
is best would seem to pose an even greater problem for my account.  Do they not inhabit the 
epistemic frame of mind with regard to the activity in question?  If not, why do they claim that 
they ‘knew’ what to do and that they ‘should have’ let themselves be guided by knowledge?  If 
this epistemic ‘ought’ is not arising from the epistemic frame of mind itself, where is it coming 
from?  These are among the questions I will have to answer after more ground has been covered.  
Let me say for now, however, that there is a difference between being an inhabitant of the 
epistemic frame of mind and being a mere sojourner, and that this distinction goes some of the 
way towards answering all of these questions.
1
  
 I said that I make room for a kind of belief-akrasia, i.e., a kind of action against one’s 
belief about what is best, and I said “a kind” because there is another kind that I do not allow.  
According to my account, whoever fully inhabits the epistemic frame of mind with regard to the 
activity of living a human life but fails to possess the knowledge that properly governs this 
activity will try his best to live in accordance with whatever he believes come closest to 
knowledge.  If this turns out to be his father’s advice, he will not act against his father’s advice; 
if it is his ‘divine sign’, he will not act against his divine sign
2
; if it is his own independent 
                                                
1
 Note my repeated use of the phrase ‘(fully) inhabiting the epistemic frame of mind’.    
2 Cf. Crito 46b (Socrates speaking): “[F]or I am not only now but always a man who follows nothing but the 
reasoning which on consideration seems to me best (hôs egô ou monon nun alla kai aei toioutos, hoios tôn emôn 
mêdeni allôi peithesthai ê tôi logôi, hos an moi logizomenôi beltistos phainêtai).”  Cf. also Apology 40a-c: “[A] 
wonderful thing has happened to me.  For hitherto the customary prophetic monitor (hê gar eiôthuia moi mantikê hê 
tou daimoniou) always spoke to me very frequently and opposed me (enantioumenê) even in very small matters, if I 
was going to do anything I should not (ei ti melloimi mê orthôs praxein); but now . . . this thing which might be 
thought, and is generally considered, the greatest of evils (eschata kakôn) has come upon me; but the divine sign (to 
tou theou sêmeion) did not oppose me (emoi . . . ênantiôthê) either when I left my home in the morning, or when I 
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opinion (where this remains unchanged by someone else’s warning or advice), he will not act 
against his opinion.  And of course whoever knows that it would be best for him to do something, 
and therefore also believes that it would be best for him to do it, will not act against this belief of 
his, since (as I have already explained) he will not act against his knowledge.  In short, no one 
who fully inhabits the epistemic frame of mind will ever act against his belief about what is best.  
Yet it is consistent with my account of akratic behavior to allow that someone who fails to 
inhabit this frame of mind with regard to this activity may act against his belief about what is 
best.  Thus according to my account, supposed cases of knowledge-akrasia are really only cases 
of belief-akrasia, if that,
1
 and all cases of belief-akrasia involve beliefs about what is good that 
do not arise or have their home within the epistemic frame of mind.  Roughly speaking, this is 
the kind of belief-akrasia that my account makes room for.
2
 
 Finally, I said that my account of akratic behavior makes sense of the fact that Socrates, 
though he never acquired the knowledge of how to live well, evidently rid himself of the 
distinctive kind of inner resistance that plagues the akratic.  According to my account, a certain 
psychic serenity may be achieved by curing oneself of ignorancee, even as one continues to 
suffer from ignorancek.  Someone who fully inhabits the epistemic frame of mind places his trust 
in the guidance of knowledge—or, failing that, in whichever ‘guide’ he thinks comes closest to 
knowledge—and at least when he believes that he can see where this guidance is pointing him, 
                                                                                                                                                       
came here to the court, or at any point of my speech . . . . What then do I suppose is the reason?  I will tell you.  This 
which has happened to me is doubtless a good thing (agathon), and those of us who think death is an evil (kakon) 
must be mistaken.  A convincing proof of this has been given me (mega moi tekmêrion toutou gegonen); for the 
accustomed sign (to eiôthos sêmeion) would surely not have opposed me (ou . . . esth’ hopôs ouk ênantiôthê an moi) 
if I had not been going to meet with something good (ei mê ti emellon egô agathon praxein).”  (Harold North 
Fowler’s translations, Loeb Classical Library.) 
1
 It may be that someone who takes himself to be acting against his knowledge of what is best is not even acting 
against his belief about what is best, for he may be mistaken about what it is that he really believes.       
2
 Again, more ground will need to be covered before I can be more precise. 
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such epistemic trust makes for a kind of serene self-control.  It seems to me that this was true of 
Socrates.  
 
1.2. The aim and shape of this dissertation 
 The aim of this dissertation is to shed light on Plato’s Protagoras and on akratic 
behavior.  Given this aim, I might have decided to give my thesis either of two shapes: I might 
have written an interpretation of the Protagoras in which I primarily shared my thoughts about 
the text and incidentally shared my thoughts about akratic behavior; or I might have written a 
treatise on the philosophical problem of akrasia in which I primarily shared my thoughts about 
akratic behavior and incidentally shared my thoughts about the Protagoras.  In the former case I 
would mainly have tried to show that my reading of the Protagoras was correct, illuminating, 
worth taking seriously, etc.; in the latter I would mainly have tried to show that my account of 
akratic behavior was true, interesting, worth taking seriously, etc.  But I have decided not to give 
my thesis either of these shapes.  In order to explain what shape I have decided to give it and 
why, I will need to employ a rather odd analogy, whose aptness I hope will excuse its 
eccentricity.   
 Imagine, if you will, a pen, an inkwell, and half of a large bivalve seashell with irregular 
contours on its inner surface.  Person A scrutinizes the inner surface of the shell and points out 
interesting patterns and details, while person B uses the inkwell and pen to make a fairly good 
pen-and-ink drawing (say, of a reclining nude) on a piece of paper.  Person C then uses all three 
items as follows: like person A, he scrutinizes the contours of the shell and notices interesting 
features, and like person B, he makes a pen-and-ink drawing that would be a pretty good work of 
art in its own right if reproduced on a flat piece of paper; but instead of using paper, he makes his 
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drawing on the inner surface of the shell itself, using the contours he sees in the shell to help him 
arrive at a good idea for a drawing, and fitting the lines of his drawing to those contours as best 
he can—thereby engaging in a hybrid activity that combines the activities of persons A and B but 
that also has its own standard of success.  It is true that person C will not succeed at this hybrid 
activity if he does not succeed at its component parts: viz., (a) noticing interesting patterns and 
details on the inner surface of the shell and (b) creating a drawing that could stand tolerably well 
on its own, i.e., on a flat surface.  Still, the success of person C at his chosen activity does not 
depend chiefly on the sum of these parts, but rather on how well he can combine them, that is, on 
how closely and creatively he can fit the lines of his pen-and-ink drawing to the contours of the 
shell.  
 Somewhat analogously, and there are many respects in which the analogy fails, a person 
might scrutinize Plato’s Protagoras and notice interesting patterns and details in it (cf. activity 
(a)), while someone else, without once picking up the Protagoras, might create his own account 
of akratic behavior (cf. activity (b)).  Many philosophers who write on akrasia, of course, do 
engage with the Protagoras to some degree, and many interpreters of the Protagoras think 
seriously for themselves about the philosophical problem of akrasia.  But to combine the two 
activities to some degree is not necessarily to do what I have done.  What I have tried to do is to 
notice interesting features of Plato’s text, to use these features to help me arrive at ideas for an 
account of akratic behavior that is true, interesting, and worth taking seriously in its own right, 
and to try all the while to make this account correspond as closely as possible to the features of 
Plato’s text that I have noticed (cf. person C’s ‘hybrid’ activity).   
 To engage in this activity well is to submit one’s thoughts to a discipline that I believe 
sharpens one’s sense of the text while improving one’s understanding of part of its subject 
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matter, by forcing one to think creatively about the connections between the two and in the 
process think more carefully and sensitively about each one individually.  It is possible, of 
course, to be sloppy about it—to fail to keep criticizing one’s own philosophical thoughts so as 
to bring them closer to the truth, to fail to keep rereading Plato’s text so as to prevent oneself 
from finding things in it that are not there, etc.  Ideally, however, the result of engaging in this 
activity well is a plausible and interesting account of akratic behavior whose most distinctive 
aspect is how closely and creatively its contours fit the contours of Plato’s Protagoras, an 
account, in other words, whose most distinctive aspect only becomes apparent when the account 
is superimposed upon the text.   
 It is because I think that this is the activity in which I have engaged over the past several 
years that I have chosen to argue primarily, not that my account of akratic behavior is true, 
interesting, etc., nor that my reading of the Protagoras is correct, illuminating, etc., but rather 
that materials for the creation of my account are to be found throughout the text.  If in the 
process I fail to show that my thoughts about akratic behavior are plausible, interesting, etc., and 
that my thoughts about the Protagoras are accurate, illuminating, etc., I will have failed to 
achieve my aim, for my aim (as I said at the start of this section) is to shed light on the 
Protagoras and on akratic behavior.  I do believe, however, that in the course of laying out my 
account and tracing the correspondences between it and Plato’s text, I will shed light on both 
these things, even as I also highlight the fact that my account and the Protagoras combine to 
make ‘shell art.’   
 I said that there were many respects in which the shell analogy fails.  One of them is this:  
A shell is a natural object, while the Protagoras is an elaborate human artifact.  It is one thing to 
take a natural object and turn it into a work of art; it is something else to take what is already a 
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finished work of art and presume to superimpose one’s own artwork upon it.  Nevertheless, one 
might imagine a collaborative-minded artist who is very good at creating shell-like objects (say, 
out of porcelain) that are works of art in their own right but that also lend themselves to being 
taken up by someone else who carefully studies their contours, uses them to help him arrive at a 
good idea for a drawing, and tries to fit his drawing to those contours as best he can.  The final 
‘shell art’ would be the result of a kind of artistic collaboration, which could conceivably span 
thousands of years.  Similarly, one might imagine a collaborative-minded philosophical author 
who is very good at creating texts that are philosophical works of art in their own right but that 
also lend themselves to being taken up by someone else who carefully studies their features, uses 
them to help him arrive at good philosophical thoughts of his own, and tries all the while to fit 
his thoughts to those features as best he can, rendering himself more sensitive to the nuances of 
the text while refining his understanding of the subject matter in question.  Whether or not he 
conceived of himself in this way, Plato seems to me to have been such an author.  If the primary 
aim of this dissertation is to shed light on the Protagoras and on akratic behavior, its secondary 
aim is to promote this kind of approach to Plato’s works.   
 
1.3. The structure of the Protagoras 
 I end this introductory chapter by summarizing the section on akrasia (352a-359a) and 
the Protagoras as a whole.  This should help prepare the way for chapter 3, in which I trace the 
connections between my account of akratic behavior and the section on akrasia, and for chapter 
4, in which I argue that ingredients in my account are to be found throughout the Protagoras.   
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1.3.1. The section on akrasia (352a-359a) 
The section on akrasia may be divided into three parts.  In the first part (352a-353b) 
Socrates asks Protagoras whether in his opinion people ever act against their knowledge of what 
is best.  When Protagoras says he thinks this never happens and Socrates agrees, Socrates adds 
that most people do not believe the two of them but say that many people do act against their 
knowledge of what is best and that they do so because they are overcome by pleasure or anger or 
fear or some other emotion.  Socrates persuades Protagoras to help him imagine how the two of 
them would demonstrate to these objectors (‘the many’) what is really responsible for the 
behavior commonly (and, according to Socrates and Protagoras, incorrectly) described as action 
against one’s knowledge of what is best.   
In the second part of the section on akrasia (353c-357e) Socrates and Protagoras imagine 
how this demonstration would go, Socrates taking the lead and doing almost all of the 
argumentative work.  The crucial premise in the demonstration, a premise which the many are 
led to accept, is that the good is the pleasant (it has been much debated by scholars whether 
Socrates himself accepts this premise).1  The conclusion of the demonstration is that by their own 
lights the many must agree that what is responsible for the behavior commonly described as 
action against one’s knowledge is ignorance.2   
In the third part (358a-359a) Socrates questions Protagoras, Prodicus, and Hippias (all 
three at once)
3
 about the pleasant and the good, akratic behavior, and fear, in preparation for the 
                                                
1
 See for instance Donald J. Zeyl’s “Socrates and Hedonism: Protagoras 351b-358d,” Terrence Irwin’s Plato’s 
Ethics, pp. 85-92, Charles Kahn’s Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, pp. 210-257 (esp. p. 240), and Martha 
Nussbaum’s The Fragility of Goodness, pp. 89-121 (esp. pp. 109-110).  I believe, with Zeyl and Kahn, that Socrates 
does not accept this premise. 
2
 As I have said, the exact nature of this ignorance is left unspecified.   
3 It is debatable whether Protagoras is among the group of people giving answers at this point, and in particular, 
whether he himself accepts the version of hedonism agreed to here by Prodicus “and the others” (358b2-3).  I feel 
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final discussion between himself and Protagoras about how courage is related to the rest of 
virtue.  It is only in this third part that action against one’s belief is even mentioned, all previous 
talk about akratic behavior having been about action against one’s knowledge.
1
  
 
1.3.2. The dialogue as a whole 
The Protagoras begins with a short introductory frame in which a nameless Friend 
questions Socrates about his relationship with Alcibiades and about his encounter with 
Protagoras earlier that morning.  The rest of the Protagoras is Socrates’ narration of the earlier 
events of the day.  
Early in the morning, shortly before dawn, Socrates’ young friend Hippocrates knocks on 
his door and begs him to accompany him to Callias’s house to help persuade Protagoras (who is 
staying with Callias during a visit to Athens) to teach Hippocrates.  Socrates asks Hippocrates 
who he takes Protagoras to be that he is so eager to study with him.  Hippocrates is led to see that 
he does not know what kind of teacher Protagoras is and that in rushing to study with him he is 
staking his soul in a risky gamble.  Light having dawned, Socrates and Hippocrates proceed to 
Callias’s house.    
Once inside, Socrates and Hippocrates approach Protagoras, and after others have been 
gathered together to hear the exchange, including the sophists Hippias and Prodicus, Socrates 
                                                                                                                                                       
the pull of both sides of this question, and I do not believe that a burden of proof lies on one side or on the other.  
Nevertheless, I am strongly inclined to believe, together with Adam and Adam and numerous other interpreters, that 
Protagoras is agreeing here with Prodicus and Hippias. (Cf. Adam and Adam, p. 188: “Throughout this chapter all 
the Sophists reply.”)    
1
 The words used for ‘believe’ in this section are oiesthai (358b7, c7, d1) and hêgeisthai (twice at 358e5, recalled at 
359d2, d5).  Doxa (‘opinion’) occurs at 358c4, while prosdokia (‘expectation’) is used at 358d2.  The explicit 
distinction drawn in the Meno (96eff.) between doxa alêthês or orthê doxa (‘true opinion’, ‘correct opinion’) and 
epistêmê (‘knowledge’) is not drawn in the Protagoras.  C. C. W. Taylor suggests in his commentary (pp. 202-3) 
that at the time of writing the Protagoras Plato may have “not yet arrived at a clear distinction between true belief 
and knowledge.” 
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asks Protagoras what Hippocrates can expect to receive from becoming Protagoras’s pupil.  
Protagoras claims, after some prodding by Socrates, that he teaches the art that makes men good 
citizens.
1
  Socrates cites evidence suggesting that this kind of goodness or virtue cannot be 
taught, and he challenges Protagoras to show that it can.  Protagoras meets the challenge in a 
brilliant speech.
2
  Genuinely impressed, Socrates praises Protagoras and says that he is now 
convinced that virtue is teachable—except for one small point, “which Protagoras will of course 
easily explain away . . . .”
3
   
Socrates’ one small point unfolds into a long discussion between him and Protagoras 
about the relation between the parts of virtue and the whole of virtue.  The discussion begins 
with an examination of the relations between justice and piety, temperance and wisdom, and 
temperance and justice, but the question of the relation between courage and the rest of virtue—
in particular, between courage and wisdom—comes to dominate the inquiry.  At a turning point 
in the discussion, Protagoras claims that some people are most unjust, most impious, most 
immoderate, most unwise, and yet eminently courageous.  Socrates then tries to make Protagoras 
admit that this is impossible.  He makes two distinct attempts to lead Protagoras to agree that 
courage is wisdom.  The first is a somewhat embarrassing failure, though not a wasted effort; 
Socrates prepares the ground for his second attempt by questioning Protagoras about two things: 
the relation between the good and the pleasant, and whether a person ever acts against his 
knowledge of what is best.  This is the beginning of the section on akrasia.   
                                                
1
 The ‘civic’ or ‘political’ art: hê politikê technê (319a).      
2
 Sometimes called the ‘Great Speech’ in secondary literature. 
3
 328e.  Paul Friedländer, commenting on a similar passage in the Charmides (154de), writes: “When Socrates 
misses a ‘small point,’ it is always the decisive thing.” (Friedländer, Paul, Plato: An Introduction, p. 47.)    
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By the end of the section on akrasia, Socrates has secured agreement from Prodicus, 
Hippias, and (in my opinion) Protagoras
1
 that the pleasant is the good and that no one ever acts 
against his belief about what is best.  Armed with these two premises, Socrates leads Protagoras 
to the conclusion that courage is wisdom.  Protagoras is forced to admit that, from what has been 
agreed, it seems to him that what he claimed earlier, namely, that some people are most unwise 
and yet very courageous, is impossible.  An awkward tension is relieved, some gracious final 
remarks are made, and Socrates leaves.  Thus the Protagoras begins with a conversation between 
Socrates and a friend, slips into Socrates’ narration of the earlier events of the day, and ends at 
the point in this narration where Socrates leaves Callias’s house, soon to run into said friend. 
 
I have purposely omitted two important complications, in part because they interrupt the 
flow of the dialogue’s main discussion, in part because I think they are very important and ought 
to be saved for last.  The first is that in the middle of the dialogue, just about exactly halfway 
through the text, the main discussion nearly falls apart.
2
  Protagoras and Socrates cannot agree on 
a set of dialectical ground rules, and Socrates decides that he will leave.  Only through the efforts 
of several members of the audience, including Alcibiades, Prodicus, and Hippias, is the 
discussion revived.  The second complication is that when the discussion resumes, it does not 
pick up where it left off.  The roles of questioner and answerer are reversed—Protagoras, who 
had been being questioned by Socrates, now asks Socrates questions—and the topic of 
conversation shifts from the relation between the parts of virtue and the whole of virtue to the 
compositional merits of a poem by Simonides, a poem which concerns the imperfection of 
human goodness.  After the poet has been dubiously defended and interpreted by Socrates, with 
                                                
1
 See above, p. 22, n. 3.  
2
 334-335.  This ‘breakdown’ interrupts the examination of the relation between temperance and justice. 
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help from Prodicus, the dialectical roles are again reversed and the discussion about the relation 
between the parts of virtue and the whole of virtue is resumed.   
George Grote called the Protagoras “one of the most finished and elaborate of all the 
dialogues: in complication of scenic arrangement, dramatic vivacity, and in the amount of theory 
worked out, it is surpassed by none—hardly even by the Republic.  Its merits as a composition 
are indeed extolled by all the critics . . . .”
1
  A. E. Taylor wrote: “If there is any Platonic dialogue 
which can challenge the claim of the Symposium to be its author’s dramatic chef d’œuvre it is the 
Protagoras . . . .”2  When in the Protagoras Socrates says of Simonides’ poem, “[I]t is a work of 
very elegant and elaborate art; but it would take too long to detail all its beauties,”
3
 one is 
tempted to apply these words to the work in which they occur. 
 
                                                
1
 One such critic, according to Grote, had this to say: “Als aesthetisches Kunstwerk ist der Dialog Protagoras das 
meisterhafteste unter den Werken Platons.” (Grote, George, Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, vol. I, p. 
198.  The critic cited is Joseph Socher.)  
2
 Taylor, A. E., Plato: The Man and His Work, p. 235. 
3
 344b.   
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2. A FULLER PRESENTATION OF MY ACCOUNT 
 
 In chapter 1 I presented the core idea of my account of akratic behavior: inhabiting the 
epistemic frame of mind.  In this chapter I introduce two other frames of mind (the ‘animal’ and 
‘manly’), describe the epistemic frame of mind more fully, specify what kind of ignorancee I 
think is chiefly responsible for typical cases of akratic behavior,
1
 and render my account more 
intelligible by presenting a framework made up of conceptual genera to which the parts of my 
account belong as species.
2
  In chapters 3 and 4 I will go on to argue that ingredients in my 
account are to be found throughout the Protagoras.  The present chapter has two main parts.  In 
Part One I present the abovementioned framework.  In Part Two I present my account of akratic 
behavior more fully.    
 
2.1. Part One: Conceptual framework 
 
2.1.1. Performances 
The first piece of the framework is the idea of a performance.3  By this I mean a kind of 
human activity that is to some degree observable, that can be judged to have been done better or 
worse, that tends when done well to inspire others to emulate the performer, and whose good 
execution typically requires some sort of training.  Paradigmatic examples are athletic, musical, 
and dramatic performances at which crowds of people gather who witness and evaluate the 
performances.  Another example is the ‘performance’ of a human being living his or her entire 
                                                
1
 By ignorancee I mean failure to inhabit the epistemic frame of mind with regard to an activity that is properly 
governed by knowledge; by ‘akratic behavior’ I mean that kind of erring behavior which is commonly described as 
acting against one’s knowledge or belief about what is best, whether or not such descriptions are correct.  See 
chapter 1, pp. 10-11 and 1-2, respectively.   
2
 This framework also serves to help the reader understand how certain key concepts (e.g., aretê, the teachability of 
aretê) are used in the Protagoras. 
3
 This is the English word that I think comes closest to the idea that I want to pick out; it is not a perfect fit.   
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life.  While this is not as obvious an example, it is a human activity (if you allow the word 
‘activity’ to be stretched this far) that can to some extent be observed by other people, that can be 
judged to have been done better or worse, that tends when done well to inspire imitation, and 
whose good execution does seem to require some sort of training (e.g., learning a human 
language).  
 Witnesses to a footrace may agree that one runner ran best; theater critics may disagree 
over whether this or that actor’s performance was better.  But in addition to asking “How good 
was this particular performance which I have just witnessed?”, one may also ask with respect to 
each kind of performance: “What counts as a good performance of this kind?”
1
   There may be a 
dispute as to who crossed the finish line first, though all may agree that to cross this line first is 
to do well in a footrace.  As for the example of a human ‘life-performance’, it is possible to 
disagree over whether some person has lived a good life (“Has Socrates lived well?” the jury 
asked itself) as well as over what counts as a good life-performance (“What is it to live well?” 
asked Socrates).  
 One way in which a person may decide to judge a certain kind of performance is by 
singling out the one thing that in his opinion makes or breaks a performance of that kind.2  This 
method of judging is clearly not always appropriate; sometimes there is no single thing on the 
basis of which a performance of some kind is to be judged good or bad (or better or worse) 
overall.  And even when there is, one may need to split the general question into a cluster of 
questions: “What is the one aspect of this kind of performance that matters most?”; “What is the 
one aspect of this kind of performance that must be good if the whole performance is to be 
good?”; “What is the one aspect of this kind of performance whose goodness ensures the 
                                                
1
 Indeed, one typically needs at least a rough answer to the second question before one can answer the first. 
2
 E.g., how much it makes people laugh may be said to make or break a comic performance.   
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goodness of the performance?”; “What is the one aspect of this kind of performance that 
distinguishes it as the kind of performance it is?”, etc.    
 
 In addition to receiving praise from critics, great performances also inspire the next 
generation of performers.  A young fan at a sporting event may think to himself: “So-and-so is 
great; I want to be like So-and-so.”  He will be curious to know what it takes to be able to play 
like this athlete, exactly what skills he will need to acquire and how best to acquire them.  Many 
young men in 5
th
-century Athens presumably thought to themselves: “Pericles is a great man; I 
want to be like Pericles.”  Such young men would naturally have been eager to learn what it took 
to speak the way Pericles spoke and to act as Pericles acted, or more generally, what it takes to 
live the way ‘good people’ live and to be as ‘good people’ are—whether this is mainly a matter 
of natural gifts, the result of painstaking practice, a kind of knowledge transmitted by teaching, 
or something else.
1
     
 One way in which master performers describe to performers-in-training what it takes to 
bring off a good performance is by singling out the one thing that in their opinion is the key to 
performing well.  A violinist giving a master class may name the one thing that in her opinion is 
the key to playing the violin well; less generous performers may jealously guard such 
information.  But there is usually no single secret to a performer’s success, and even when there 
is, one needs to separate several related questions: “What is the one ingredient most directly 
responsible for a good performance of this kind?”; “What is the one ingredient that must go into 
a performance of this kind if the whole performance is to be successful?”; “What is the one 
                                                
1
 Cf. the opening lines of Myles Burnyeat’s essay “Aristotle on Learning to Be Good”: “The question ‘Can virtue be 
taught?’ is perhaps the oldest question in moral philosophy.  Recall the opening lines of Plato’s Meno (70a): ‘Can you 
tell me, Socrates—can virtue be taught, or is it rather to be acquired by practice?  Or is it neither to be practiced nor 
to be learned but something that comes to men by nature or in some other way?’  This is a simple version of what was 
evidently a well-worn topic of discussion.” 
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ingredient whose inclusion ensures a good performance?”; “What is the ingredient most often 
omitted by mediocre performers?”, etc.   
 
The ‘one thing’ which an experienced critic might name as the mark of a good 
performance is not to be confused with the ‘one thing’ which an experienced performer, when 
speaking to his students or apprentices, might identify as the key to performing well.  A young 
child at a baseball game who knows almost nothing about baseball may hear his older brothers 
referring to certain pitchers as good pitchers.  The child does not yet understand the role that 
pitchers play in the game and so does not yet know the criteria by which pitchers are to be 
judged good or bad.  He may therefore ask his brothers: “What makes a pitcher a good pitcher?”  
And his brothers may answer: “Getting batters out.”  Here an ignorant spectator asks a question 
with a view to becoming a better judge of a certain kind of performance, and experienced critics 
identify the one thing that in their opinion is the mark of a good performance of that kind.  
Consider now a mediocre minor-league pitcher who knows that something separates good 
pitchers from pitchers like him, though he does not know what that ‘something’ is.  Using the 
very same words as the child, he may ask a veteran pitching coach: “What makes a pitcher a 
good pitcher?”  But here a different question is being asked, and the answer will differ 
accordingly: “If I had to pick one thing,” the coach may reply, “I’d say strong legs.”  Whereas in 
the earlier case an ignorant spectator asked a question with a view to becoming a better judge of 
a certain kind of performance and was told what the mark of a good performance was, in this 
case a performer asked a question with a view to becoming a better performer of a certain kind, 
and an experienced performer named the one thing that in his opinion is the key to bringing off a 
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good performance of that kind.
1
  Applying this distinction to the case of living a human life 
yields the following pair of questions: (1) “What, if anything, is the single criterion to which 
judges of human lives must look in order to judge of their goodness?”; (2) “What, if anything, is 
the key ingredient the presence or possession of which effectively enables a person to lead a 
good life?”  
These two questions seem to me to encapsulate fairly well the basic ancient Greek 
concept of human virtue or goodness (aretê).  While reading a Platonic dialogue it is often worth 
asking oneself whether the characters in that dialogue, when they speak of the aretê of a human 
being, have question (1) or (2) in mind.  In the Euthyphro, for example, Socrates speaks in the 
following way about piety (or rather, at this point in the dialogue, the idea of ‘the pious’ or ‘the 
holy’ [to hosion]):  
 
Tell me then what this aspect (tên idean) is, that I may keep my eye fixed upon it and employ it as a 
model (hina eis ekeinên apoblepôn kai chrômenos autêi paradeigmati) and, if anything you or anyone 
else does agrees with it, may say that the act is holy, and if not, that it is unholy.
2
   
 
Here it seems that of the two questions distinguished above, question (1) is much closer than 
question (2) to what Socrates has in mind.
3
  At 190ab in the Laches, by contrast, Socrates speaks 
about virtue as follows:  
 
[I]f we happen to know of such and such a thing that by being joined to another thing it makes this 
thing better (hoti paragenomenon tôi beltion poiei ekeino hôi paregeneto), and further, if we are 
able to get the one joined to the other, we obviously know the thing itself on which we might be 
                                                
1
 In distinguishing between the child’s question and the minor leaguer’s question I do not mean to imply that one can 
know the answer to one while being wholly ignorant of the answer to the other.  When it comes to most kinds of 
performances, a good performer will also be a good judge of that kind of performance (though the best performer 
will not necessarily be the best judge).  Likewise, when it comes to certain kinds of performances (e.g., translating 
Greek into English), one needs to be a fairly good performer in order to be a good judge. 
2
 Euthyphro 6e (Harold North Fowler’s translation, Loeb Classical Library).  
3
 Though here, of course, Socrates is focusing on piety in particular, not virtue as a whole.   
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consulting as to how it might be best and most easily acquired. . . . If we happen to know that sight 
joined to eyes makes those eyes the better for it (hoti opsis paragenomenê ophthalmois beltious 
poiei ekeinous hois paregeneto), and further if we are able to get it joined to eyes (poiein autên 
paragignesthai ommasi), we obviously know what this faculty of sight is, on which we might be 
consulting as to how it might be best and most easily acquired. . . . And do you know, Laches, that 
at this moment our two friends are inviting us to a consultation as to the way in which virtue may 
be joined to their sons’ souls (tin’ an tropon tois huiesin autôn aretê paragenomenê tais psuchais), 
and so make them better (ameinous poiêseien)? —Yes, indeed.  —Then our first requisite is to 
know what virtue is (ho ti pot’ estin aretê)?1  
 
In this passage, though it is not the goodness of human lives but the goodness of people 
themselves that is being emphasized, it seems that question (2) is closer than question (1) to what 
Socrates has in mind.  I do, however, think that Socrates also has something like question (1) in 
mind here, or at least in the surrounding context, and that in general, when characters in Plato’s 
‘early’ dialogues attempt to answer questions such as “What is courage?” or “What is virtue?”, 
they are thinking along the lines of questions (1) and (2) simultaneously, perhaps without 
distinguishing the two.
2
 
 
Two questions that are explicitly distinguished by characters in Plato’s dialogues are 
“What is human virtue?” and “How is human virtue acquired?”
3
  This distinction is drawn in the 
Laches passage cited above:  
 
                                                
1
 Laches 190ab (W. R. M. Lamb’s translation, Loeb Classical Library). 
2
 Here I owe a heavy debt to Terry Penner’s essay “The Unity of Virtue,” Philosophical Review, 1973.  It is worth 
observing further (here I owe a separate debt to James Allen) that Plato’s own metaphysical theorizing raises the 
possibility that the answers to my two “What is F?” questions could ultimately be the same.  Cf. Phaedo 100c-e 
[Socrates speaking]: “I no longer understand or recognize those other sophisticated causes, and if someone tells me 
that a thing is beautiful because it has a bright colour or shape or any such thing, I ignore these other reasons—for 
all these confuse me—but I simply, naively and perhaps foolishly cling to this, that nothing else makes it beautiful 
other than the presence of, or the sharing in, or however you may describe its relationship to that Beautiful we 
mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by 
the Beautiful.  That, I think, is the safest answer I can give . . . .” (G. M. A. Grube’s translation.)     
3
 Or, “What is courage?” and “How is courage acquired?”, etc. 
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“Then our first requisite is to know what virtue is?  For surely, if we had no idea at all what virtue 
actually is (aretên . . . to parapan ho ti pote tungchanei on), we could not possibly consult with 
anyone as to how he might best acquire it (hopôs an auto kallista ktêsaito)?”1   
 
It is also drawn at the start of the Meno, where after Meno asks whether virtue is acquired by 
teaching, by practice, or in some other way, Socrates replies that he is so far from knowing how 
virtue is acquired, he does not even know what virtue is [here Socrates speaks in the voice of a 
fellow Athenian]:  
 
“Stranger, you must think me a specially favoured mortal, to be able to tell whether virtue can be 
taught, or in what way it comes to one (eite didakton eith’ hotôi tropôi paragignetai . . .): so far am I 
from knowing whether it can be taught or not, that I actually do not even know what the thing itself, 
virtue, is at all (auto, ho ti esti to parapan aretê . . .).”2 
 
And of course this distinction is drawn in the Protagoras itself, where the questions “Is virtue 
teachable?” and “What is the nature of virtue?” are pursued consecutively.
3
  For the sake of 
clarity, we might distinguish these three questions: (1) “What is the one criterion by reference to 
which human behavior is to be judged good?”; (2) “What is the key ingredient responsible for 
the production of good human behavior?”; (3) “How is this ingredient acquired?”  To the first 
two corresponds the question “What is virtue (aretê)?”  To the third corresponds the question “Is 
virtue a teachable thing (didakton)?” 
  
2.1.2. Approaches 
 The next piece of the framework is the idea of an approach.  By this I mean a way or 
mode of engaging in an activity.  Paradigmatic examples are the different ways of moving from 
                                                
1
 190bc.   
2
 Meno 71a (W. R. M. Lamb’s translation, Loeb Classical Library).  Cf. Meno 86de: “Had I control over you, Meno, 
as over myself, we should not have begun considering whether virtue can be taught (eite didakton eite ou didakton 
hê aretê) until we had first inquired into the main question of what it is (ho ti esti . . . auto).  But . . . I will yield to 
your request—what else am I to do?  So it seems we are to consider what sort of thing it is (poion ti estin) of which 
we do not yet know what it is (ho ti estin)!”      
3
 See 329b-d; 360e-361a; 361c.   
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place to place: by walking, by running, by swimming; the breaststroke approach, the backstroke 
approach, the crawl approach, etc.  A performer may try to improve his performance either by 
switching to a more effective approach or by doing a better job within his current approach (e.g., 
a person who is using the ‘walking’ approach to get from A to B may try to improve his 
performance either by walking faster or by starting to run).  Not all approaches are as easy to 
detect as running or walking.  Some professional storytellers use the ‘memorization’ approach to 
telling a story, others use the ‘improvisation’ approach, but the average child will probably not 
spot the difference.  Indeed, certain approaches depend for their success on eluding detection, 
e.g., the ‘sleight-of-hand’ approach to performing a magic trick.  
 An approach may be nothing more than a default mode, i.e., a way of behaving that one 
automatically falls back on in lieu of a self-consciously adopted approach.  A person who reverts 
to a default mode may not be aware of the mode as such, or of the possibility of other modes.  
The sloppiest, most unreflective approaches tend to be default modes (though by no means are 
all default modes devoid of careful thinking).  Such sloppy ‘approaches’ lie at one end of the 
spectrum, on the other end of which lie self-consciously adopted, systematic, orderly approaches 
commonly called ‘methods’.  Of these the most systematic, most self-consciously adopted, and 
most reliably successful might be called technical methods, roughly what the ancient Greeks 
called technai.    
 To the many young men who wished to rise to the top of Greek society and live 
successful lives, different ‘wise men’ seemed to provide different technical means to this end.  
Hippias of Elis offered one approach, Protagoras of Abdera another, and these two ‘wise  
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men’ or sophists attracted and competed for adherents.
1
  Socrates also attracted adherents, both 
foreign and Athenian,
2
 and though he did not profess to know about the most important matters 
and emphatically denied that he was a ‘wise man,’ he seemed to certain people to have mastered 
a peculiar philosophical approach to life superior to any sophist’s approach.  
 Drawing on our previous distinctions, we might distinguish the questions “What is a 
successful life?” (i.e., “What are the criteria by reference to which a human life is to be judged 
successful?”) and “How, practically speaking, does one manage to live such a life?”  In the story 
‘The Three Little Pigs’ each pig decides to build a house.  We might distinguish the questions 
“What is a suitable house?” and “How does one manage to build such a house?”  Each pig 
answers the second question differently.  Each, in other words, adopts a different approach—the 
‘straw’ approach, the ‘stick’ approach, the ‘brick’ approach—to the same activity, building a 
suitable house.  But how do they answer the first question?  Do they all agree from the start that 
a suitable house is a house that keeps out wolves?  If so, the first two simply choose the wrong 
means to their end.  But if the first two pigs do not start out thinking that a suitable house is a 
house that keeps out wolves, their primary problem is not an inadequate approach but an 
inadequate conception of the goal of their activity.  Perhaps one lesson to be learned from the 
story is that people often go wrong in failing to criticize and improve their own conceptions of 
the goals of their activities.  The 5
th
-century sophists and Socrates adopted different approaches 
to the activity of living a human life.  Unlike such men as Hippias and Protagoras, however, 
Socrates never thought that he knew what a good or successful human life was.  If Socrates’ 
adherents were right and he had really found a path to successful living that surpassed all the 
sophists’ approaches, this may have been because of his continual efforts to correct his own and 
                                                
1
 Cf. Protagoras 318de, where Protagoras compares his own approach favorably with that of people like Hippias.   
2
 Cf. Phaedo 59bc, Theaetetus 150b-151b.   
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others’ conceptions of what it is to live well.  Of course, these very efforts were themselves a 
central part of his approach to living.       
 
2.1.3. Hybridization 
 Different approaches may be combined in a hybrid approach.  A pitcher may adopt a 
hybrid approach to throwing a baseball in which different approaches—the fastball approach, the 
curveball approach, the slider approach—are adopted from pitch to pitch.  Certain kinds of 
approaches can be put into each other’s service.  Consider a person who adopts the ‘checklist’ 
approach to grocery shopping, the ‘improvisation’ approach to playing the flute, and the 
‘imitation’ approach to spending a day: that is, someone who makes a list of the various things 
he wants to do while at the grocery store and, as he does each one, checks that item off; who has 
little idea what he will play when he picks up his flute, making up the music as he goes along; 
and who models the way he spends his day after somebody else’s way of spending a day.  If 
grocery shopping and playing the flute are part of how this person spends his day, then in this 
case, the checklist approach and the improvisation approach are being put into the service of the 
imitation approach (when the person sees his role model shopping for groceries with a shopping 
list, he, too, adopts this approach to grocery shopping; when he hears his role model improvising 
on the flute, he, too, plays the flute in this way).  But another person might adopt the 
improvisation approach to grocery shopping (buying whatever seems good to him at the time, 
without having planned what to buy), the imitation approach to playing the flute (imitating the 
style of some other flutist), and the checklist approach to spending his day (composing a list of 
the various things he wants to get done in the course of the day, and as he does each one, 
checking that item off).  A third person may adopt the improvisation approach to spending his 
day, making up the order of his activities as the day unfolds, even as he also adopts the checklist 
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and imitation approaches to certain individual activities during the day.  Thus a hybrid approach 
combining these three approaches may have any one of them as its chief or ‘ruling’ approach.
1
  
 A hybrid approach that is more organized than a totally chaotic jumble of approaches but 
not so organized as to exhibit clear lines of authority between component approaches or to have a 
single ‘ruling’ approach into whose service the other approaches are put, may be called a ‘semi-
organized hodgepodge’ approach.  A person who adopts such a hybrid approach to the activity of 
living a human life may be said to adopt a ‘semi-organized hodgepodge’ approach to life.    
 
2.1.4. Resistance 
 The last piece of the framework is the idea of resistance.  By this I mean any kind of 
hindering force that makes it hard for a performer to move smoothly or easily towards his goal.  
Often a performer does not know where it is coming from or how it is arising; he only knows 
that something is impeding him.  When he encounters resistance, a performer has at least three 
options.  He can (1) give up; (2) continue using his current approach; (3) ask himself whether the 
resistance might be due not to the nature of the work itself but to his approach to the work.  A 
person who is trying to loosen a nut on the wheel of a car but accidentally twisting the nut in the 
wrong direction would do best to reconsider his approach.  If option (3) does not occur to this 
person, and he either persists in his current approach or gives up, he may be said to suffer from a 
distinctive kind of ignorance: the ignorance of a person who fails to realize that the resistance he 
is encountering is due to his own wrongheaded approach.
2
 
                                                
1
 Cf. the idea, developed in Plato’s Republic, that depending on an individual’s inner ‘constitution’ (aristocratic, 
timocratic, oligarchic, etc.), any one of the three parts of his soul (appetitive, spirited, rational) may be put in charge 
of the government of his whole person (see, e.g., 550b, 553cd).     
2
 Cf. William James’s illustration of the essential difference between the mechanical and the mental: “Blow bubbles 
through a tube into the bottom of a pail of water, they will rise to the surface and mingle with the air.  Their action 
may . . . be poetically interpreted as due to a longing to recombine with the mother-atmosphere above the surface.  
But if you invert a jar full of water over the pail, they will rise and remain lodged beneath its bottom, shut in from 
the outer air, although a slight deflection from their course at the outset, or a re-descent towards the rim of the jar 
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2.2. Part Two: My account 
 
2.2.1. General remarks  
 An episode of akratic behavior, however else one is to describe it, is an episode in a 
larger performance: the living of a human life.  Of the many ways in which a person may fall 
short of living a good human life, one distinctive way is to live an ‘akratic life’, i.e., a life shot 
through with akratic behavior.  If to live a good human life is to bring off a good performance of 
a certain kind, to live an akratic life is to fail in a distinctive way to bring off a good performance 
of that kind.  People who agree that there is such a thing as living a good human life, or, in some 
episode within one’s life, behaving well, may disagree over what it is, exactly, to live or behave 
in this way.  Similarly, people who agree that there is a distinctive way of falling short of living a 
good human life (‘living an akratic life’), or, in some episode within one’s life, of falling short of 
behaving well (‘behaving akratically’), a way of falling short which is commonly described as 
acting against one’s knowledge of what is best—people who agree on this may disagree over 
what it is, exactly, to live or behave in this way.  Some may think that the common descriptions 
of akratic behavior are correct, i.e., that people who engage in it really are acting against their 
knowledge of what is best or against their best judgment, whereas others may believe that these 
descriptions are inaccurate.  Those who disagree over what it is for a human being to behave well 
are likely also to disagree over what is responsible for the production of good human behavior.  
                                                                                                                                                       
when they found their upward course impeded, would easily have set them free. . . .  Suppose a living frog in the 
position in which we placed our bubbles of air, namely, at the bottom of a [pail] of water.  The want of breath will 
soon make him also long to rejoin the mother-atmosphere, and he will take the shortest path to his end by swimming 
straight upwards.  But if a jar full of water be inverted over him, he will not, like the bubbles, perpetually press his 
nose against its unyielding roof, but will restlessly explore the neighborhood until by re-descending again he has 
discovered a path round its brim to the goal of his desires.” (William James, The Principles of Psychology, Harvard 
University Press, 1983 (1890), p. 20.)  Cf. the image used by Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations §309: 
“What is your aim in philosophy?—To shew the fly the way out of the fly bottle.” (G. E. M. Anscombe’s 
translation.) 
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Similarly, those who disagree over what it is to behave akratically are likely also to disagree over 
what gives rise to akratic behavior.  Some may say that what makes people act akratically is that 
they are overcome by an emotion such as anger or fear, whereas others may say that what makes 
people act akratically is a kind of ignorance.  As the range of what may properly be classified as 
akratic behavior is wide and varied, so the range of causal factors responsible for the production 
of akratic behavior is wide and varied.  Nevertheless, a person might attempt to single out the 
‘one thing’ that is chiefly responsible for typical instances of akratic behavior.  What follows is 
such an attempt.        
 
2.2.2. Frames of mind  
 
 I said in chapter 1 that the core idea of my account of akratic behavior was the concept of 
the epistemic frame of mind, and I briefly explained what I meant by that.  In order to present my 
account more fully, I need to explain what I mean by a frame of mind in general, to introduce 
two other frames of mind, and to describe the epistemic frame of mind in greater detail.  
 
 By ‘frame of mind’ I mean a mode of thinking-feeling-acting.  To inhabit a frame of 
mind with regard to some activity is to think, feel, and act in a characteristic mode with regard to 
that activity.  A frame of mind is thus an approach—i.e., a way of engaging in an activity—that 
involves a person’s thoughts and feelings and actions.  Within a given mode of thinking-feeling-
acting, i.e., within a given frame of mind, certain ways of thinking, feeling, and acting will be 
part of the repertoire, others will not; certain patterns of thinking, feeling, and acting will be 
common, others rare.  Ways or patterns of thinking, feeling, and acting that are common in one 
frame of mind will be rare in another, while in a third they may be unthinkable, beyond the pale, 
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etc.  Normally, a frame of mind has its own internal logic or inner cohesiveness that tends to 
‘detain’ its occupants and resist their efforts to leave, at least when it comes to those particular 
activities with regard to which they have grown accustomed to moving within that particular 
frame of mind.
1
  But it is almost always possible to lift oneself out of a frame of mind (with 
regard to some activity) or to be lifted out by someone else, sometimes quickly, sometimes only 
over a number of years.
2
  It is worth distinguishing degrees to which a person inhabits a frame of 
mind; someone who to some extent thinks, feels, and acts in a characteristic mode with regard to 
some activity is a person who to that extent inhabits a particular frame of mind with regard to 
that activity.   
 Some frames of mind, in addition to being inhabitable with regard to specific activities 
within a human life and with regard to the activity of living a human life, may also be put into 
each other’s service, three examples being what I call the ‘animal’, ‘manly’, and ‘epistemic’ 
frames of mind.
3
  These three modes correspond fairly closely to the three parts or ‘forms’ of the 
soul distinguished by Plato in the Republic4: to epithumêtikon (the ‘appetitive’), to thumoeides 
(the ‘spirited’), and to logistikon (the ‘rational’).  A person who mainly inhabits the animal frame 
of mind with regard to the activity of living a human life corresponds fairly well to a person who 
in Plato’s parlance is ‘ruled’ by the appetitive part of his soul; a person who mainly inhabits the 
manly frame of mind (with regard to the activity of living a human life) corresponds fairly well 
                                                
1
 Someone, for example, may have grown so accustomed to occupying a ‘competitive’ frame of mind with regard to 
the activity of playing some game that whenever he plays the game, even in a context where he thinks it 
inappropriate to act and feel and think competitively, he finds it hard to keep himself from falling into this frame of 
mind.  
2
 Cf. the process of conversion undergone by the boy described in chapter 1, pp. 9-10. 
3
 Each is better thought of as an extended family of modes, but for simplicity’s sake I will speak of each one as if it 
were a single rigid mode. 
4
 435e: “Is it not, then, . . . impossible for us to avoid admitting this much, that the same forms and qualities (eidê te 
kai êthê) are to be found in each one of us that are in the state?”  439e: “These two forms (eidê), then, let us assume 
as actually existing in the soul.  But now the Thumos or principle of high spirit, that with which we feel anger, is it a 
third, or would it be identical in nature with one of these?”  442bc: “Brave, too, then, I take it, we call each 
individual by virtue of this part (toutôi tôi merei) in him . . . .”  442c: “But wise by that small part (tôi smikrôi merei) 
that ruled in him and handed down these commands . . . .”  (Paul Shorey’s translation, Loeb Classical Library.) 
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to a person who is ruled by the spirited part of his soul, etc.  There are, however, certain 
differences.  Whereas Plato sometimes speaks of parts of the soul as little agents, I make no use 
of ‘homunculus’ talk; on my account there is always only the same whole human being 
inhabiting different frames of mind with regard to different activities.  Second, whereas in 
Plato’s scheme all human beings possess an appetitive part, a spirited part, and a rational part in 
roughly the same proportions (i.e., in every human being the appetitive part is the largest and the 
rational part the smallest, whatever exactly that means), and there seems to be a single relevant 
sense in which one part may be said to be the ‘ruling’ part, in my scheme different people inhabit 
the animal, manly and epistemic frames of mind to very different degrees with regard to different 
activities, and there are as many different senses in which one frame of mind may be said to be 
the ‘ruling’ frame of mind in a given person as there are different activities in which that person 
engages.  For example, when it comes to the activity of building ships, a person’s ‘ruling’ mode 
of thinking-feeling-acting may be the epistemic frame of mind, but when it comes to the activity 
of fighting at sea, his ‘ruling’ mode may be the manly frame of mind.
1
  Third, whereas Plato 
sometimes speaks as if the appetitive, spirited, and rational parts of the human soul were the only 
parts there were, or at any rate the most important,
2
 and that human beings fall into three natural 
classes corresponding to this division, I do not wish to suggest that my three frames of mind have 
some privileged status, that they are, for instance, the three primary modes from which all other 
modes of thinking-feeling-acting are derived, let alone that every person possesses either an 
‘animal’, ‘manly’, or ‘epistemic’ nature and that a natural human hierarchy is founded on this 
                                                
1
 There is, however, a privileged sense in which the frame of mind that a person mainly inhabits with regard to the 
activity of living a human life may be said to his ‘ruling’ frame of mind.    
2
 It should not be forgotten that in certain passages in the Republic (e.g., 435d, 443de [. . . kai ei alla atta metaxu 
tungchanei onta . . .], 612a) Plato represents his tripartite scheme as a convenient simplification of the whole truth 
about the human soul. 
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basis.  I do think that inhabiting each of these three frames of mind is an important part of what it 
is to be human, but that is the most I will claim for them in this respect.    
 
 I will not cite passages from the Republic to prove that my three frames of mind 
correspond to Plato’s three parts of the soul, since my arguments do not depend on this.  I will 
cite many passages from the Protagoras, however, in order to show that my three frames of mind 
correspond to distinctions drawn in the Protagoras.1  To the extent that I succeed in showing 
this, and to the extent that the reader is independently inclined to think that what I call the 
animal, manly, and epistemic frames of mind correspond fairly closely to the parts of the soul 
distinguished in the Republic, to that extent I will have shown that distinctions drawn in the 
Protagoras reappear in the Republic and are used there to delineate three ‘forms’ of the soul, and 
that this incidentally supports the idea that the account of akratic behavior in the Republic is not 
as sharp a departure from the Protagoras as has commonly been thought.2  Whether or not I 
persuade you of this, it is not my aim to do so; my aim, as I have said, is to shed light on the 
Protagoras and on akratic behavior by tracing the connections between my account of akratic 
behavior and the Protagoras, not between the Protagoras and the Republic.   
 
2.2.2.1. The animal frame of mind 
 
 The person who mainly inhabits the animal frame of mind thinks, feels, and acts in a 
primitive, childish way.
3
  He tends to behave in accordance with appetite, instinct, and habit.
1
  
                                                
1
 I do this mainly in chapters 3 and 4.   
2
 Others have argued for similar points in recent years.  See, for example, Gabriela Roxana Carone, “Akrasia in the 
Republic, ” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy (vol. xx), Summer 2001, pp. 107-148. Cf. also Heda Segvic, “No 
One Errs Willingly:  The Meaning of Socratic Intellectualism,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy (vol. xix), 
Winter 2002, pp. 2-45.    
3
 Rather than add the qualification ‘with regard to some activity within a human life’ or ‘with regard to his life as a 
whole,’ I will simply speak of the person who inhabits this frame of mind generally, though some of what I say will 
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He has a hard time ignoring his bodily sensations and impulses; these, more than anything else, 
tend to set his agenda.  He lacks discipline, but his behavior is not totally irregular: because he is 
a creature of habit, he tends when once in the habit of doing something a certain way to continue 
to do it that way, for better or worse.  He is definitely not good soldier material: he does not hold 
up well under rigorous, painful ordeals; he frightens like a child; he is easily discouraged; 
nothing is stronger in him than his instinct to save his own skin.  Though he is not incapable of 
listening to reason, his thinking, like his conduct, is undisciplined and prone to fall into ruts.  
Showy appearances impress him, underlying realities tend to escape his notice.  In other words, 
he is easily fooled.  
For the sake of concreteness, consider a person who inhabits this frame of mind with 
regard to the activity of eating.  Such a person will be guided by hunger, taste, and habit in 
deciding which things to eat.  He will eat and eat until he feels like stopping; he will eat 
whichever foods he likes the taste of; although he lacks the self-discipline required for most 
diets, when he has gotten used to eating a certain food in a certain context, he will tend to want to 
continue to eat that food in that context.  During hard times, he will not hold up well if deprived 
of the foods he has grown used to eating.  All else being equal, he will tend to go for whichever 
                                                                                                                                                       
only directly apply to the person who inhabits this frame of mind with regard to his life as a whole.  This is also how 
I will describe the other two frames of mind. 
1
 “Why habit?” one may ask, especially if one is thinking of Plato’s appetitive part of the soul.  People of all ages 
and descriptions often do what they do simply because they are in the habit of doing it.  But whereas older people 
know how to question the authority of habit and regularly demand from themselves a better reason for their actions 
than ‘I happen to be in the habit of doing this,’ very young children have not yet learned to step back from habit in 
this way.  Also, if one wishes to change the behavior of a one-year-old child (e.g., alter his sleeping patterns), it will 
not work to try to reason with him or to praise and blame him; one must habituate him.  If changing a human being’s 
behavior by reasoning with him may be said to correspond in Plato’s scheme to the rational part of the soul, whereas 
changing a human being’s behavior by praising or blaming him may be said to correspond to the spirited part of the 
soul, changing a human being’s behavior by habituating him may perhaps be said to correpond to the appetitive part 
of the soul.  In any case, Plato seems to be operating with some such hierarchy of modes of human influence in the 
following passage from the Laws:  “[B]ut our lawgiver will reverse the appearance by removing the fog, and by one 
means or another—habituation, commendation, or argument (ethesi kai epainois kai logois)—will persuade people 
that their notions of justice and injustice are illusory pictures . . . .” (663bc; R. G. Bury’s translation, Loeb Classical 
Library.) 
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foods are dressed up in the most attractive ways, regardless of what they are, or how sick they 
make him later.  He will tend not to learn from his gastronomic mistakes.  Those who sell and 
advertise food will find in him an easy victim.   
 
2.2.2.2. The manly frame of mind 
 
Much of what the person who inhabits the manly frame of mind thinks, feels, and does 
may be attributed to his eagerness to prove to himself and to others that he is a man, whatever 
that happens to mean in his society.
1
  Typically, he strives to have the qualities of a good soldier: 
courage, discipline, physical and mental toughness, a ‘warrior’ mentality, obedience to his 
superiors, a strong sense of camaraderie, etc.  He tries to be extremely loyal to his friends; he 
tends to be harsh towards his enemies.  He also tends to be quite hard on himself and even to 
hate himself; he is a fighter of internal and external battles.
2
  He cares about how other people 
think of him and treat him: he fears rejection; he wants to be respected as an equal; he dreams of 
being admired.  He routinely pegs others as his inferiors, equals, or superiors (in this or that 
respect) and despises, respects, or envies and admires them accordingly.  He possesses a strong 
sense of honor and shame.  He is ambitious and highly competitive.  Intellectually, he strives to 
                                                
1
 I speak of a man specifically, as opposed to a grown-up in general, because of the stereotypically masculine 
character of this frame of mind, not because it is limited to males; it isn’t.  
2
 Cf. Laws 626de:  
 
ATHENIAN: And must each individual man regard himself as his own enemy?  Or what do we say when we 
come to this point? 
CLINIAS: O Stranger of Athens, . . . you have made the argument more clear by taking it back to its 
starting-point; whereby you will the more easily discover the justice of our recent statement that, in the 
mass, all men are both publicly and privately the enemies of all, and individually also each man is his own 
enemy. 
ATHENIAN: What is your meaning, my admirable sir? 
CLINIAS: It is just in this war, my friend, that the victory over self (to nika[i]n auton hauton) is of all 
victories the first and best while self-defeat (to . . . hêttasthai auton huph’ heautou) is of all defeats the 
worst and the most shameful.  For these phrases signify that a war against self exists within each of us 
(hôs polemou en hekastois hêmôn ontos pros hêmas autous). 
  
(R. G. Bury’s translation, Loeb Classical Library.)     
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bring to his studies the same soldierly qualities he admires in general: discipline, rigor, 
perseverance, etc.  He likes to belittle and ridicule those who he thinks are less “in the know” 
than he, and he tends to accept unquestioningly the judgment of those who he thinks know more 
than he does.  Out of a sense of shame, he typically tries to conceal his ignorance; when he is the 
target of rational criticism, he tends to react as if he were being attacked; he hates the 
embarrassing, awkward feeling of being at a loss intellectually.  If he loves knowledge, it is 
mostly because of the sense of power and mastery knowledge provides.  As for power in general, 
he considers it a mark of inferiority to be in the power of others and a mark of superiority to have 
others in one’s power.  He takes pride in his ability to be a good soldier and follow orders, but he 
would prefer to be the one who gave the orders.  If he is a typical ancient Greek, he 
acknowledges the authority of the gods over human affairs, but he wishes he could elevate man 
to the position of highest authority in the universe; he is grateful to Prometheus for helping 
human beings take a step in this direction.
1
 
 
 Again, consider the person who inhabits this frame of mind with regard to the activity of 
eating.  Such a person will fear being laughed at or criticized for his immature choice of foods or 
for his inelegant table manners.  He will want to eat what adults eat, or what the members of the 
highest social classes eat, and he will try to copy their manner of eating.  In doing so, he may 
find himself eating foods he does not like the taste of, but which he thinks are finer foods than 
those he does like the taste of.  Among his fellow soldiers on campaign, when food is scarce, he 
will try to show that he can cope with hunger “like a man.”  In short, whichever ways of eating 
are associated with being grown up or socially superior, these are the ways in which he will try 
to eat.  
                                                
1
 The figure of Prometheus plays an important role in the Protagoras.  See 320d-322a, 361cd.   
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2.2.2.3. The epistemic frame of mind 
 
 Whether it is a question of how to think, feel, or act, the guiding ideal of the person who 
inhabits the epistemic frame of mind is knowledge.  He is conscious that many of the horrible 
things that happen to human beings could be prevented by the guidance of knowledge.  When he 
sees ignorant people engaging in certain activities (e.g., raising children, ruling a political 
community) and causing all sorts of unnecessary damage, he is filled with revulsion and tries 
hard to put these activities under the guidance of knowledge.  When knowledge is unavailable, 
he tries to make it available, whether by bringing in outside experts, if such are to be found, or by 
trying himself and encouraging others to discover the knowledge first-hand.  While the ‘manly’ 
person strives to have all the qualities of a good soldier, the ‘epistemic’ person strives to have all 
the qualities of a true lover of wisdom.  Like Socrates, he is attracted to people in whom 
knowledge seems to be present, and he devises ways of testing to see whether knowledge really 
is present in them.
1
  If he thinks that a person does not have the knowledge he claims to have, he 
tries to point this out to the person and make him admit he was wrong, believing that in this way 
he will either set this person on the path to knowledge or uncover some misunderstanding of his 
own.  The mistake he fears most is falsely thinking that he knows something important.  His 
nightmare is to confront a bad situation in which people’s very lives or souls are in jeopardy, 
think that he knows how to come to the rescue, persuade those involved that he knows what he is 
doing, take control of the situation, and—through ignorance of his own ignorance—make 
matters worse.  
 The inhabitant of the epistemic frame of mind is also a reconciler and composer (as in the 
phrase ‘compose a quarrel’), both between people who are at odds and between intrapersonal 
                                                
1
 Cf. Apology 21b-23c.  Cf. also Theaetetus 150bc, 151cd. 
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elements that are in tension (e.g., beliefs, feelings, words, deeds).  He regularly juxtaposes parts 
of a supposed whole and asks how well they fit, in the intellectual sphere and in life in general.  
As the ‘manly’ person is good soldier material, so this person is good manager material: his 
passion for fitting things together and making sure they cohere, which serves him well in his 
search for knowledge, also makes him suited to the manager’s job of taking in hand a group of 
people and organizing them into a cooperative unit so as to bring out the best in them.  But 
although he is suited to be a superintendent (epistatês),1 he is very reluctant to serve as one if he 
does not have the knowledge (epistêmê) that is proper to the job.2  
 The epistemic frame of mind is also a ‘self-correcting’ frame of mind.  Not only do its 
inhabitants try to correct their thoughts, feelings, and actions so as to make themselves less 
ignorant, they also tend to become aware of the very mode of thinking-feeling-acting which they 
inhabit and to ask themselves whether this frame of mind itself might not stand in need of 
correction.  There might be said to be different versions or specific modes of the epistemic frame 
of mind, some cruder, some more refined, through which people progress as they become 
increasingly expert inhabitants of this general mode of thinking-feeling-acting.  The self-
correcting, self-improving nature of this frame of mind is itself largely responsible for the 
confidence its long-term inhabitants have in it. 
 
 As for the person who occupies the epistemic frame of mind with regard to the activity of 
eating, his first step is to ask himself, “What is the knowledge that properly governs this 
activity?”  He will be cautious about the foods he puts into his mouth and will seek out those 
                                                
1
 Epistatês, LSJ, II, 2: “one who is set over, chief, commander . . .”; III, 2: “overseer, superintendent, in charge of 
any public building or works . . . .”; III, 3: “governor, administrator . . . .” 
2
 Cf. the last sentence of the previous paragraph.   
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who seem to him to be experts in this field.
1
  If he can find no experts, he will attempt to eat in 
accordance with his best ideas to date, whichever in his view come closest to knowledge.  As he 
reflects upon his eating habits, he may discover that ‘animal’ and ‘manly’ ways of eating are 
deeply ingrained in him and that they are partly at odds with what seems to him, from an 
‘epistemic’ point of view, to be the ideal way to eat.  He may ask himself: “How might I best 
reconcile these different approaches to eating?”  He may attempt to assign to each approach its 
proper role in an epistemically-governed hybrid approach.  If he does so, however, he will not 
lose sight of the fact that he does not yet have the knowledge that properly governs the activity of 
eating, nor will he stop trying to acquire this knowledge.        
 
2.2.2.4. The ‘semi-organized hodgepodge’ frame of mind 
 
I said earlier that any one of these three frames of mind may be put into the service of any 
other, and I have just suggested that a person who inhabits the epistemic frame of mind with 
regard to the activity of eating might include the animal and manly frames of mind in an 
epistemically-governed hybrid approach to this activity.  How might the epistemic frame of mind 
be put into the service of the manly frame of mind?  Consider a spirited youth who wants to 
become an admired and powerful man in his city.  He has noticed that in many fields of human 
activity, those who practice long and hard and approach their work ‘scientifically’ are able to 
gain a competitive edge.  When he hears of a ‘wise man’ who teaches an art that makes people 
clever at speaking and enables them to get ahead in public life, he is very excited and strongly 
                                                
1
 Cf. Protagoras 314a: “When you buy victuals and liquors you can carry them off from the dealer or merchant in 
separate vessels, and before you take them into your body by eating or drinking you can lay them by in your house 
and take the advice of an expert whom you can call in, as to what is fit to eat or drink and what is not, and how much 
you should take and when . . . .” (W. R. M. Lamb’s translation, Loeb Classical Library.) 
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desires to study under this man.  Even though he has hardly any idea who this ‘wise man’ is, he 
rushes to entrust his soul to him.
1
  Here is a person who in a rash and ‘manly’ way wishes to 
utilize painstaking care (epimeleia) and technical or ‘scientific’ knowledge (epistêmê).   In other 
words, here is a person who wishes to put the epistemic frame of mind into the service of the 
manly frame of mind.
2
   
Consider now a person who with regard to the activity of living a human life inhabits a 
‘semi-organized hodgepodge’ frame of mind that combines the animal, manly, and epistemic 
frames of mind, borrowing more from the first two, less from the third, but who, unlike the 
‘epistemic’ man, is not so introspective as to be conscious of these frames of mind as such.  A 
skilled conversation partner (e.g., Socrates) should be able to lead this person to think and 
answer questions in accordance with the mentality of any one of these component frames of 
mind without the person’s noticing that his present answers conflict with the answers he would 
give if he were questioned along different lines.
3
  But while this person’s approach is a 
‘hodgepodge’ hybrid in which no one approach is the ‘ruling’ approach, it is not utterly 
disorganized.  In certain contexts an ‘animal’ mode of thinking-feeling-acting tends to dominate; 
in others, a ‘manly’ mode; and in a few contexts, an ‘epistemic’ mode.  It is in other words a 
semi-organized hodgepodge frame of mind.      
 
2.2.3. Different modes of thinking about what is good 
 
 I said in chapter 1 that what is chiefly responsible for typical instances of akratic behavior 
is a certain kind of failure to inhabit the epistemic frame of mind with regard to the activity of 
                                                
1
 Cf. Protagoras 310-314.   
2
 One might imagine similar examples of how the animal frame of mind can be put into the service of the manly 
frame of mind, how the epistemic frame of mind can be put into the service of the animal frame of mind, etc.  
3
 In chapter 3 I describe the exchange between Socrates and ‘the many’ (hoi polloi) in these terms.   
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living a human life generally and, in particular, with regard to the activity of thinking about what 
is good.
1
  Let me now describe four modes of thinking about what is good that correspond to the 
animal, manly, epistemic, and ‘semi-organized hodgepodge’ frames of mind, respectively.  In 
this way I wish to show that people’s beliefs about what is best are different kinds of things, 
according to the different frames of mind in which they function.  In particular, I wish to make it 
clear that of the four frames of mind discussed here, it is only in the epistemic frame of mind that 
beliefs about what is best are formed and revised chiefly with a view to knowledge; and it is only 
in this frame of mind that the guidance of knowledge—or, when that is unavailable, whatever is 
thought to come closest to knowledge—reliably controls the person’s behavior. 
 
2.2.3.1. The ‘animal’ mode of thinking about what is good 
 
When forming and revising his beliefs about what is good, a person who mainly inhabits 
the animal frame of mind with regard to the activity of living a human life will generally consult 
his personal tastes and inclinations.  What agrees with him, he will generally deem ‘good,’ and 
what disagrees with him, for whatever reasons, he will generally deem ‘bad.’  If he likes to play 
with a certain toy, he will be inclined to think it good to play with it.  When forming or revising 
his beliefs, he does not tend to ask himself: “Do others also think that this is good?  Am I alone 
in thinking so?  Am I wrong?”  If he does revise a belief about what is good, it is usually as a 
result of comparing his own tastes with each other.  If he has liked every banana he has ever 
tasted, then tastes a mushy one and does not like the taste of it, he may qualify his old belief 
(“Eating bananas is good”) with a proviso (“. . .  so long as they aren’t too mushy”).  He is also 
capable of following simple chains of reasoning and revising his beliefs in the light of such 
reasoning.  If he thinks that it would be bad to go to bed before his brothers do, but worse to go 
                                                
1
 See chapter 1, p. 12.   
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to bed without being told a story, then when he is informed that unless he goes to bed before his 
brothers do there will be no story told to him tonight, he is capable of concluding that it would be 
good for him, under the circumstances, to go to bed before his brothers do.  This is about as 
logically rigorous as his practical thinking gets.  He lacks both the ability and the patience for 
long-term means-end reasoning.  He does not try to organize his various likes and dislikes into a 
single coherent system.  And when he finds himself in danger, he does not tend to resort to 
careful, deliberate thinking about how best to save himself.   
Luckily for him, he typically has people who take care of him and do a lot of this sort of 
thinking for him.  If he seems to them to lack important beliefs about his own welfare, they step 
in with their beliefs and manage his life accordingly.  They try to make the world in which he 
moves as foolproof as possible, so that whenever he acts on a dangerous whim, something or 
other—a locked gate, a cap on a bottle of pills, a pair of arms that swoops him up in the nick of 
time—saves him from danger.  Understandably, such a person is slow to develop his own habit 
of thinking about what is good in a careful, deliberate manner and of living his life in accordance 
with his own well-formed and well-revised beliefs about what is best.   
Indeed, this person’s ‘beliefs’ about what is best, such as they are, have little authority 
over his actions.  He does sometimes use them to guide his behavior, but it does not take much to 
make him disregard his belief or change it to suit a new feeling of his.  “What, then,” someone 
might object, “do such beliefs amount to?  If they are largely based on feeling in the first place 
and give way or change when stronger feelings oppose them, do they themselves, as opposed to 
the feelings, have any effect on the person’s actions?  If not, isn’t it superfluous to speak of this 
person’s ‘beliefs’?”  It is true that the action-guiding role played by the ‘animal’ person’s beliefs 
about what is best is far less authoritative than that played by more fully rational people’s beliefs 
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about what is best.  Nevertheless, even the ‘animal’ person is able, if not always willing, to 
follow simple lines of practical reasoning and act in accordance with them.  Though he tends to 
disengage from rational conversations when he finds them difficult or upsetting, he does have 
some ability, as well as some inclination, to engage in such conversations, and he does 
sometimes use their conclusions to guide his behavior.  Still, this person is only beginning to 
learn to use his beliefs about what is good as ‘epistemically-minded’ people use theirs.  If one 
prefers to reserve the word ‘belief’ for cognitive states that function in more fully rational mental 
modes, what this person has may be said to be something less than belief.  
 
2.2.3.2. The ‘manly’ mode of thinking about what is good 
 
When forming and revising his beliefs about what is good, a person who mainly inhabits 
the manly frame of mind with regard to the activity of living a human life will generally ask 
himself, “What do other people think is good?”  He will be afraid that his belief about what is 
good is immature or shameful, and if he thinks that it is, he may try to revise it to fit the social 
standards he respects.  He may wait for his superiors to let it be known what they think is best, 
then say that he agrees with them.  This person often finds himself ‘believing’ things that he 
himself would otherwise not be inclined to believe, but which he thinks are finer and nobler than 
the things he is inclined to believe on his own.  Not only will there be a gap between what he 
believes and what he says he believes, it will also by no means be clear to this person just what 
he believes and what he only says he believes.  Many of this person’s beliefs about what is best 
will be ‘half-hearted’ beliefs, though he himself may not recognize them as such.    
Although such a person is capable of subtle practical reasoning and may even be proud of 
how clever he is, his intellectual curiosity and capacity for doubt go only so far.  If he feels very 
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strongly that something is shameful and bad, he will cling to this belief, all arguments to the 
contrary notwithstanding.  Like the ‘animal’ person, he too has a threshold of personal comfort 
past which he will say: “This conversation is over.”
1
  But unlike the ‘animal’ person, he typically 
views reason as something respectable.  He thinks that forming and revising one’s beliefs in 
accordance with reason is, at least in certain areas of belief-formation, the intellectually 
honorable thing to do.  He also wishes to be favorably judged when others inspect the relation 
between his beliefs as he has stated them and his actions.  Harmonizing his words (logoi) and his 
deeds (erga) is for him a point of honor.2  Unless he has great confidence in his integrity, 
however, he will fear running into a Socrates, somebody who regularly exposes people’s failure 
to live in accordance with their own beliefs about what is best or most important.  Instead of 
wanting to achieve such integrity for its own sake (in which case he might actively seek out a 
Socrates), the ‘manly’ person wants to achieve enough of it not to be embarrassed when he is 
forced to give an account of his life.   
Although his desire to fit his beliefs to his actions is less absolute than it might be, the 
‘manly’ person is eager to live in accordance with standards and rules.  He tends to think of the 
virtuous man as a kind of obedient soldier or law-abiding subject.  As it is not normally the job 
of a subordinate to question the judgment of a superior, so the ‘manly’ person is not in the habit 
of asking himself: “Are my superiors correct in thinking this best, and if so, why is it best?”  He 
does not spend much time entertaining such thoughts, for he knows that he is surrounded by 
people who threaten to treat him badly if he does not meet their standard of behavior.  He knows 
that if he seems to such people to think, feel, and act more or less in accordance with that 
                                                
1
 Cf. the end of the Euthyphro (15e): “Some other time (eis authis), Socrates.  Now I am in a hurry and it is time for 
me to go.”  Cf. also the end of the Protagoras (361e): “We shall pursue the subject on some other occasion (eis 
authis), at your pleasure: for the present, it is time to turn to another affair.” (Loeb Classical Library translations.)  
2
 Cf. Laches 188c-e and ancient Greek literature in general.   
54 
 
standard, life will be much easier for him than if he does not.  Under such pressure,
1
 he is not 
inclined to call into question prevailing ideas about what is best, carefully inquire into what is 
best, and act in accordance with the results of such inquiries—unless, of course, this very sort of 
inquisitiveness is itself admired by people he respects.   
 
2.2.3.3. The ‘epistemic’ mode of thinking about what is good 
 
The person who fully inhabits the epistemic frame of mind with regard to the activity of 
living a human life will form and revise his beliefs about what is good with a view to knowing 
what is good.  Yet when he asks himself how exactly to go about doing this, he may realize that 
in addition to being no expert when it comes to living a human life, he is also not an expert when 
it comes to making progress in revising his beliefs about what is good.  As he searches for clues, 
he may wonder: “Being rigorous in a field like mathematics or geometry is one thing, but what 
counts as being rigorous in such a delicate matter as thinking about what is good?”  Although he 
may wrestle with this question without ever finding the answer, he will in the meantime have 
settled into ‘epistemic’ habits of belief-formation.  He will attempt to reconcile and organize his 
beliefs about what is good, juxtaposing beliefs that would otherwise remain segregated, asking 
how well they cohere, and trying to impart greater integrity to his system of beliefs.  He will be a 
relentless editor of his beliefs about what is good, ever on the lookout for mistakes and making 
                                                
1 Cf. Republic 492b-d [Socrates speaking to Adeimantus]: “‘[Is it] not rather the very men who talk in this strain 
who are the chief sophists and educate most effectively and mould to their own heart’s desire young and old, men 
and women?’  ‘When?’ said he.  ‘Why, when,’ I said, ‘the multitude are seated together in assemblies or in court-
rooms or theatres or camps or any other public gathering of a crowd, and with loud uproar censure some of the 
things that are said and done and approve others, both in excess, with full-throated clamour and clapping of hands, 
and thereto the rocks and the region round about re-echoing redouble the din of the censure and the praise.  In such 
case how do you think the young man’s heart . . .  is moved within him?  What private teaching do you think will 
hold out and not rather be swept away by the torrent of censure and applause, and borne off on its current, so that he 
will affirm the same things that they do to be honourable and base (phêsein te ta auta toutois kala kai aischra einai), 
and will do as they do (kai epitêdeusein haper an houtoi), and be even such as they (kai esesthai toiouton)?’  ‘That is 
quite inevitable (pollê . . . anangkê), Socrates,’ he said.”    
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corrections where needed, even as he also questions the trustworthiness of his own editorial 
judgment.  He will also try not to be fooled by people who seem to know what is best.  When he 
meets such people, he will test their seeming knowledge by the best tests he knows, checking at 
the very least for consistency.  He will clearly distinguish the question “Do the people I respect 
approve of this?” from the question “Is this good?”  He will also try to be on guard against 
according undue weight to the pleasure or pain that something brings.  While remaining open to 
the possibility that the good is the pleasant, he will clearly distinguish the questions “Is this 
pleasant?” and “Is this good?” 
As for the relation between his beliefs and his actions, the defining characteristic of the 
person who fully inhabits the epistemic frame of mind is complete trust in the guidance of 
knowledge, accompanied by a more or less radical mistrust of every other form of guidance.  
Accordingly, this person will not, so far as is in his power, act otherwise than as knowledge 
dictates.  If knowledge is unavailable, he will try to follow, albeit somewhat warily, that form of 
available guidance which in his opinion comes closest to knowledge.  Yet the further removed he 
is from the guidance of knowledge, the muddier the relationship between his beliefs and actions 
gets.  Like the ‘manly’ person, he may not know quite what he believes; he may have ‘half-
hearted’ beliefs; he may simply not have an opinion.  Nevertheless, to the extent that he has a 
clear belief about how best to proceed, and to the extent that he considers this to be the closest 
thing he has to knowledge, to that extent he can be counted on to act in accordance with this 
belief. 
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2.2.3.4. The ‘semi-organized hodgepodge’ mode of thinking about what is good 
  
The person who inhabits the abovementioned ‘semi-organized hodgepodge’ frame of 
mind with regard to his life as a whole will think about what is good in a partly coherent 
combination of ‘animal’, ‘manly’, and (to a lesser degree) ‘epistemic’ ways, no one approach 
being the ‘ruling’ approach.  It would be wrong to think of this person as forming his beliefs 
about what is good now in an ‘animal’ manner, now in a ‘manly’ manner, now in an ‘epistemic’ 
manner, occupying distinctly different modes from situation to situation.  It would also be wrong 
to think of him as consistently forming his beliefs about what is good in a single ‘blended’ mode.  
This person’s ‘hodgepodge’ mode of thinking about what is good falls somewhere between these 
extremes, as does the relation between his beliefs and his actions.   
 
2.2.4. A fuller formulation of my account  
 
 I said in chapter 1 that the akratic fails to inhabit the epistemic frame of mind with regard 
to the activities of living a human life and of thinking about what is good.  I did not, however, 
say which frame of mind he does inhabit.  In this chapter I have described a ‘semi-organized 
hodgepodge’ frame of mind in which no one approach is the ‘ruling’ approach and which 
borrows more from the animal and manly frames of mind than from the epistemic.  Having 
described this hybrid frame of mind, I may now present a fuller formulation of my account:  
 
 There are many different kinds of akratic behavior, and different factors are 
responsible for different kinds, but what is chiefly responsible for typical instances of 
akratic behavior is that the akratic inhabits the abovementioned ‘semi-organized 
hodgepodge’ frame of mind, rather than the epistemic frame of mind, with regard to the 
activity of living a human life generally and, in particular, with regard to the activity of 
thinking about what is good.  Moreover, what keeps the typical akratic stuck in his rut is 
his ignorance of the fact that the psychic resistance he encounters during episodes of 
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akratic behavior is due to his own wrongheaded approach to life.  In other words, if what 
is immediately responsible for akratic behavior is a kind of ignorance, what is 
responsible at a deeper level is ignornance of this ignorance, i.e., ignorance of the fact 
that one inhabits an inherently ignorant frame of mind with regard to the activity of 
living a human life and that one ought to be trying to cure oneself of this ignorance.  Put 
briefly, it is a ‘semi-organized hodgepodge’ form of ignorancee, coupled with ignorance 
of this ignorance, that typically lies at the root of akratic behavior. 
 As for what akratic behavior is, it is certainly not action against one’s 
knowledge of what is best, since no one ever acts against his knowledge of what is best.1  
Nor is it action against one’s belief about what is best—if by ‘belief’ about what is best 
is meant ‘epistemic’ belief, i.e., the kind of belief possessed by a person who fully 
inhabits the epistemic frame of mind with regard to the activities of living a human life 
and of thinking about what is good.  For to the extent that such a person has a clear 
belief about how best to proceed, and to the extent that he considers this to be the closest 
thing he has to knowledge, to that extent he can be counted on to act in accordance with 
this belief (for this again is part of what it is to inhabit this frame of mind).
2
  No, typical 
cases of akratic behavior are rather cases of acting against a ‘semi-organized 
hodgepodge’ belief about what is best, i.e., the kind of belief possessed by a person who 
inhabits a ‘semi-organized hodgepodge’ frame of mind with regard to the activities of 
living a human life and of thinking about what is good.   
 
 Let me apply this abstract formulation to the concrete situation of a person who is lying 
in bed, feeling like not getting out of bed, but thinking that he should get out of bed.  I will 
assume that the person in question is able to get out of bed and that getting out of bed in this 
particular situation is in fact the best thing to do.  For the sake of completeness, I will walk the 
reader through this situation four times over, once each for the four frames of mind distinguished 
above. 
                                                
1
 As I have already said, part of what it is to possess such knowledge is to fully inhabit the epistemic frame of mind 
with regard to the activity of living a human life, and part of what it is to fully inhabit this frame of mind with regard 
to this activity is to try wholeheartedly to act in accordance with such knowledge if one possesses it.  See chapter 1, 
pp. 13-15. 
2
 See above, p. 55.    
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2.2.4.1. The ‘animal’ form of akratic resistance 
 
 A person who mainly inhabits the animal frame of mind with regard to the activities of 
living a human life and of thinking about what is good, and who finds himself lying in bed, 
feeling like not getting out of bed, but believing that he should get out of bed, will perhaps have 
formed this belief in the following way.  He might have been told the night before that there was 
to be an early morning contest between two great athletes, and that his father and older brothers 
were going to go into town to see it and were willing to take him with them if he got up in time 
to go.  The prospect of a sporting event and a trip into town delighted him, and, being an 
‘animal’ person who tends to form beliefs about what is good in accordance with his personal 
tastes and inclinations, he formed the ‘animal’ belief that it would be good to get up early the 
following morning.    
 Now it is morning, and the boy is lying in bed remembering what had been said the night 
before and believing that it would be best for him to get up now.  But he is also very sleepy, and 
because he inhabits a frame of mind in which he tends to focus on his bodily feelings and 
impulses, his thoughts drift towards the immediate pleasure of going back to sleep.  Yet when he 
rolls over to go back to sleep, he experiences a kind of inner resistance, for he is still attracted by 
the thought of going into town and seeing the athletes, and he knows that if he does not get up 
soon, he will miss his chance.  On the other hand, when he moves to get up, he also experiences 
inner resistance, this time in the form of a desire to go back to sleep.  This inner tension between 
a bodily impulse and an ‘animal’ belief about what is good—a belief based on personal tastes 
and elementary means-end reasoning—is an example of the ‘animal’ kind of akratic resistance.  
For in this case everything operates within the animal frame of mind: what makes it hard for the 
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person to go in one direction is an ‘animal’ desire to get more sleep, and what makes it hard for 
him to go in the other direction is a belief about what is good that was formed, functions, and is 
open to revision within the animal frame of mind.      
 This tension may resolve itself in one of three ways.  The person may change his mind to 
suit his immediate bodily feeling (i.e., decide that it would not, after all, be best to get out of bed, 
but that it would be best to get more sleep) and act in accordance with this new belief; or he may 
retain his old belief, let it guide him, and lift himself out of bed; or he may simply let himself fall 
back asleep without either having changed his behavior to suit his belief or having changed his 
belief to suit his behavior.  The crucial fact is that this person’s beliefs about what is good are 
based for the most part on personal tastes, do not stand up well to contrary bodily impulses, and 
in any case are not the primary means by which the person’s life tends to be guided.
1
   
2.2.4.2. The ‘manly’ form of akratic resistance 
 
 A person who mainly inhabits the manly frame of mind with regard to the activities of 
living a human life and of thinking about what is good, and who finds himself lying in bed, 
feeling like not getting out of bed, but believing that he should get out of bed, will perhaps have 
formed this belief in the following way.  His friends might have been getting increasingly 
interested in the art of public speaking, and his father might have been expressing hopes recently 
that his son would soon become a leading man in the city, and it might have been that because 
this person is not inclined to call into question prevailing ideas about what is best, especially not 
when expressed by people he knows and respects, he had concluded that of course it would be 
good for him to become an effective public speaker and a man to reckon with in city affairs.  
Moreover, he might have been told the night before that a famous ‘wise man’ was in town, a man 
                                                
1
 Such a person’s life tends to be guided, as I have said, by other people who care for him and do much of his 
thinking for him.     
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who people said was able to make his students clever speakers and powerful figures in public 
life.  Again, not being inclined to question what seems to be common knowledge, and being a 
fairly good means-end reasoner, this person might have concluded that it would be best for him 
to meet this ‘wise man’ and learn his techniques, and that the best way to do so would be to get 
up before dawn, go to the house of an older friend (himself a sort of public intellectual), and ask 
him to take him directly to this ‘wise man’ before he left town and to help persuade him to take 
him on as a student.   
 When this young man wakes up before dawn, he is still extremely sleepy and he feels like 
staying in bed; yet he also retains his belief from the night before, and he tells himself that if ever 
he wants to become somebody, he needs to get up right now.  Like the ‘animal’ person, this 
person experiences tension between his bodily feeling and his belief: when he moves to get out 
of bed, he meets resistance in the form of a desire to go back to sleep, and when he lies back 
down to go back to sleep, he meets resistance in the form a belief that it would be best to get up.  
But unlike the ‘animal’ person, his beliefs about what is good are ‘manly’ beliefs and are 
therefore bound up with notions of honor and shame; his belief that it would be best to get up is 
more or less the same as his belief that it would be shameful to remain in bed.  This person’s 
beliefs about what is good are also tied more closely than the ‘animal’ person’s to thoughts about 
what others say is good.  In forming beliefs about what is good, this person looks to something 
less subjective and more stable than his own inclinations and tastes: he looks to what is generally 
approved, in word or in deed, by people he respects in his community.  Accordingly, when this 
person encounters resistance in the form of a desire to go back to sleep, he will probably not 
change his belief to fit this feeling, since nothing about his personal feeling changes the fact that 
preferring sleep to self-advancement is generally frowned upon by the people he knows and 
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respects.  If he does give in to his sleepiness, he will most likely keep his belief unchanged, 
castigating himself and feeling ashamed of himself for not ‘conquering’ it.  He will also be upset 
at having acted against his belief about what is best, for as I have said, it is a point of pride with 
‘manly’ people that their actions harmonize with their beliefs.
1
 
 It is therefore much more likely that this person will act in accordance with his belief and 
force himself to get out of bed.  In doing so, however, he will probably exaggerate the 
worthlessness of his desire to sleep and the certainty of his belief—he may call it knowledge—
that he ought to get out of bed.  Such exaggeration may help motivate him to get up, but it also 
reveals a deficiency in his mode of thinking-feeling-acting.  Unlike the person who fully inhabits 
the epistemic frame of mind with regard to the activities of living a human life and of thinking 
about what is good, the inhabitant of the manly frame of mind does not chiefly form his beliefs 
about what is good with a view to knowledge, nor does he completely trust knowledge as a guide 
to life.  Rather, he has his favored views about what is good, and if a thought occurs to him that 
threatens to keep him from carrying out those views (e.g., the thought that sleep is important for 
health, the thought that maybe the life of a politician is not for him), he will be tempted to 
dismiss it or ignore it, even though by welcoming and working through such thoughts he might 
learn more about what it would be best for him to do.  Yet some of the thoughts that this person 
attempts to dismiss will keep pressing into his consciousness, since some will have a basis in 
reality, and realities do not normally leave a person alone just because he has dismissed some 
thought about them.  Hence even if this person never acts against his belief about what is best, 
i.e., even if he is completely continent, he will probably still suffer from a ‘manly’ form of 
akratic resistance.  That is, he will probably suffer from a kind of psychic tension that is caused 
                                                
1
 Though as I have also said, they tend to care about this harmony not for its own sake but in order to avoid 
embarrassment (see p. 53).   
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by his unwillingness to learn the whole truth about what is good.  He may always overpower 
such resistance, but as long as there are portions of reality that he refuses to face and as long as 
these realities make it hard for him to retain his views and act upon them, he will not rid himself 
of it.   
2.2.4.3. ‘Epistemic’ freedom from akratic resistance 
 
 I have suggested that the person who fully inhabits the epistemic frame of mind with 
regard to the activities of living a human life and of thinking about what is good will be free of 
what I call ‘akratic resistance’.  But just because a person is free of akratic resistance does not 
mean that he is free of all tension between his beliefs and his feelings.  If, for example, an 
‘epistemically-minded’ person is woken up before dawn by a loud knocking at his door, it is 
entirely possible that he will be pulled in one direction by the thought that he ought to find out 
what the matter is, and in another by a desire to get more sleep.  What makes this person 
different from the people just discussed is that he completely trusts the guidance of knowledge, 
not just as a guide to his thoughts but also as a guide to his feelings and actions, and that he 
always thinks and feels and acts in accordance with this guidance as far as he can.  Accordingly, 
if he finds himself momentarily torn between a thought and a desire, he will do what he is 
accustomed to do whenever he experiences psychic tension, whether between two beliefs, two 
desires, or a belief and a desire: he will try to reconcile the opposing elements so as to bring his 
thoughts and feelings closer to knowledge.  As he tries to make his thoughts agree with each 
other and with the truth when he has two contradictory beliefs, so if he has opposing beliefs and 
desires, he will try to join his thoughts and feelings into a coherent system that accords as far as 
possible with the knowledge that properly governs the activity of living a human life.  
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 Even if he is a long-time inhabitant of the epistemic frame of mind, this is not an easy 
task.  For one thing, he almost certainly does not possess the knowledge that properly governs 
human lives, so it is not as if it is simply a matter of bringing himself into line with something he 
already clearly sees.  Nor does he have time to deliberate carefully in this case; he has to think 
fast.  In addition, while it is true that his feelings are closely interwoven with his thoughts and 
that changes in the way he thinks will affect the way he feels, he does not have total control over 
his feelings—or over his thoughts, for that matter.  Finally, there is no guarantee that he will 
arrive at a clear idea of what it would be best for him to do, let alone come to know what is best.  
To fully inhabit the epistemic frame of mind is not necessarily to have a clue about where 
knowledge points in a given case; sometimes the ‘epistemically-minded’ person is simply at a 
loss.  Nevertheless, as far as he is able in the time that he has, he will ask himself what ‘the one 
who knows’ would do,
1
 settle on what he thinks is a good answer, and (again, as far as he is able) 
bring his thoughts, feelings, and actions into line with it.       
 Suppose that in the present case he does form a clear idea about how to proceed: it would 
probably be best, he thinks, to find out what is the matter.  One thing he will do in this case is 
make whatever physical movements are called for.  Another thing he will try to do is reconcile 
his feelings to his beliefs.  If he can, he will redirect the course of his feelings to harmonize with 
his belief that it would be best not to sleep right now.  But if he cannot rid himself of his desire to 
go back to sleep, he will accept this fact and factor it into his future thinking about what it would 
be best for him to do.  In any case, he will not let this desire guide his actions, rather than his 
belief about what is best, so long as he takes this belief to be the closest thing he has to 
knowledge.  
                                                
1
 Cf., e.g., Crito 48a (ho epaïôn . . . ho heis).   
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 The crucial fact about this person is that he has complete trust in the guidance of 
knowledge, trust which itself comprises an essential set of tendencies to think and feel and act.  
Insofar as he can harmonize his beliefs and desires so as to accord with the guidance of 
knowledge, he will, but if some recalcitrant thought or feeling resists his efforts, he will not let 
this bother him more than it has to, nor will he close his mind to the possibility that this feeling 
or thought may be pointing him towards a part of the truth that he does not currently recognize.  
In this respect he is unlike the ‘manly’ person, who tends, as I have said, to distort or stifle the 
truth in order to facilitate the execution of his favored ideas about what is best.  The policy of the 
‘epistemically-minded’ person, by contrast, who genuinely wishes to know what is best, is to 
acknowledge and sort through whatever thoughts or feelings he has in an effort to bring all of his 
thoughts and feelings closer to knowledge.  It is this knowledge-seeking, knowledge-trusting 
openness to the contents of one’s own mind and to the whole truth about what is good that I 
think endows a person with that certain sort of “psychic serenity” which I earlier suggested could 
be achieved by curing oneself of ignorancee, even as one continues to suffer from ignorancek.
1
 
 
2.2.4.4. The ‘semi-organized hodgepodge’ form of akratic resistance  
 
 Imagine that you are a person who inhabits a ‘semi-organized hodgepodge’ frame of 
mind with regard to the activities of living a human life and of thinking about what is good, and 
that you are lying in bed, feeling like not getting out of bed, but thinking that you should get out 
of bed.  You will perhaps have formed this belief in the following way.  You might have 
reasoned the night before that in order to do all the work you need to do today, you would have 
to get up early.  Doing this work is important, you sometimes think to yourself, in part because 
of the people who will be hurt if you do not do it, in part because of the credit you will bring to 
                                                
1
 See chapter 1, pp. 17-18.   
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yourself if you do it well (and the blame you will incur if you do not), in part because this work 
‘puts food on the table,’ i.e., provides you with your animal necessities and other bodily comforts 
and conveniences.  When your alarm clock goes off, however, though you believe that it would 
be best to get out of bed, you do not feel like getting out of bed.  Indeed, your feeling of 
sleepiness and your desire to get more sleep may well translate into a belief that it would be good 
to stay in bed.  For like the ‘animal’ person, you have a tendency to sometimes form beliefs 
about what is good on no other basis than personal taste and inclination, and besides, you may 
have other reasons for thinking that it would be good to stay in bed (e.g., legitimate health 
concerns).  Unlike the ‘animal’ person, however, you will not be so easily led to abandon your 
belief that it would be best for you to get out of bed, for your process of forming and revising 
your beliefs about what is best, unlike the ‘animal’ person’s, is largely based on ideas about what 
would be responsible and what irresponsible, what mature and what childish, etc.  Indeed, unlike 
any of the three people described above, you will feel confusedly torn, not just between a bodily 
sensation and a belief about what it would be good to do, nor just between one ‘animal’ belief 
about what is good and another ‘animal’ belief about what is good, but between an ‘animal’ 
belief about what is good and a ‘manly’ belief about what is good—or rather, a tendency to form 
‘animal’ beliefs about what is good and a tendency to form ‘manly’ beliefs about what is good.  
There may also be an ‘epistemic’ aspect to your thinking.  You may think to yourself:  “Let me 
reason this out.  Apart from how I feel, or what I think others would think of me if I acted in this 
way or that, what would in fact be the best thing to do?”  But if this thought occurs to you, you 
do not sustain the line of thinking for long; it is not, after all, your primary mode of thinking 
about what is best.  
66 
 
 In short, you will experience little, if any, of the psychic serenity enjoyed by the 
‘epistemically-minded’ person.  On the other hand, you will experience much of the akratic 
resistance that the ‘animal’ and ‘manly’ people experience, since you largely inhabit their frames 
of mind with regard to the activities of living a human life and of thinking about what is good.  
But the most distinctive kind of akratic resistance that you will experience is the ‘semi-organized 
hodgepodge’ kind, i.e., the kind of akratic resistance that comes from being torn between 
‘animal’ and ‘manly’ ways of thinking, feeling, and acting and from not being wholly committed 
to inhabiting any one frame of mind, least of all the epistemic frame of mind.     
 
2.2.5. Questions from chapter 1 
 
 I end my presentation of my account of akratic behavior by answering two questions that 
were left unanswered in chapter 1.   
 
 Question 1:  “If, as I claim, akratics fail to inhabit the epistemic frame of mind with 
regard to the activity of living a human life and therefore do not view the knowledge that 
properly governs this activity as the standard against which their actions are to be judged, what 
standard are they using when they say that they ‘should have’ done otherwise, and why do they 
fail to live up to this standard?” 
 Answer:  When typical akratics show remorse, they are primarily using a ‘manly’ moral 
standard.  But when a person inhabits the manly frame of mind with regard to the activity of 
thinking about what is good, it will often not be clear to him just what he believes and what he 
only says he believes, or just what he firmly believes and what he believes half-heartedly.  
Moreover, if an akratic inhabits the ‘semi-organized hodgepodge’ frame of mind with regard to 
the activity of living a human life, then in addition to inhabiting a manly frame of mind with 
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regard to this activity, he also inhabits an animal frame of mind—and neither approach ‘rules’ 
the other.  Accordingly, one should not be surprised if the typical akratic fails to live up to his 
own ‘manly’ standard.   
 
 Question 2:  “What about people who take themselves to be acting not just against their 
belief but against their knowledge of what is best?  Do they not inhabit the epistemic frame of 
mind with regard to the activity in question?  If not, why do they say that they ‘knew’ what to do 
and that they ‘should have’ let themselves be guided by knowledge?” 
 Answer:  Part of what it means to inhabit the abovementioned ‘semi-organized 
hodgepodge’ frame of mind with regard to some activity is to partially occupy the epistemic 
frame of mind with regard to that activity.  According to my account, typical akratics inhabit this 
‘hodgepodge’ frame of mind with regard to the activity of living a human life and therefore do to 
some extent occupy the epistemic frame of mind with regard to this activity.  To the extent that 
they do, they genuinely believe that they ‘should have’ let themselves be guided by knowledge 
(if indeed they think that knowledge was available to them).  But to the extent that they do not, 
they will have no trouble acting against what they think is the guidance of knowledge.  
Moreover, depending on which frame of mind one inhabits with regard to the activity of thinking 
about what is good, one will have a more or less strict conception of what it is to know what is 
best.  To the person who mainly inhabits the manly frame of mind with regard to this activity, to 
‘know’ what is best may mean little more than to know what one’s parents and other respectable 
people say is best, while to the person who mainly inhabits the animal frame of mind with regard 
to this activity, ‘knowledge’ of what is best may be even easier to come by: it may simply be a 
matter of consulting one’s personal tastes and being sure about one’s own likes and dislikes.  
One should therefore not be surprised if a person who is not a true inhabitant of the epistemic 
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frame of mind (with regard to the activity of living a human life) nevertheless says that he knew 
what to do and that he should have let himself be guided by knowledge.   
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3. THE SECTION ON AKRASIA AND ITS IMMEDIATE CONTEXT 
 
In chapters 1 and 2 I presented my account of akratic behavior; in the remaining two 
chapters I superimpose this account upon Plato’s Protagoras.1  In the first part of this chapter I 
describe and explain the section on akrasia (352a-359a) and its immediate context (349a-352a; 
359a-360e); in the second part I trace the correspondences between my account and this section.  
In chapter 4 I argue that ingredients in my account of akratic behavior are to be found throughout 
the Protagoras.   
 
3.1. Part One: Analysis of text  
 
Immediately enveloping the section on akrasia (352a-359a) is what I call the ‘courage-
wisdom section’ (349a-360e), that part of the Protagoras which begins when Protagoras is 
brought to say (revising his initial view
2
 in light of Socrates’ earlier questions
3
) that many people 
are most unwise, yet most courageous, and which ends when he is forced to admit that, to judge 
from what has been agreed, this seems to him to be impossible.  If one thinks of the section on 
akrasia as the kernel of a larger nut, the courage-wisdom section is the nut, and if one wants to 
make good sense of the section on akrasia, one must understand this larger section.  It is a good 
idea, moreover, to approach this portion of Plato’s text with certain distinctions in mind.  This, 
then, is my plan for Part One: I will draw some preliminary distinctions, I will explain in general 
terms what Socrates seems to me to be trying to do in the courage-wisdom section, and I will 
                                                
1
 See chapter 1, p. 20.   
2
 330ab.   
3
 330c-334c.   
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analyze what Socrates actually does in this section, discussing first the ‘shell’ (349a-352a; 359a-
360e) and then the ‘meat’ (352a-359a).  
 
3.1.1. Preliminary distinctions 
 
3.1.1.1. Three pairs of value terms 
 
In the Protagoras, as in other Platonic dialogues, each of three pairs of value terms is at 
certain times distinguished from and at certain times lined up with one or both of the others: 
agathon, kakon (good, bad); kalon, aischron (beautiful, ugly; or, noble, shameful); hêdu, aniaron 
(pleasant, painful).
1
  Agathon/kakon, like our ‘good/bad’, is the most abstract and flexible of the 
three pairs: it can be used to express the idea that something serves or thwarts one’s self-interest, 
as well as to express the idea that something is good or bad for the community, or good or bad 
absolutely; the idea that some food is beneficial or corrupting to the body, as well as the idea that 
some habit or practice is beneficial or corrupting to the soul; the idea that someone is good or 
bad at some particular occupation, as well as the idea that he is a good or bad person.2  Agathon 
is the standard adjective corresponding to the noun aretê (goodness, virtue).  Kalon/aischron, 
though somewhat less all-purpose than agathon/kakon, is also fairly flexible: it can be used to 
express the idea that someone is physically attractive or repulsive, as well as to express the idea 
that some action is noble or base.  Of the three adjective pairs, it is the one most closely tied to 
notions of praise, blame, honor, and shame and, in general, to what I called in chapter 2 the 
‘manly’ frame of mind.  Hêdu/aniaron is the most immediately sensual pair of terms: while its 
range does extend from bodily pleasure and pain to spiritual joy and sorrow, and while it can be 
                                                
1
 What follows is a brief discussion of the differences between these terms.  For a more detailed discussion, see K. J. 
Dover, Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle, pp. 51-3 and 69-73 especially.    
2
 Cf. the use of agathos and kakos in Simonides’ poem (339b1, 344c4, 344d8, 344e7-8, 346c3) and in Socrates’ 
interpretation of it (esp. 345a1-c3). 
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used to refer to an objective quality about which a person may be mistaken (e.g., the sweetness 
of honey), it is the one of these three pairs that is most tightly bound to subjective sense 
experience.
1
     
 Most children, whether ancient Athenian or modern American, whether taught to use the 
words agathon, kalon, hêdu or the words good, beautiful, pleasant, are sufficiently familiar with 
but also sufficiently confused about these three pairs of value terms that they are inclined at 
times to unite each pair with each of the others, but also at times to set each pair at odds with 
each of the others, depending on the “diet” of examples they are fed
2
; and many such children 
turn into adults who retain these inclinations.  Someone who is skilled at asking questions can 
easily exploit this kind of confusion, as Socrates does, I think, in the courage-wisdom section.
3
   
                                                
1
 The following passage from Plato’s Laws illustrates some of these differences in range of use and meaning (though 
the view expressed by the Athenian at the end is far from the conventional ancient Greek view):  
     ATHENIAN: . . . Granted that a man is brave, strong, handsome (kalos), rich, and can satisfy every passion of a 
lifetime, do you deny that, if he is an unjust and arrogant man (adikos . . . kai hubristês), his life must inevitably be 
dishonorable (ex anangkês aischrôs an zê[i]n)?  Or possibly you would go so far as to concede the dishonor (to ge 
aischrôs). 
     CLINIAS: Readily. 
     ATHENIAN: And inevitably [bad], too (to kai kakôs)?  Would you allow that? 
     CLINIAS: No, that is not to be so readily admitted (ouk an eti touth’ homoiôs). 
     ATHENIAN: And, further, unpleasant (to kai aêdôs) and inexpedient for himself (mê xumpherontôs autôi)? 
     CLINIAS: How can we possibly carry concession to that pitch?  
     ATHENIAN: How?  Apparently only by the intervention of a god to produce a concord as complete as our 
present discordance.  For my part, dear Clinias, I find it even more certain that these truths are beyond question than 
that Crete is an island. (661e-662b, A. E. Taylor’s translation.) 
2
 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations §593:  “A main cause of philosophical disease—a one-sided diet: one 
nourishes one’s thinking with only one kind of example.” 
3
 To illustrate this point and to help prepare the reader for what is to come, I offer this made-up exchange 
between a Socrates-like questioner and an answering child: 
 
When your head or stomach hurts, does that mean that something bad has happened to your body, 
or something good? —Something bad.  When you hit your brother on the head or punch him in the 
stomach, hard enough to make him cry, what do your parents say: that you’ve done something 
good, or something bad? —Something bad.  So whether it’s you who’s feeling pain or somebody 
else, pain goes together with badness? —Right.  And pleasure goes together with goodness? —
Yes.  When your father makes you eat your vegetables, or when your mother makes you get a shot 
at the doctor’s, do you like it? —No, I hate it.  It pains you? —Yes.  Then since pain goes together 
with badness, when your father tells you to eat your vegetables, he must say something like this: 
“Eat your vegetables, they’re bad for you.”  Isn’t that what he says? —No, he says the reverse; he 
says they’re good for me.  Well, but when your mother takes you to the doctor’s, surely she 
doesn’t tell you that the painful shot you’re getting is for your own good? —But that’s just what 
she does say.  Then do you still think that pain goes together with badness? —No, maybe not.  
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3.1.1.2. Two pairs of questions 
 
 A simpler set of distinctions may be drawn between the questions “What is courageous 
behavior?” and “What is responsible for courageous behavior?” and between the questions 
“What is akratic behavior?” and “What is responsible for akratic behavior?”  Each pair of 
questions may be derived from a general pair of questions which I distinguished in chapter 2: 
“What is a good performance of this kind?” and “What is responsible for a good performance of 
this kind?”  I think that the kind of performance in question, in the case of both courageous and 
akratic behavior, is the living of a human life.  And whereas to live a courageous life—or, in 
some episode within one’s life, to behave courageously—is to excel in a distinctive way at this 
kind of performance, to live an akratic life—or, in some episode within one’s life, to behave 
akratically—is to fail in a distinctive way at this same kind of performance.  
 
3.1.1.3. Two ways of thinking about courageous behavior 
 
 Later I will argue that the courage-wisdom section may be usefully viewed as an attempt 
by Socrates to lead Protagoras out of a somewhat confused and largely ‘manly’ way of thinking 
about courageous behavior and into an ‘epistemic’ way of thinking about it.  But all I wish to do 
                                                                                                                                                       
Well, then, if painful things are sometimes good for you, why are they good for you?  For instance, 
are painful shots good for you because they make you sick, or because they keep you healthy? —
Because they keep me healthy.  And why don’t you want to get sick?  Is it because it’s very 
painful to be sick? —Yes, that’s why.  So being sick is bad because it’s very painful? —Yes.  
More painful than getting a shot at the doctor’s, or less? —More painful.  So painful shots are 
good for you because they prevent something even more painful? —That’s right.  Then might pain 
go together with badness after all? —I don’t know. 
 
This conversation focuses on the relation between two pairs of terms, ‘good/bad’ and ‘pleasant/painful’.  
Similar conversations might be imagined involving the other two relations, between ‘good/bad’ and 
‘noble/shameful’ and between ‘noble/shameful’ and ‘pleasant/painful’.  Cf. First Alcibiades 115aff. 
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now is to distinguish these two ways of thinking about courageous behavior.  Each way involves 
distinctive ways of answering the pair of questions distinguished above: “What is courageous 
behavior?” and “What is responsible for courageous behavior?”  I begin with the somewhat 
confused, largely ‘manly’ way. 
 Someone who thinks in this way will readily agree that courage is a praiseworthy quality 
that has to do with fear and confidence.  The courageous man, in virtue of his courage, goes 
confidently forward to meet what the coward shrinks from in fear, and he is to be highly 
regarded because of his courage.  What counts as courageous behavior?  Is it any old confident 
going-forward to meet what most people fear to meet, or are there further limitations?  Here the 
person who thinks in this way is of two minds.  On the one hand, he is inclined to say that any 
case in which a person boldly goes where most of us are too afraid to go is a case of courageous 
behavior.  Thus a temple-robber, in the very act of robbing a temple, would on this view 
demonstrate courage, since he would be boldly committing an act which most of us are too afraid 
to commit.  Indeed, on this view, part of what makes the robber so manly and brave (and 
deserving of qualified praise)
1
 is that while most other people are held back by a fearful sense of 
shame at the thought of committing unjust and impious acts, the robber, if he has any social 
fears, is ‘man’ enough to override them.
2
  On the other hand, the person who thinks in this 
somewhat confused way about courageous behavior will also be inclined to say that courage is 
inherently noble and beautiful (kalon) and that any case of bold behavior which is not kalon, 
however rare or gutsy, is not a case of courageous behavior.  Thus if unjust acts are ignoble and 
ugly, they cannot, on this view, be courageous.  But while the person who thinks in this way will 
want to deny that courage is ever directly responsible for a person’s acting against to kalon (the 
                                                
1
 E.g., “I will say this for him, the man has guts.” 
2
 Cf. Gorgias 494d, where Socrates suggests that because Callicles is andreios (courageous, manly) he will not be 
held back by a sense of shame, as were Gorgias and Polus.    
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noble), he may agree that courage sometimes makes a person act against his best interests, i.e., 
against to agathon (the good).  He may, for instance, say that when Achilles sacrificed his life to 
avenge Patroclus, he acted nobly and beautifully, but against his best interests.  Indeed, on this 
view, part of what makes Achilles’ behavior so brave is that he was willing to act against his 
own good for the sake of the noble.   
  As for the question “What is responsible for courageous behavior?”, the person who 
thinks in this way will probably say that it is a kind of psychic toughness, something that enables 
one to persevere in the face of pain or fearful things.  On the one hand, he will be inclined to say 
that it involves an ability to override one’s sense of shame so as to bring oneself to violate a 
social taboo.  On the other hand, he will be inclined to say that it implies a proper upbringing 
which makes a person able to distinguish between the noble and the shameful, together with a 
passionate commitment to the noble which is strong enough to override one’s desire for the 
pleasant or for the good (if ever either one of these conflicts with the noble).     
 
 Consider now a person who thinks of courageous behavior in an ‘epistemic’ way.  Like 
the person just mentioned, he, too, will agree that courage is a praiseworthy quality that has to do 
with fear and confidence.  And like this other person, he will find something in fearless rogues 
which he is tempted to call courage, even as he is also tempted to say that acting courageously is 
incompatible with acting unjustly, though compatible with acting against one’s best interests.  
Unlike the abovementioned thinker, however, the ‘epistemic’ thinker will call these ways of 
thinking into question and notice how they conflict.  He will also try hard to arrive at a single, 
coherent account of courageous behavior.  And he will test how well his own understanding of 
courage measures up to the knowledge of courage.  In addition to trying to fit his best thoughts 
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about courageous behavior together with each other, he will also try to fit his best thoughts about 
courage together with his best thoughts about the other human virtues, e.g., justice and wisdom.  
He will be troubled by the conclusion that a courageous man’s behavior is sometimes at odds 
with a just man’s behavior, or that a wise man’s behavior is sometimes at odds with a courageous 
man’s behavior.  As he works his way towards a coherent account not just of the courageous man 
but of the wholly or truly good man, “in hands and feet and mind foursquare,”1 he will try to 
refute such conclusions.  
 How will the person who thinks in this way about courage (and who inhabits an 
epistemic frame of mind with regard to the activity of living a human life) address the question: 
“What is responsible for courageous behavior?”?  Since he thinks of the activity of living a 
human life as properly governed by knowledge, he assumes that if courage is a human virtue, 
i.e., if to live courageously is to succeed in some way at living a human life, then courageous 
behavior must be a kind of knowledge-guided behavior.  Courage may turn out to be an 
executive virtue, but if so, it will only count as a virtue so long as it is under the guidance of 
knowledge; take this guidance away, and whatever courage-like state may remain will not be a 
virtue, if what is meant by a virtue is something that can be counted on to give rise to good 
human behavior.  Assuming courage is a virtue in this sense (this person will think), a 
courageous man’s behavior must at least in part be thanks to his knowledge of how to live well.  
 
3.1.1.4. The bare courageous act and the feeling of confidence 
 When trying to account for each small step that Socrates takes in the courage-wisdom 
argument,2 it helps to distinguish between the bare act performed by the courageous person and 
                                                
1
 Simonides’ words, cited at 339b.   
2
 E.g., at 360ab.   
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the courageous feeling with which he performs it.  Consider a situation in which the courageous 
thing to do is to pick up a spider.  One person walks right up to the spider and confidently picks 
it up; another person is afraid of the spider, hesitates as he approaches it, but somehow brings 
himself to pick it up; a third person is so frightened by the spider that he refuses to touch it.  
While the first two people should be distinguished from the third person, they should also be 
distinguished from each other.  Protagoras and Socrates, at any rate, appear to think that the 
courageous person does not just perform some bare courageous act but performs it readily, 
confidently, even eagerly.1   
 
3.1.1.5. Two ways of thinking about akratic behavior 
 
 Later I will argue that the demonstration to the many (353c-357e) may be usefully 
viewed as an attempt by Socrates to lead the many out of a common, confused way of thinking 
about akratic behavior and into a more ‘epistemic’ way of thinking about it.  Now, however, I 
simply wish to distinguish these two ways of thinking.  Each involves distinctive ways of 
addressing the pair of questions distinguished above: “What is akratic behavior?” and “What is 
responsible for akratic behavior?”  Let me begin with the common, confused way of thinking. 
 Someone who thinks in this way will readily agree that akratic behavior is action against 
one’s knowledge of what is best.  On this view, the akratic agent knows what it would be best to 
do (e.g., remain at his post), is able to do it, but feels like doing something else instead (e.g., 
fleeing) and gives in to this feeling.  The person who thinks in this way about akratic behavior, 
when asked what kinds of things he calls good, will answer differently, depending on the kinds 
of examples he has in mind.  If put in mind of a narrow set of examples, he may say that what he 
                                                
1
 Consider in particular Protagoras’s use of the word itas (‘eager’) at 349e3, which is recalled by Socrates at 359c1-3 
and 359d.  The use of itas at 359d1ff. harks back to the use of hekôn (‘willingly, readily’) at 358c7 and hekonta (a 
form of hekôn) at 358e6. 
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calls good are certain tangible things whose desirability is obvious to him, e.g., bodily health and 
material wealth.  If put in mind of a wider set of examples, he may name certain other things, 
e.g., justice and wisdom, which he has heard other people praise highly and call very good, and 
which he himself calls good as well, in part because he trusts these people’s judgment, in part 
because the goodness of these things is partly perceptible even to him.  Yet unlike health and 
wealth (he may add), he does not care about these things as much as he should.  Given the 
narrower set of examples, the person may agree that the best action is the one that most 
effectively brings the agent what he in fact desires most, and that the akratic acts akratically 
either because he does not clearly see or know what is best (which contradicts this person’s own 
description of akratic behavior) or because he is somehow compelled to act against his 
knowledge (which also contradicts this person’s description of akratic behavior).  Given the 
wider set of examples, however, the person may be led to say that the best action is the one that 
will bring the agent what he ought to desire most deeply, whether or not he does, and that the 
akratic acts akratically because he does not care about goodness as much as he should.   
 
Consider now a person who thinks of akratic behavior in an ‘epistemic’ way and who 
inhabits an epistemic frame of mind with regard to his life as a whole.  Like the person just 
mentioned, he will agree that there is a distinctive kind of erring behavior which is commonly 
described as acting against one’s knowledge of what is best.  Unlike this other person, it will 
occur to him that there must be something wrong with this description, if indeed the knowledge 
in question is the sort of knowledge that properly governs the activity of living a human life.  For 
how, he will ask, can a person with such knowledge fail to inhabit the epistemic frame of mind 
with regard to the activity of living a human life?  And how can a person who inhabits this frame 
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of mind with regard to this activity fail to act in accordance with this knowledge of his?  No, if 
the akratic fails to do what is best (he will argue), the problem must be either inability or 
ignorance.  Since ex hypothesi the problem is not inability, the problem must be ignorance. 
 
3.1.2. What Socrates is trying to do 
 
3.1.2.1. The courage-wisdom section 
 
  What is Socrates trying to do in the courage-wisdom section?  Just before the section 
begins, Socrates assures Protagoras that the only reason he is conversing with him is that he 
wants to examine well (diaskepsasthai) those things with respect to which he, Socrates, is at a 
loss (ha autos aporô).1  Immediately after the courage-wisdom section, Socrates reassures 
Protagoras that he asks all the questions he asks for no other reason than that he wants to 
examine (skepsasthai) the truth about matters relating to virtue (pôs pot’ echei ta peri tês aretês) 
and also what virtue itself is (ti pot’ estin auto, hê aretê).2  The particular question that Socrates 
focuses on in this section is how courage is related to the rest of virtue and, in particular, to 
wisdom.  If Socrates is telling the truth, his aim in the courage-wisdom section is to examine this 
question along with Protagoras.  
 But there are various ways in which two people might conduct a joint examination; in 
what way does Socrates wish to conduct the present one?  He seems to me to view the situation 
in something like the following terms.  He, Socrates, has been granted the right to ask questions, 
and it is his responsibility and privilege to lead the inquiry in the way that seems best to him.
3
  
As for the object of inquiry, he knows that his own way of thinking about it, though the product 
of years of careful thinking, is unsatisfactory; and he supposes that Protagoras’s way, though 
                                                
1
 348c5-7.   
2
 360e6-8.   
3
 See 348c1-4, 351e3-11, 353b1-5.       
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probably also unsatisfactory, is the product of even more years of careful thinking.
1
  When 
Socrates discovers that Protagoras’s way of thinking about the relation between courage and the 
rest of virtue is very much at odds with his own, he decides that the best way to lead the inquiry 
will be to try, by asking questions, to lift Protagoras out of his own accustomed way of thinking 
about courageous behavior and lead him into a more Socratic way of thinking about it.  Such an 
attempt, which involves, as it were, a rubbing together of two distinct ways of thinking about the 
same issue, is likely either to turn up flaws in Socrates’ way of thinking while corroborating 
Protagoras’s, or else to corroborate Socrates’ way of thinking while turning up flaws in 
Protagoras’s.  Or it may turn up flaws on both sides.      
 Whether or not this is an accurate characterization of Socrates’ approach to the inquiry, it 
is at least in the spirit of his comments to Protagoras at 348de, directly before the courage-
wisdom section:   
 
I hold that there is a good deal in what Homer says— 
 
When two go together, one observes before the other; 
 
for somehow it makes all of us human beings more resourceful in every deed or word or thought; 
but if one observes something alone, forthwith one has to go about searching until one discovers 
somebody to whom one can show it off and who can corroborate it (hotôi epideixêtai kai meth’ 
hotou bebaiôsêtai).  And I also have my reason for being glad to debate with you rather than with 
anyone else; it is that I regard you as the best person to investigate in general any matters that a 
sensible man may be expected to examine, and virtue in particular.  Whom else should I choose 
but you?”
2 
 
                                                
1
 Cf. 320b: “I therefore, Protagoras, in view of these facts, believe that virtue is not teachable: but when I hear you 
speak thus, I am swayed over (kamptomai), and suppose there is something in what you say (oimai ti se legein), 
because I consider you to have gained experience in many things (pollôn men empeiron gegonenai) and to have 
learnt many (polla de memathêkenai), besides finding out some yourself (ta de auton exêurêkenai).” 
2
 348de; cf. also 320b.  More evidence that Socrates conceives of this conversation as one in which both he and 
Protagoras are being put to the test may be found at 331c, 333c, and 348a. 
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 If it is true that Protagoras and Socrates enter the conversation each with his own 
characteristic way of thinking about courageous behavior, and that Socrates is trying to ask the 
sort of questions that will lead Protagoras out of his own way of thinking and into a more 
Socratic way, what are these two ways of thinking?  In section 3.1.1.3, I distinguished two ways 
of thinking about courageous behavior, one of which I called a somewhat confused, largely 
‘manly’ way, the other of which I called an ‘epistemic’ way.  It seems to me that Protagoras 
enters the conversation predisposed to think about courageous behavior in the first of these two 
ways and that Socrates enters the conversation predisposed to think about courageous behavior 
in the second way.   
Specifically, Protagoras appears to me to be inclined to think that courageous behavior is 
compatible with injustice; that courageous behavior is inherently noble and beautiful; that 
injustice is shameful and ugly; that courageous behavior is therefore incompatible with injustice 
[note the confusion]; that courageous behavior is compatible with acting against one’s best 
interests (e.g., sacrificing one’s life for the sake of a noble cause); that what is responsible for 
courageous behavior, namely, courage, is a kind of psychic toughness that enables one to 
persevere in the face of pain or fearsome things; that such toughness could come from nature 
alone, since even some beasts seem to have it; and that courage essentially involves an ability to 
distinguish the noble from the shameful, an ability which presumably requires a proper 
upbringing, or at any rate something more than mere nature, so that, in fact, courage cannot 
come from nature alone [again, note the confusion].  Socrates, on the other hand, appears to enter 
the conversation already inclined to try to arrive not only at a unified account of courage that 
integrates our best thoughts about courageous behavior, but also at a unified account of human 
virtue that integrates our best thoughts about good human behavior generally; to be troubled by 
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the assertion that a courageous man’s behavior is sometimes at odds with a just man’s behavior, 
or that a wise man’s behavior is sometimes at odds with a courageous man’s; to try to refute such 
assertions; and to think that courageous behavior, whatever else it is, must be a kind of 
knowledge-guided behavior and that therefore what is responsible for courageous behavior must 
be a kind of knowledge. 
If, as I suggest, Socrates is trying in the courage-wisdom section to lead Protagoras out of 
his largely ‘manly’ way of thinking about courageous behavior and into an ‘epistemic’ way of 
thinking about it, the better to discover flaws in these two ways of thinking, then with regard to 
the question “What is courageous behavior?”, Socrates is trying (among other things) to lead 
Protagoras to reject the claim that a courageous man’s behavior is sometimes at odds with a just 
man’s behavior, or with a wise man’s behavior, and to embrace the claim that a courageous 
man’s behavior can never be at odds with a perfectly good man’s behavior.  And with regard to 
the question “What is responsible for courageous behavior?”, Socrates is trying (among other 
things) to lead Protagoras to embrace the idea that what makes courageous people act 
courageously is a kind of knowledge. 
 
 Assuming that Socrates is in fact trying to do this, what obstacles lie between him and his 
goal?  Consider two moves that Protagoras could make in an effort to resist an ‘epistemic’ way 
of thinking about courageous behavior.  The first has more to do with the question “What is 
courageous behavior?” and may be expressed in this way: ‘Courageous people boldly go for 
what is nobler (kallion).  But what is nobler is sometimes worse [for the agent] (kakion).  Since 
prudence, i.e., wisdom, always recommends against a course of action that is worse [for the 
agent], courageous behavior is sometimes at odds with wisdom.’  The second move has more to 
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do with the question “What is responsible for courageous behavior?” and may be expressed in 
this way: ‘Even if it is true that courageous people boldly go not only for what is nobler but 
always also for what is better [for them], and that cowards are unwilling to go for this same 
thing, surely cowards sometimes know full well that they are choosing the worse of two available 
alternatives, for surely one common form of cowardly behavior is to act against one’s knowledge 
of what is best, overcome by a feeling of fear.  If so, knowledge, i.e., wisdom, is not enough to 
guarantee courageous behavior; so courage is not wisdom.’
1
 
One way in which Socrates might block these two moves is by broaching the subject of 
akratic behavior and leading Protagoras to agree that no one ever acts against his knowledge of 
what is best (a denial of knowledge-akrasia) and that no one ever willingly goes for what he 
thinks is bad (a version of a denial of belief-akrasia).  If no one ever acts against his knowledge 
of what is best, then it is not the case that cowards sometimes “know full well” that they are 
choosing the worse of two available alternatives, and so the second move is blocked.  As for the 
first move, Protagoras claims at 349e that courageous men eagerly go for what the many fear to 
go for; but if no one ever willingly goes for what he thinks is bad, then in eagerly going for what 
the many fear to go for, courageous people are not going for what they think is bad, but rather, 
presumably, for what they think is good.  So either (i) courageous people are mistaken in 
believing that their course of action is good [for them], or (ii) their course of action really is good 
[for them].  Since (i) is unpalatable,
2
 it seems that one must accept (ii).  Yet if courageous 
behavior is good [for the agent], it would seem to be recommended by prudence, i.e., wisdom.  
                                                
1
 Cf. Charles Kahn’s Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, p. 239.   
2
 It is one thing to think that the courageous man purposely acts against his own best interests, for the sake of the 
noble.  This has a noble ring to it.  It is another thing to suggest that what keeps the courageous person acting as he 
does is his ignorance of what is good for him.     
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So courageous behavior would not appear to be at odds with wisdom, after all; so the first move 
is blocked. 
 
To summarize:  I have suggested that in the courage-wisdom section Socrates is trying to 
lead Protagoras out of a largely ‘manly’ way of thinking about courageous behavior and into an 
‘epistemic’ way, the better to examine the relation between courage and the rest of virtue, and 
that in particular, he is trying to lead Protagoras to embrace the ideas that a courageous man’s 
behavior can never be at odds with wisdom and that what is responsible for courageous behavior 
is a kind of knowledge.  I have mentioned two moves that Protagoras can make to resist this 
attempt.  And I have said that one way in which Socrates can block these moves is by leading 
Protagoras to agree that no one ever acts against his knowledge of what is best and that no one 
ever willingly goes for what he thinks is bad.  In short, I have suggested that given Socrates’ 
aims in the courage-wisdom section, he has ample reason to lead Protagoras into a discussion of 
akratic behavior.   
 
3.1.2.2. The demonstration to the many  
 
It is one thing to account for the fact that Socrates decides to discuss akratic behavior; it 
is another to account for the peculiar form that this discussion takes.  Almost as soon as the 
section on akrasia begins, Protagoras freely concedes that no one ever acts against his knowledge 
of what is best, thereby arming Socrates with a premise that can block the first move mentioned 
above.  One might expect that at this point Socrates would proceed to a direct attempt to lead 
Protagoras to agree that no one ever willingly goes for what he thinks is bad, so as to secure for 
himself a premise that can block the second move mentioned above.  But what Socrates actually 
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does is try to justify and explain to an imagined group of people (‘the many’) the very statement 
that Protagoras has just endorsed, viz., that no one ever acts against his knowledge of what is 
best.  Why bother doing this?  When Protagoras asks Socrates a similar question at 353a, 
Socrates answers: “I fancy . . . that this will be a step towards discovering how courage is related 
to the other parts of virtue.”
1
  How is one to understand this answer?  
If Socrates’ aim in the courage-wisdom section were merely to refute Protagoras’s claim 
that some people are most unwise yet most courageous, it seems to me that he could have taken a 
much shorter route to his goal and could have skipped entirely the demonstration to the many.  I 
think it would have sufficed to lead Protagoras to concede two things, both of which Protagoras 
appears to be already inclined to concede: one, that no one ever acts against his knowledge of 
what is best; two, that noble actions are good.
2
  Having obtained these concessions, Socrates 
could proceed to argue that the coward, in refusing to fight in a noble war in which courageous 
people eagerly fight, fails to choose not only the nobler but also the better of two available 
options.
3
  Yet if the coward knew that this was his better option, he would not fail to choose it, 
since no one ever acts against his knowledge of what is best.  So if the coward had knowledge of 
the good and the bad, he would not behave in a cowardly manner.  What makes cowards 
cowardly, then, is lack of knowledge, i.e., ignorance.  From this point on, the argument could 
proceed as it does in fact proceed in the Protagoras:  ‘Surely cowardice is also what makes 
                                                
1
 353b1-3: Oimai . . . einai ti hêmin touto pros to exeurein peri andreias, pros talla moria ta tês aretês pôs pot’ 
echei.   
2
 Cf. Protagoras’s denial of knowledge-akrasia at 352cd: “Not only does it seem just as you say, Socrates, but 
further, it would be shameful indeed for me above all people to say that wisdom and knowledge (sophian kai 
epistêmên) are anything but the most powerful forces (kratiston) in human activity.”  Cf. as well Protagoras’s 
reaffirmation at 359e that all noble actions are good: “[Socrates:] Then if it is honourable, we have admitted, by our 
agreement, that it is also good; for we agreed that all honourable actions were good.  [Protagoras:] True, and I abide 
by that decision [more literally: ‘You speak the truth, and ever does it seem to me to be so (alêthê legeis, kai aei 
emoige dokei houtôs)’].”    
3
 One might well protest against this move from ‘noble’ and ‘good’ to ‘nobler’ and ‘better’, but when Socrates 
makes a similar move at 359e-360a, Protagoras does not protest.   
85 
 
cowards cowardly; so cowardice must be ignorance.  But since wisdom is the opposite of 
ignorance, and courage the opposite of cowardice, courage must be wisdom.’   
 Why not take this shortcut?  If Socrates’ aim in the courage-wisdom section were merely 
to refute Protagoras, I cannot think why he would fail to take it, assuming he notices it.  But if, as 
I have suggested, Socrates is trying throughout this section to lead Protagoras into a more 
‘epistemic’ way of thinking about courageous behavior, then Socrates’ decision to linger over the 
denial of knowledge-akrasia, and to demonstrate to the many what is really responsible for 
akratic behavior, makes strategic sense.  Rather than directly interrogate Protagoras about 
courageous behavior, which Socrates tries to do too quickly and crudely in the first courage-
wisdom argument,1 Socrates could enlist Protagoras’s help in leading the many down an 
‘epistemic’ line of thought; and as the many are being led down this path, an ‘epistemic’ way of 
thinking about human behavior would be sinking in with Protagoras all the while.   
 
 But apart from where he wants to lead Protagoras, in what direction, exactly, does 
Socrates hope to lead the many (placing ourselves now, as Socrates places Protagoras, in the 
make-believe situation in which this question makes sense)?  Recall my distinction between two 
ways of thinking of akratic behavior, one of which I called a common, confused way, the other 
of which I called an ‘epistemic’ way.
2
  It seems to me that the many are inclined to think about 
akratic behavior in the first of these two ways, that Socrates is inclined to think about it in the 
second way, and that Socrates’ immediate aim at this point in the text is to lead the many out of 
their accustomed way of thinking about akratic behavior and into a way that (imperfectly) 
approximates his own.  
                                                
1
 349e-351b.   
2
 See above, section 3.1.1.5.       
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  Specifically, the many seem to me to be inclined to think that akratic behavior is what it 
is commonly described to be, namely action against one’s knowledge of what is best; that the 
good things in life are nothing other than those tangible things whose desirability is obvious to 
them, e.g., bodily health and material wealth; that the good things in life also include such 
possessions as justice and wisdom, whose goodness is partly perceptible to them, partly beyond 
them
1
; that the best action is the one that will most effectively bring the agent what he in fact 
desires most; that the best action is the one that will bring the agent what he ought to desire most, 
whether or not he does; that what is responsible for akratic behavior is any one of a number of 
emotions; that such emotions operate on the akratic by clouding his judgment [incompatible with 
the idea that the akratic clearly sees or knows what is best]; that such emotions compel the 
akratic to act as he does [incompatible with the idea that the akratic acts freely]; that what is 
responsible for akratic behavior is that the akratic does not care for goodness as much as he 
should.  As for Socrates, he seems to be inclined to think that there is a distinctive kind of erring 
behavior which is commonly described as acting against one’s knowledge of what is best; that 
this description must be incorrect, since knowledge of the good and the bad is presumably the 
very sort of knowledge that properly governs the activity of living a human life, and anyone who 
had such knowledge (so long as he took himself to be living a human life) could never act 
against it; that what is responsible for akratic behavior must be a kind of ignorance. 
If, as I suggest, Socrates is trying to lead the many out of their accustomed way of 
thinking about akratic behavior and into a way that approximates his own, what obstacles must 
                                                
1
 I find no textual support for this, but it seems to me to be a plausible assumption about the average ancient 
Athenian.  Cf. Aristotle’s remark in Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics (1095a): “Ordinary people identify 
[happiness] with some obvious and visible good, such as pleasure or wealth or honor—some say one thing and some 
another, indeed very often the same man says different things at different times: when he falls sick he thinks health 
is happiness, when he is poor, wealth.  At other times, feeling conscious of their own ignorance, men admire those 
who propound something grand and above their heads . . . .” (H. Rackham’s translation, Loeb Classical Library.)   
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he surmount?  There are at least two: one, the fact that until the many are disabused of the idea 
that akratic behavior is action against one’s knowledge of what is best, they will only laugh at the 
suggestion that what is responsible for akratic behavior is ignorance1; two, the fact that the 
many, if fed the wrong set of examples, will be inclined to recognize a gap between what is best 
and what is most pleasant, and that once this gap is recognized, it will provide a basis for saying 
that the akratic finds something attractive other than the good and that on this account he is 
sometimes moved to act against his knowledge of the good.  An obvious way to approach the 
first obstacle is to begin by showing the many that their own way of thinking of akratic behavior 
is incoherent, only then proceeding to reveal that what is responsible for akratic behavior is 
ignorance.  And the obvious way to approach the second obstacle is to offer the many the sort of 
examples that will lead them to close the gap between the good and the pleasant. 
 
3.1.3. What Socrates does  
 
3.1.3.1. First courage-wisdom argument (349b-351b) 
 
When Protagoras tells Socrates at 349d that he will find many people who are most 
unjust, most impious, most immoderate, and most unwise (amathestatous), and yet surpassingly 
courageous (andreiotatous de diapherontôs), Socrates is very surprised.2  This claim is at odds 
with his own way of thinking about courageous behavior.  For Socrates evidently distinguishes 
between merely bold behavior, e.g., that of a daring rogue, and the kind of bold behavior that is 
in keeping with the whole of virtue, justice and wisdom included.  While Socrates appears to 
want to reserve the term ‘courageous’ for the latter kind of behavior, Protagoras seems happy (at 
                                                
1
 Cf. 357d: “If on the spur of the moment (ei men oun tote euthus) we had replied, “Ignorance,” you would have 
laughed us to scorn (kategelate an hêmôn). . . .” 
2
 Socrates informs the company later (359b6): “His answer caused me great surprise at the moment (kai egô euthus 
tote panu ethaumasa tên apokrisin).”  
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this point, at least) to apply the term ‘courageous’ to the bold behavior of a thief.  And so it is 
natural for Socrates to ask, by way of clarification, “By the courageous, do you mean [the] bold, 
or something else? (poteron tous andreious tharraleous legeis ê allo ti;)”.1  In asking this 
question Socrates seems to me to be trying to determine whether by ‘courageous’ Protagoras 
means nothing finer or nobler than ‘bold’.  While it soon becomes clear that Protagoras does 
distinguish between the courageous and the bold (he thinks the former is a subset of the latter)
 
and that he takes himself to have been asked by Socrates only whether the courageous are bold, 
not whether the bold are courageous (nor whether by ‘courageous’ he means nothing finer or 
nobler than ‘bold’),
2
 at this point Protagoras simply says: “And eager, too, [to go] for what the 
many are afraid to go for” (kai itas ge . . . eph’ ha hoi polloi phobountai ienai).3  It is at this 
point, the point at which Protagoras says kai itas ge, that Socrates, quoting these very words, will 
resume his line of questioning after a long hiatus, i.e., after the section on akrasia.
4
    
 When Socrates does resume this line of questioning at that later point, he soon refutes 
Protagoras; here, however, he fails to refute.  If Socrates was hoping to lead the inquiry in such a 
way as to turn up flaws either in his own way of thinking or in Protagoras’s way of thinking, here 
is one place where he seems to turn up a flaw in his own way of thinking—or at any rate, where 
he tries to lead Protagoras too hastily and crudely to assimilate cases of courageous behavior to 
cases of knowledge-guided behavior.  But rather than examine the inadequacies of the argument, 
let me point out certain respects in which this first courage-wisdom argument, though 
inadequate, prepares the way for the second.    
 
                                                
1
 349e2.   
2
 See 350c6-d2.   
3
 349e3.   
4
 359b7ff.   
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Almost immediately after Protagoras has said, in effect, that people can act most 
shamelessly and yet most courageously, Socrates establishes a link between the courageous and 
the noble (to kalon).  Socrates leads Protagoras to agree that every part of virtue is a noble thing 
(kalon)1 and to imply in one of his answers that any claim that would make courage out to be 
something shameful (aischron) must be mistaken.2  Thus already in the first courage-wisdom 
argument Socrates leads Protagoras away from the view that courage is compatible with 
injustice, impiety, intemperance (assuming that this, too, is necessarily shameful), and ignoble 
ignorance (e.g., the ignorance that leads foolish laymen to dive confidently into wells), while 
leading him closer to the ‘epistemic’ thought that a courageous man’s behavior must be in 
keeping with justice, wisdom, and the whole of virtue.   
Another thing that Socrates does to pave the way for the second courage-wisdom 
argument is establish a link, albeit not as close a link as he would like, between wisdom and 
confidence.  Through a series of questions about expert divers, etc., Socrates leads Protagoras to 
agree that those who have knowledge (hoi epistêmones) in some area of activity are more 
confident in that area than those who do not (tôn mê epistamenôn).3  Protagoras is put in mind of 
the fact that there is something about knowledge that lends knowers a feeling of confidence, and 
although he resists it now, he will later be forced to accept the conclusion that what lends the 
courageous man his feeling of confidence is also a kind of knowledge.   
A third thing that Socrates leads Protagoras to do at this point is distinguish between 
noble and shameful feelings of confidence, as well as between the noble and shameful sources of 
those feelings.  Courage is a source of noble confidence in the courageous man, whereas 
                                                
1
 349e3-8.  
2
 350b5.     
3
 350a6-7.   
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foolishness or madness is a source of shameful confidence in the madman or fool.
1
  This 
distinction helps prepare the way for a decisive move in the second courage-wisdom argument: 
the step to the conclusion that what causes cowards, over-bold men, and mad fools (hoi deiloi kai 
hoi thraseis kai hoi mainomenoi) to feel ignoble confidence in their pursuit of things that are bad 
[for them] is their ignorance of what is bad and good, i.e., their ignorance of what is and what is 
not to be feared.
2
  
 One final thing that emerges from the first courage-wisdom argument is that Protagoras’s 
way of thinking about courageous behavior is somewhat confused.  We learn from Protagoras’s 
opening assertion at 349d (that some people are most unjust, etc., and yet exceedingly 
courageous) that he is inclined to think that courageous behavior is compatible with injustice.
3
  
But we later learn that he is also inclined to say that courage is something noble (kalon), as is 
justice and the rest of virtue,
4
 and that shameful bold behavior cannot be deemed courageous, 
since that would make courage out to be something shameful (aischron).5  Protagoras thus seems 
to be somewhat confused about whether courageous behavior is compatible with injustice, and 
hence about what is responsible for courageous behavior: whether, for example, nature alone 
might make a person courageous, or whether courage necessarily involves the kind of moral 
education without which human beings cannot distinguish the just from the unjust.
6
  I say this in 
support of my suggestion in section 3.1.2.1 that Protagoras enters this conversation inclined to 
think about courageous behavior in the somewhat confused way described in section 3.1.1.3.   
 
                                                
1
 350b6, 351b1.   
2
 360bc.   
3
 Indeed, we learn this already at 329e, where Protagoras asserts that many people are courageous but unjust (. . . 
polloi andreioi eisin, adikoi de . . .). 
4
 349e.  
5
 350b.  
6
 Note the ambiguity of kai (‘and’? ‘or’? ‘and/or’?) in Protagoras’s comment at 351b: andreia de apo phuseôs kai 
eutrophias tôn psuchôn gignetai.   
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3.1.3.2. Second courage-wisdom argument, beginning and conclusion 
  
Beginning (351b-e) 
 
 The second courage-wisdom argument, though more successful than the first, itself 
begins with a failure.  Socrates tries to get Protagoras to agree that pleasant things—in respect of 
their pleasantness, leaving aside whatever else they may contain or bring—are good, and that 
painful things are likewise bad.
1
  Protagoras initially concedes that a person who lives out his life 
pleasantly has lived well, but he hastens to add that living pleasantly is good provided that the 
person in question take pleasure in noble things (tois kalois).2  He also twice refuses to commit 
himself to the claim that pleasant things, in respect of their pleasantness, are good, or as Socrates 
puts it the second time, that pleasure itself is a good.
3
  Protagoras says instead that there are some 
pleasant things that are not good and others that are good, some painful things that are not bad 
and others that are bad, and a third class of pleasant and painful things that are neither good nor 
bad.
4
  Protagoras, in other words, refuses to close a common-sensical gap between the pleasant 
and the good that Socrates is clearly trying to get him to close.  In this sense Socrates fails.
5
 
                                                
1
 351c4-6, 351e1-3.     
2
 351b6-c2.  Protagoras’s response distinguishes him from the many, who will later (silently) agree that it is enough 
for them to live their lives out pleasantly and without pain (355a2ff.).  Later still, Protagoras himself will agree that 
all actions that promote living painlessly and pleasantly are fine (kalai) (358b3-6). 
3
 351e2-3.   
4
 351d; cf. 351c3, where Socrates says that “the many” (hoi polloi) call some pleasant things bad and some painful 
things good.   
5
 Why would Socrates be trying to get him to close this gap at this point?  One possibility is that Socrates is already 
trying to lead Protagoras to say that what makes the coward boldly go for that which he goes for is ignorance (from 
which conclusion it follows that courage is wisdom).  Socrates may reason that so long as Protagoras can be led to 
agree that the coward boldly goes for what is worse [for him], the only thing that blocks the desired conclusion is the 
notion that cowards might knowingly pass up what is better (or, less bad) for what is more pleasant (or, less painful).  
Yet if Socrates can make Protagoras narrow the gap between the pleasant and the good—whether by identifying the 
two or by agreeing that all pleasant things, qua pleasant, are good, and that the only reason why people ever opt for 
them is that they are good—this will discredit the notion that cowards sometimes knowingly pass up what is better 
for what is more pleasant. 
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 What he does succeed in doing, however, besides gauging roughly where Protagoras 
stands on the question “What is the relation between the pleasant and the good?”,
1
 is sounding 
certain notes which he will sound again at later points in the argument.  In particular, Socrates 
here raises the question of how the pleasant is related to the good, a question he will raise again 
in the demonstration to the many.  He also here establishes a link between pleasure or pain and 
living a whole human life; at the start of this part of the argument, it is not just pleasure and pain 
that Socrates focuses on, but pleasure or pain as experienced over the course of an entire life.
2
  A 
connection between the pursuit of pleasure (and the avoidance of pain) and living one’s life as a 
whole will play an important role in the demonstration to the many.
3
  Finally, at one point in this 
part of the argument Socrates elicits a response from Protagoras which refers to all three of the 
value terms—agathon, hêdu, kalon—that I distinguished early in this chapter:  
 
  And, I suppose, to live pleasantly is good (to . . . hêdeôs zê[i]n agathon), and unpleasantly, bad 
(to aêdôs kakon)?   
  Yes, he said, if one lived in the enjoyment of honourable things (tois kalois).4   
 
Here the terms are somewhat at odds, but they will come together when Socrates questions all 
three sophists at once, and they will be powerfully reunited in the concluding stage of the 
argument.
5
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1
 Cf. 352a6-8.   
2
 Cf. 351b3-c2, and in particular b6-7: ti d’ ei hêdeôs bious ton bion teleutêseien;  ouk eu an soi dokei houtôs 
bebiôkenai; 
3
 Cf. 355a2-3 and the occurrences of bios between 356d and 357a.  Perhaps to emphasize this point, Plato makes 
Protagoras refer to all the rest of his life at 351d: “I think it safer for me to reply, with a view not merely to my 
present answer but to all the rest of my life (pros panta ton allon bion ton emon) . . . .” 
4
 351bc.   
5
 At 358b3-5 and 360a3-5, respectively.   
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Conclusion (359a-360e) 
 
I have now discussed one ‘half shell’ of the courage-wisdom section (349a-352a).  Before 
examining the meat of the nut (the section on akrasia), let me briefly discuss the other half shell 
(359a-360e).   
 
By the end of the section on akrasia, Protagoras has endorsed the following six claims: 
(1) that no one ever acts against his knowledge of what is best
1
; (2) that no one ever willingly 
goes for what he thinks is bad
2
; (3) that the pleasant is [the] good
3
; (4) that noble actions are 
good
4
; (5) that what a person fears, he believes to be bad
5
; and (6) that when he (Protagoras) says 
that ‘being weaker than oneself’ (to hêttô einai hautou) is nothing other than ignorance 
(amathia), what he means by ‘ignorance’ is having false opinions and being mistaken about 
matters of great importance.
6
  Socrates now, as I mentioned before, picks up his earlier line of 
questioning at the point where Protagoras had said that courageous men are not only bold but 
                                                
1
 352c4-d3.   
2
 358c6-d4.   
3
 The Greek at 358b6-7, as at 358a5 (where the same phrase occurs in indirect statement), is to hêdu agathon estin 
(literally, “the pleasant is good”), not to hêdu to agathon estin (“the pleasant is the good”).  But it appears from his 
response at 360a3 that Protagoras takes himself to have agreed at this earlier point, not only that that which is 
pleasant is good, but also that that which is good is pleasant. (Cf. C. C. W. Taylor’s commentary, pp. 208-9.)  For a 
Platonic passage where the construction (to + adjective1 + adjective2) must amount to (to + adjective1 + to + 
adjective2), consider Euthyphro 10d12-13: “So the god-beloved is not [the] holy, Euthyphro, nor is the holy [the] 
god-beloved, as you say, but this is different from that (Ouk ara to theophiles hosion estin, ô Euthuphrôn, oude to 
hosion theophiles, hôs su legeis, all’ heteron touto toutou).”  Burnet observes, “Socrates is not, of course, denying 
that theophiles may be predicated of to hosion.  Strictly he ought to have said oude to hosion to theophiles, in order 
to show that he means to deny that the subject and predicate are convertible.  But the usage of the language does not 
demand this when the meaning is perfectly clear from the context, as here.” (Plato: Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates, 
Crito, edited with notes by John Burnet, p. 129.)  The meaning in our passage from the Protagoras is not “perfectly 
clear from the context,” which is why I have placed the second ‘the’ in brackets.    
4
 358b5-6.    
5
 358e4-359a1.   
6
 358c1-6.   
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eager, too (kai itas ge), to go for what the many are afraid to go for.1  Recalling this earlier 
answer, Socrates stops speaking to Prodicus and Hippias and starts speaking again to Protagoras:  
 
. . . I asked him whether by the brave he meant “bold.”  Yes, he replied, and impetuous [=eager] 
(ho de, kai itas g’ ephê).  Protagoras, I said, do you remember making this answer?2  
  
When Protagoras says that he does, Socrates proceeds to lead him step by step to the conclusion 
that courage is wisdom, making use of the six claims above.  In order to show what work is done 
by claims (1) and (2) in this argument (the most important of the six for my purposes), I present 
below a summary of Socrates’ line of reasoning.   
 ‘Courageous men do not eagerly go for what they themselves consider fearful [i.e., for 
what they fear], for if they did, this would mean that they eagerly went for what they thought was 
bad [by (5)], and nobody willingly, let alone eagerly, goes for what he thinks is bad [by (2)].  On 
the contrary, courageous men go for what inspires them with confidence.  But so do cowards.  
How, then, do they differ?  For one thing, courageous men are willing to go to war, whereas 
cowards are not.  In cases where courageous men are willing to go to war, going to war is a noble 
thing.  But if it is a noble thing to do, it is also a good thing to do [by (4)].  Indeed, it would even 
seem to be a pleasant thing to do [by (3), if the bracketed ‘the’ is included].
3
  So it would seem 
that cowards, in refusing to go to war, are refusing to go for (ienai epi) the nobler, better, more 
pleasant course of action.  Yet they cannot do this knowingly [by (1)].
4
  As for feelings of 
confidence and fear [which are also an essential part of what it is to be a courageous man or a 
coward], courageous men feel noble and good feelings of confidence and fear, whereas cowards 
                                                
1
 349e3.   
2
 359bc.   
3
 C. C. W. Taylor suggests (on pp. 208-209 of his commentary) that ‘pleasant’ here should be construed in the sense 
of “contributing to a life in which pleasure predominates.”     
4
 Or, alternatively, by the following reasoning:  By refusing to go to war, cowards get the shorter end of all three 
‘sticks’ that anyone ever might care about.  So they must not realize what they are doing; otherwise, why would they 
do it?  
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feel base feelings of confidence and fear.  In other words, whereas courageous men feel 
confident in doing things that are in fact noble and good, cowards (and rash men and madmen) 
feel confident in doing things that are in fact base and bad [for them].  [Since what a person fears 
to do, he believes to be bad, it is presumably the case that what a person feels confident in doing, 
he believes to be good.  At any rate, it is clear that cowards’ feelings of fear and confidence do 
not square with the goodness and badness of their actions, and it is therefore safe to say that their 
feelings of fear and confidence reveal that they have false opinions and are mistaken about the 
goodness and badness of their actions.  This, then, is surely a case of having false opinions and 
being mistaken about matters of great importance.]  So cowards feel confident in doing things 
that are bad [for them] through nothing other than ignorance [by (6)].  [It has thus been shown (i) 
that it is because they do not realize what they are doing that cowards do what they do and refuse 
to do what they refuse to do, and (ii) that it is because they are ignorant of the badness of what 
they are doing and of the goodness of what they refuse to do that cowards feel what they feel.  In 
other words, ignorance has been shown to be responsible both for the choices that cowards make 
and for the feelings associated with these choices.]  So what makes cowards cowardly is nothing 
other than ignorance: specifically, the ignorance of what is and what is not to be feared.  But 
what makes cowards cowardly is also nothing other than cowardice.  So cowardice is the 
ignorance of what is and what is not to be feared.  Courage, on the other hand, is the opposite of 
cowardice.  And wisdom concerning what is and what is not to be feared is the opposite of 
ignorance of what is and what is not to be feared.  So courage is the wisdom of what is and what 
is not to be feared.’  
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 Protagoras refuses to agree or disagree with this final step (“Finish it yourself,” he says to 
Socrates).
1
  He does, however, obligingly admit that to judge from what has been agreed (a 
carefully self-distancing qualification), what he had asserted at first—that some people are most 
unwise, yet most courageous—now seems to him to be impossible.
2
 
 
3.1.3.3. The section on akrasia (352a-359a) 
 
 Although I have already suggested why Socrates, given his aims in the courage-wisdom 
section, would want to lead Protagoras to agree that no one ever acts against his knowledge of 
what is best and that no one ever willingly goes for what he thinks is bad, and although I have 
already shown how Socrates employs these claims in the final stage of the courage-wisdom 
argument, I have not yet described the route by which Protagoras is led to endorse these claims.  
That route is the section on akrasia.   
The section on akrasia, as I said in chapter 1, may be divided into three parts.  In the first 
part (352a-353b) Socrates and Protagoras agree that no one ever acts against his knowledge of 
what is best; Socrates tells Protagoras that ‘the many’ (hoi polloi) do not believe them but say 
that many people act against their knowledge of what is best, overcome by pleasure or anger or 
fear or some other emotion; and Socrates and Protagoras agree to imagine how the two of them 
would demonstrate to the many what is really responsible for the behavior commonly described 
as acting against one’s knowledge of what is best (i.e., what is really responsible for akratic 
behavior).  In the second part (353c-357e) Socrates and, nominally, Protagoras demonstrate to 
the many that by their own lights what is responsible for akratic behavior is a kind of ignorance.  
In the third part (358a-359a) Socrates questions the three sophists, Protagoras, Hippias, and 
                                                
1
 360d8.   
2
 360e3-5.   
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Prodicus, securing their agreement to the claim that the pleasant is [the] good, to the denial of 
belief-akrasia, and to certain other claims about fear. 
 
 
First Part: Denial of knowledge-akrasia (352a-353b) 
 
 
How does Socrates lead Protagoras to agree that no one ever acts against his knowledge 
of what is best?  He does so by asking a single long question, prefaced by a medical analogy.  As 
a doctor, after examining his patient’s face and forearms, might ask his patient to uncover his 
chest and back, so Socrates, having seen how Protagoras stands with respect to the good and the 
pleasant, now asks Protagoras to reveal how he stands with respect to knowledge (pôs echeis 
pros epistêmên).1  In other words, Socrates is asking Protagoras to ‘strip’ for him intellectually, a 
characteristic Socratic request, charged with certain ‘manly’ associations (being socially 
exposed, judged by others, found to have flaws that one is normally able to hide from view, 
etc.).
2
  And what could be a more intimate part of one’s intellect to reveal than one’s knowledge 
(or ignorance) of knowledge itself?  For Protagoras, of course, the matter is not just personal, but 
also professional.  Protagoras presents himself to the world as a seller of knowledge; and as a 
                                                
1
 352ab.   
2
 Cf. Charmides 154dff: “Then Chaerephon called me and said—How does the youth strike you, Socrates?  Has he 
not a fine face? —Immensely so, I replied.  Yet if he would consent to strip, he said, you would think he had no 
face, he has such perfect beauty of form. . . . —By Heracles! I said, what an irresistible person you make him out to 
be, if he has but one more thing—a little thing—besides.  What? said Critias.  If in his soul, I replied, he is of good 
grain.  And I should think, Critias, he ought to be, since he is of your house.  Ah, he said, he is right fair and good in 
that way also.  Why then, I said, let us strip that very part of him and view it first, instead of his form . . . .”  (Loeb 
Classical Library translation)   Cf. also Theaetetus 145b: “SOCRATES: But what if he praised the mind of either of 
us for virtue and wisdom?  Wouldn’t it be worth while for one of us, when he heard that, to do his best to inspect the 
one who’d been praised, and for the other to do his best to show himself off?  THEAETETUS: Definitely, Socrates.  
SOCRATES: Well then, Theaetetus, now is the time for you to show yourself off, and for me to look on . . . .”; 
162b: “SOCRATES: And if you went to the wrestling rings in Sparta, Theodorus, would you think it proper to 
watch other people who were stripped, some of them with rather inferior physiques, and not take your own clothes 
off and show your figure?  THEODORUS: Why do you think not, if they’d give in to me and accept my persuasion?  
Just so, I think I’m going to persuade you now to let me watch . . . .”; 169a: “THEODORUS: It isn’t easy to avoid 
saying something when one’s sitting with you, Socrates.  I was talking nonsense just now, when I claimed that you’d 
let me keep my clothes on and not make me take them off . . . .” (John McDowell’s Oxford translation.)  
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cheesemonger is expected to know cheese, and as a fishmonger is expected to know fish, so a 
seller of knowledge is expected to know knowledge.  But not only would it be bad business for 
Protagoras to come across as not knowing knowledge, it would also be bad business for him to 
come across as failing to think very highly of knowledge.  Effective salesman praise their wares, 
even (sometimes) when the praise is undeserved.
1
  So when Socrates presents Protagoras with a 
choice between describing knowledge as (A) something strong (ischuron),2 leading 
(hêgemonikon), ruling (archikon; hoion archein tou anthrôpou),3 noble (kalon),4 and sufficient to 
rescue the one who has it (hikanên . . . boêthein tôi anthrôpôi),5 or (B) like a slave (hôsper peri 
andrapodou),6 dragged about (perielkomenês) by various emotions,7 which is how ‘the many’ 
(hoi polloi) view it,8 Protagoras can hardly choose (B).  Perhaps had Socrates simply asked, 
“Does anyone ever act against his knowledge of what is best?”, this would have served as well as 
the elaborate question he does ask, for perhaps Protagoras really does think that no one ever acts 
against his knowledge of what is best.  But by framing his question in ‘manly’ terms, from the 
image of the doctor to the image of the degraded slave, Socrates all but forces Protagoras to deny 
the existence of knowledge-akrasia.  As Protagoras himself says, “it would be shameful indeed 
(aischron) for me above all people to say that wisdom and knowledge (sophian kai epistêmên) 
are anything but the most powerful forces (kratiston) in human activity.”9  
Socrates thus scores his first significant success in the courage-wisdom section; having 
stumbled twice before, he now leads Protagoras to take a major step in an ‘epistemic’ direction.  
                                                
1
 Cf. 313dff.   
2
 352b4.  
3
 352c4.   
4
 352c3.   
5
 352c6-7.  
6
 352c1.  
7
 352c2.   
8
 352b1-2.   
9
 352d (Stanley Lombardo and Karen Bell’s translation).   
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But while Protagoras and Socrates have just agreed that no one ever acts against his knowledge 
of what is best, it is by no means clear that have they done so on the basis of similar reasoning.  
Socrates’ denial of knowledge-akrasia is rooted in what I have called his ‘epistemic’ way of 
thinking.  Might Protagoras base his on a more ‘manly’ way of thinking, as the wording of his 
answer leads one to suspect?  If so, might Protagoras be brought around to think of akratic 
behavior in an ‘epistemic’ way?  A good way to find out would be by leading Protagoras through 
an ‘epistemic’ justification of the very claim that he himself has just endorsed, and asking him 
what he thinks of it.  Socrates could try to do this directly, presenting his own demonstration and 
asking Protagoras what he thinks of it at each step.  But he could also take an indirect approach: 
he could ‘team up’ with Protagoras, presenting a joint demonstration to the people to whom it is 
more natural to give one, namely the many people who disagree with them.  The hope would be 
that as ‘the many’ were being led down an ‘epistemic’ line of thought about akratic behavior, an 
epistemic way of thinking about human behavior would be sinking in with Protagoras all the 
while.  Then, when the demonstration was over, Socrates could turn to Protagoras and ask, “Do I 
seem to you to speak the truth?”  By that time, Protagoras might not only endorse an epistemic 
claim about knowledge-akrasia, he might also endorse an epistemic way of arguing for it.      
Who, then, is the author of the demonstration to the many?  On the one hand, Socrates 
frequently speaks as if he and Protagoras are presenting this demonstration together, both at the 
beginning and at the end.
1
  On the other hand, in addition to the obvious fact that Socrates does 
virtually all of the argumentative work, the demonstration itself is immediately preceded by the 
words “I, for my part, would speak to them as follows” (eipoim’ an egôge pros autous hôdi);2 
                                                
1
 352e5-6: ithi dê met’ emou epicheirêson peithein tous anthrôpous kai didaskein . . . ; 353a4: Ô Prôtagora te kai 
Sôkrates . . . ; 353c3-4: peirasometha gar humin egô te kai Prôtagoras phrasai . . . . ; 353c9: egô te kai su; 357b7-
c1: tên apodeixin hên eme dei kai Prôtagoran apodeixai peri hôn êresth’ hêmas; 357cd, passim.  
2
 353c3, my translation.     
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and in the middle of the demonstration Socrates often reverts to the first person singular.
1
  I think 
that the right thing to say is that while Socrates conceives of the demonstration as a joint answer 
which he and Protagoras would give to the many, it is his idea of what that joint answer would 
be.  Thus immediately after saying, “I, for my part, would speak to them as follows,” Socrates 
continues, “‘Listen up: Protagoras and I will try to show you.’”
2
 
 
Second Part: The demonstration to the many (353c-357e) 
 
What is the demonstration to the many a demonstration of?  Here it will help to recall the 
distinction between the questions “What is akratic behavior?” and “What is responsible for 
akratic behavior?”
3
  What Socrates and Protagoras are ultimately trying to demonstrate to the 
many is that what is responsible for akratic behavior is ignorance; but in order to do this 
persuasively, they must first refute the many’s description of what akratic behavior is, together 
with their explanation of what is responsible for akratic behavior.  The many describe akratic 
behavior as action against one’s knowledge of what is best.  The many’s explanation of akratic 
behavior is that the akratic is ‘defeated’ or ‘worsted’ by pleasure, anger, fear, or some other 
emotion.  Why must Socrates and Protagoras engage in refutation first?  Earlier, I mentioned two 
obstacles that Socrates needs to surmount in this part of the text.
4
  The first was that until the 
many are disabused of the idea that akratic behavior is action against one’s knowledge of what is 
best, they will probably just laugh at the suggestion that what is responsible for akratic behavior 
                                                
1
 354e3: . . . ei me aneroisthe . . .; e5: Sungignôskete moi, phaiên an egôge; 355a5: phêmi; 356c2: phaiên; 356c4: 
tode moi apokrinasthe, phêsô.   
2
 353c3-4, my translation.  A further complication is that just before the climax of the ‘refutative’ stage of the 
demonstration, Socrates resorts to the device of an ‘insolent questioner’ who does the refuting for him, while he, for 
his part, joins the many in their role as answerers.  Cf. Vlastos (1969), pp. 79-80: “[T]he prosecutor is that ‘insolent 
fellow,’ Socrates’ rude-spoken alter ego, called in here as in the Hippias Major (286cff.) to rub the opponent’s nose 
into the dirt . . . .”  
3
 Cf. Gerasimos Santas’s distinction between the phenomenon of weakness and explanations of weakness (“Plato’s 
Protagoras and Explanation of Weakness,” p. 5 and p. 12).  
4
 See section 3.1.2.2, final paragraph.   
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is ignorance.
1
  This appears to be the reason why the demonstration comes in two stages, a 
‘refutative’ stage (353c1-356c3) in which the many’s own account of akratic behavior is shown 
to be absurd, followed by a ‘constructive’ stage (356c4-357e8) in which it is shown that what is 
responsible for akratic behavior is a kind of ignorance.
2
     
 
A. Refutative stage (353c-356c) 
 
 What, exactly, is the many’s own account of akratic behavior?  It is stated a number of 
times, in a variety of ways, but perhaps the clearest formulation comes near the middle of the 
demonstration, when Socrates restates the many’s position as follows:  
 
[Y]ou say that often a person, knowing that the bad things [in question] are bad (pollakis 
gignôskôn ta kaka hoti kaka estin), nevertheless does them (homôs prattei auta), it being open to 
him not to do them (exon mê prattein), [because he is] driven and stricken by pleasures (hupo tôn 
hêdonôn agamenos kai ekplêttomenos).  And again, conversely, you say that the person, knowing 
the good things (gignôskôn ho anthrôpos t’agatha) [i.e., the things that it would be good to do], is 
unwilling to do them (prattein ouk ethelei), on account of being worsted by the pleasures of the 
moment (dia tas parachrêma hêdonas, hupo toutôn hêttômenos).3  
 
In order to appreciate the transformation undergone by this account in the course of the 
demonstration, it helps to distinguish between the many’s account of akratic behavior in the 
spirit in which it is first put forward and their account of akratic behavior as reworked by 
Socrates’ questioning. 
                                                
1
 See 357d (also cited above): “If on the spur of the moment (ei men oun tote euthus) we had replied, “Ignorance,” 
you would have laughed us to scorn (kategelate an hêmôn). . . .”  Cf. Socrates’ remark that “it is not easy to 
demonstrate (ou radion apodeixai) what that is which you call being weaker than pleasures”  (354e6-7, my 
translation).    
2
 John Burnet, in the OCT, divides the demonstration to the many into three long paragraphs.  What I am calling the 
‘refutative’ stage corresponds to the first two of these, and the ‘constructive’ stage corresponds to the third.   
3
 355ab, my translation. 
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The text is silent on the question what line of thinking lies behind the many’s initial 
account of akratic behavior (i.e., the thinking in the backs of their minds before Socrates starts 
asking them leading questions), but perhaps a developed version of it would run somewhat as 
follows:  ‘Sometimes the better (to beltion) and the more pleasant (to hêdion) are at odds with 
each other.  Both matter to the akratic, but he tends to regard to beltion more highly (i.e., he 
praises it more, considers it more kalon, etc.).  On the other hand, he tends to be attracted more 
strongly by to hêdion; when faced with a choice between to beltion and to hêdion, he tends to 
feel a stronger pull in the direction of to hêdion, and he tends to go along with it.  The akratic 
therefore often finds himself in the position of criticizing himself for passing up to beltion in 
favor of to hêdion; he passes it up because he feel himself more strongly attracted by to hêdion, 
and he criticizes himself (considers himself to have made a poor choice, to have done something 
regrettable, etc.) because he holds to beltion in higher regard.1  Accordingly, a feeling of shame 
typically accompanies, or at any rate follows, akratic behavior.’  The many themselves have 
presumably not thought through their position this carefully, but the spirit in which their account 
of akratic behavior is initially put forward seems to me to fit this line of thinking better than it 
does the hedonistic line of thinking down which Socrates is soon to lead them. 
 Recall what I said was the second obstacle that Socrates needs to surmount in this part of 
the text: that the many, if offered the wrong set of examples, will be inclined to recognize a gap 
between what is best and what is most pleasant, and that if this gap is recognized it will provide a 
basis for saying that the akratic finds something attractive other than the good.  Recall as well my 
early observation that most children, whether taught to use the words agathon, kalon, hêdu or 
                                                
1
 Cf. Gary Watson’s distinction (in “Free Agency”) between valuing and desiring.   Cf. as well Harry Frankfurt’s 
distinction between first-order and second-order desires.  The akratic may be said to desire pleasure more than he 
desires goodness, even as he desires that he desired goodness more than pleasure.  The first-order desire would 
explain why he passes up to beltion in favor of to hêdion; the second-order desire would explain why he considers 
himself to have made a poor choice. 
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some other similar set of terms, are inclined at times to line each pair up with each of the others, 
but also at times to set each pair at odds with each of the others, and that many such children 
grow up to be adults who retain both inclinations.  I think that this description fits ‘the many’ in 
this text.  For on the one hand, the opposition of the pleasant and the good in their own account 
of akratic behavior, together with Socrates’ earlier remark to Protagoras that the many call some 
pleasant things bad and some painful things good, suggests that the many are inclined to set the 
pair ‘good/bad’ at odds with the pair ‘pleasant/painful’.
1
  On the other hand, their answers to 
Socrates’ questions during the demonstration reveal that they are also inclined to line up ‘good’ 
with ‘pleasant’ and ‘bad’ with ‘painful’, agreeing, when pressed, that the two pairs of terms pick 
out one and the same pair of qualities.  It seems to me that Socrates surmounts the second 
obstacle by feeding the many the kind of examples that will lead them only in this second 
direction. 
 
 In his initial question about knowledge-akrasia Socrates, as we saw, made liberal use of 
‘manly’ language.  At the beginning of the demonstration to the many, such language is 
conspicuously absent.
2
  Socrates first suggests such examples as being ‘overcome’ by food, 
drink, and sex so as to do bad things, then asks the many, “In what sense do you call them bad 
(ponêra)?”3  Had they been given a chance to respond straightaway, the many might have 
mentioned such things as shame and ugliness, i.e., they might have spoken in ‘manly’ terms.  But 
Socrates does not let them go down this path.
4
  Without waiting for an answer, he presents the 
                                                
1
 351c: “You don’t mean to say that you, too, like the many, call some pleasant things bad and some painful things 
good (mê kai su, hôsper hoi polloi, hêde’ atta kaleis kaka kai aniara agatha)?” (My translation.)   
2
 Cf. Kahn, pp. 237-8.  
3
 353c9.  Socrates shifts between ponêra and kaka in this section without any obvious shift in meaning.  Ponêron is 
used in the discussion with Hippocrates at 313 both in the sense of ‘corrupting or bad for the body’ and in the sense 
of ‘corrupting or bad for the soul’.  
4
 It also helps, of course, that they are not there and that he and Protagoras are supplying answers for them.  
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many with a choice between two alternatives, one of which is clearly unacceptable, the other of 
which cashes out ta ponêra in terms of such things as sickness and poverty.1  Socrates soon leads 
the many to reduce talk of what is bad to talk of what is painful.
2
  On the other side, Socrates 
appeals to health, physical fitness, salvation of the polis (i.e., avoiding being killed or enslaved 
by invaders), rule over others, and wealth as the sort of things with reference to which the many 
call painful things good.
3
  Why would Socrates, of all people, list such a vulgar set of goods?  
Because he needs examples of ‘goods’ whose goodness will clearly be seen by the many to be 
reducible to pleasure.  Justice and piety, however good he or the many may think them to be, will 
not do.  
Socrates makes no distinction here between what is good or pleasant for the agent and 
what is good or pleasant for others.  He leaves out cases where the agent’s act inflicts obvious 
pain on others but not on himself, even in the long run (e.g., unpunished theft), as well as cases 
where the agent’s act provides obvious pleasure for others but not for himself, even in the long 
run (e.g., fixing someone else’s leaky roof, without compensation).  This sort of omission is 
common not just in Plato, but in ancient moral philosophy in general.  It is also quite convenient 
for Socrates here, since he wants to lead the many to agree that by “pleasant but bad” they just 
mean “pleasant in the here-and-now but painful in the long run [for the agent]” and that by 
“painful but good” they just mean “painful in the here-and-now but pleasant in the long run [for 
the agent],” and cases of unpunished theft or thankless volunteer work do not obviously fit this 
mold.
4
  
                                                
1
 353d: nosous te . . . kai penias kai alla toiauta polla . . . ; 353e: nosous poiounta anias poiei, kai penias poiounta 
anias poiei; 
2
 See 353e-354a.   
3
 354b3-5: hugieiai te . . . kai euexiai tôn sômatôn kai tôn poleôn sôtêriai kai tôn allôn archai kai ploutoi;  
4
 It is also worth noting that at 354c and again at 354d Socrates proceeds on the assumption that determining 
whether something is good or bad overall is simply a matter of looking to the overall balance of pleasure and pain.  
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The pleasant and the good have now been equated.  The many have agreed that they are 
two different names for the same thing, and so it seems legitimate to Socrates to substitute the 
one for the other (likewise with the painful and the bad).  But it is through such substitution that 
the many’s account of akratic behavior is shown to be absurd.  What had not been patently 
absurd before the substitution becomes so afterwards.1   
The result of the first substitution is this: “Somebody does bad things, knowing that they 
are bad, without having to do them, because he is defeated by—the good (pl.)!”2  What exactly is 
the absurdity here?  There is no scholarly consensus on this question, nor do I pretend to know 
the answer.
3
  Here, however, is my take on it:  Although the statement quoted above has 
something of an absurd linguistic ring to it, it is not itself absurd when considered apart from its 
context.
4
  There is nothing absurd in the idea that a person could be led to do something that he 
knows has some bad in it, attracted by the good in it.  On the contrary, this often happens.5  Yet 
the akratic, by definition, makes a poor choice, a choice that is to be regretted—in other words, 
he ‘errs’.
6
  But in what sense does he err?  That is, according to what standard do we deem his 
choice a poor one?  Is it that the akratic passes up something honorable for something shameful?  
That is certainly one standard one might use, and hêttômenos (the word I translate as ‘defeated’) 
                                                                                                                                                       
Balancing, weighing, and other kinds of measuring are not discussed in these passages, but their relevance to the 
discussion is already evident. 
1
 354b: “The absurdity of all this will be manifest if we refrain from using a number of terms all at once, such as 
pleasant, painful, good, and bad; and as there appeared to be two things, let us call them by two names—first, good 
and evil, and then later on, pleasant and painful.” 
2
 355d1-3, my translation.   
3
 See C. C. W. Taylor, pp. 181-186, for a useful summary of some opposing views.  Taylor himself maintains (p. 
185) that “the argument for the incoherence of the common view is not complete until 357e.”  I disagree; I think it is 
effectively done by 355e and definitely done by 356c.   
4
 Cf. C. C. W. Taylor, p. 183: “The [ill-mannered] questioner exclaims mockingly about the manifest absurdity of 
the thesis that one could do bad things through being overcome by good things (for how could the good by itself 
cause one to do anything bad?), and then sets about demonstrating the incoherence which underlies this prima facie 
absurdity.”   Cf. also earlier on p. 183: “[T]he context strongly suggests that the absurdity of the view in question is 
not merely asserted, as something obvious, but is intended to be shown by some argument.” 
5
 Vlastos (1969) explains this well (pp. 81-2). 
6
 Cf. 355d.   
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is certainly a word with ‘manly’ overtones.  But the very ideas of the noble and the shameful, as 
we have seen, are conspicuously absent at this point in the discussion.  What, then, is it with 
reference to which we say that the good that the akratic gets is not worth the bad that he gets?  
Nothing else but relative quantity.
1
  The akratic must be getting lesser goods (i.e., pleasures) at 
the cost of greater evils (i.e., pains), and it must be on that account that we say that he erred.  In 
other words, when we describe the akratic as ‘defeated’ instead of ‘victorious,’ it must be this 
that we are saying.
2
  By hypothesis, however, the person in question has knowledge of the good 
and the bad, so not only must he be getting lesser goods at the cost of greater evils, he must know 
that this is what he is getting.  What could possibly be prompting him to make this choice?  The 
many’s answer is, his overpowering desire for the good.  But surely his desire for the good, 
coupled with his knowledge of the good, would prompt him to make the opposite choice, not the 
one that he makes.  The account is absurd, as one will also see if one makes the reverse 
substitution.  
Objection:  The ‘pleasant in the here and now’ differs from the ‘pleasant in the future.’  
Both matter to the akratic, but the former tends to attract him more strongly.  Thus even though 
the akratic knows that he is choosing to get lesser pleasures at the cost of greater pains in the 
long run, he does so anyway because he is defeated by what is immediately more pleasant.3 
Response:  Time surely can make a difference.  The same food, for example, may furnish 
you with more or less pleasure depending on when you eat it.  That is fine, you can and ought to 
factor time in; but in factoring it in, will the coins that you are counting be in any other units than 
pleasure and pain?  In other words, if a person is more strongly attracted by instant gratification 
than by delayed gratification, can it be for any other reason than that he thinks that the one is 
                                                
1
 A hint of this idea had already been dropped at 354cd.   
2
 355e2-3: Dêlon ara . . . hoti to hêttasthai touto legete, anti elattonôn agathôn meizô kaka lambanein.    
3
 A simple form of this objection comes at 356a.   
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more pleasant than the other?  The thing to do, it seems, is simply to weigh whatever makes a 
difference to the relative quantities of pleasure and pain—which as we have seen includes time—
and then to choose whichever course of action is determined to be the more pleasant.
1
 [End of 
refutation.] 
 
Is there an implicit denial of belief-akrasia already in the refutative half of the 
demonstration to the many?  I think there is.  For Socrates might just as well have argued at the 
end of his refutation, “The akratic believes (correctly) that he is getting lesser goods at the cost of 
greater evils.  What could possibly be prompting him to make this choice?  Your answer is, his 
desire for the good.
 
 But surely his desire for the good, coupled with his correct belief about the 
better and the worse, would prompt him to make the opposite choice, not the one that he makes.  
The account is absurd.”  Notice, however, that if there is an implicit denial of belief-akrasia here, 
it is not made unconditionally, but depends, like the rest of the demonstration, on the hedonistic 
moral-psychological model that the many have been led to accept.
2
 
Finally, recall my earlier comment about the connection drawn at 351b between the 
pursuit of pleasure and living one’s life as a whole.  Socrates seems to be arguing on the 
assumption that people have a strong sense of temporal integrity and that their desire for pleasure 
of course expresses itself as a desire to live a pleasant life.  In his question at 355a Socrates 
seems to imply that if the many think that the good is nothing other than the pleasant and that the 
bad is nothing other than the painful, it must then be enough for them to live their life out 
pleasantly and without pain.
3
  In other words, Socrates seems to be assuming that what a person 
                                                
1
 See C. C. W. Taylor, pp. 187-9, for a careful consideration of the objection and response. 
2
 Contrast this with Protagoras and Socrates’ unconditional denial of knowledge-akrasia. 
3
 354e-355a: “But it is still quite possible to retract, if you can somehow contrive to say that the good is different 
from pleasure, or the bad from pain.  [Or i]s it enough for you (ê arkei humin) to live out your life (katabiônai) 
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considers good is directly linked to what he thinks constitutes or contributes to a good life.  If 
this is what Socrates thinks, it should perhaps not surprise us that once the many have agreed to 
identify ‘pleasant’ and ‘good’, Socrates feels entitled to construe ‘pleasant’ in the sense of 
“contributing to a life in which pleasure predominates.”
1
   
What has been shown by the end of the refutative stage, I think, is that the many, as 
spoken for by Protagoras and Socrates, are able to be led to accept a moral-psychological picture 
of themselves that makes their explanation and description of akratic behavior seem absurd.  It 
has not been shown that this picture is accurate, nor have Socrates and Protagoras done what 
they said they would try to do, i.e., show the many what is actually responsible for akratic 
behavior.  
 
B. Constructive stage (356c-357e)  
 
It was agreed in the refutative stage that what determines whether a given choice of good 
things together with bad things is a poor choice (a choice that is to be regretted, etc.) is whether 
the bad things outweigh the good things, i.e., are greater, more numerous, etc.
2
  But it is only 
now that Socrates starts talking about perspectival illusion.  The many are led to agree that 
sometimes our perspective on things—our being nearer to this thing and farther from that 
thing—makes them appear to be greater or smaller, thicker or thinner, more or less numerous, or 
louder or softer than they really are.
3
      
                                                                                                                                                       
pleasantly, without pain?  If it is, and you are unable to tell us of any other good or evil that does not end in pleasure 
or pain, listen to what I have to say next. . . .” (W. R. M. Lamb leaves the ê at the start of the second sentence 
untranslated.  I prefer to translate it because of the logical connection I think it implies.) 
1
 C. C. W. Taylor, pp. 208-9. 
2
 Often, of course, one is faced with a choice between a variety of mixed bags, and it is a mistake to choose anything 
but the best mixed bag, even if some of the less-than-ideal bags contain more good than bad.  Here we are 
presumably to imagine a situation in which one has only two options: accepting or rejecting this mixed bag. 
3
 356c5-8.   
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Socrates next asks the many what the thing that saves our life (sôtêria . . . tou biou) 
would be if, contrary to fact, our ‘doing well’ (to eu prattein) depended on our choosing bigger 
magnitudes rather than smaller.
1
  Note the construction estin en tini, which sometimes takes an 
infinitive.
2
  This construction was used earlier in the demonstration: en toutôi eisin pasai hai 
apodeixeis (“on this point hang all our conclusions”).3  And it occurred even earlier in Socrates’ 
discussion with Hippocrates: ho de peri pleionos tou sômatos hêgê[i], tên psuchên, kai en hôi 
pant’ estin ta sa ê eu ê kakôs prattein, chrêstou ê ponêrou autou genomenou (“your soul, which 
you value much more highly than your body, and on which depends the good or ill condition of 
all your affairs, according as it is made better or worse”).
4
  Now, at 356d, we are being asked to 
imagine a scenario in which our doing well (i.e., our faring well, our being happy) depends on 
our choice of large and our avoidance of small magnitudes (Ei oun en toutôi hêmin ên to eu 
prattein, en tôi ta men megala mêkê kai prattein kai lambanein, ta de smikra kai pheugein kai 
mê prattein).
5
  And the question Socrates asks is this:  In such a scenario, what would evidently 
be the thing that would ‘save’ our life [tis an hêmin sôtêria ephanê tou biou;], i.e., ensure that we 
fare well?
6
  Socrates continues to use the construction estin en tini and words related to the 
Greek root sôs (“safe and sound,” “alive and well”) in subsequent lines, twice in close 
connection with each other.
7
  Compare a passage from Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannus, a passage 
                                                
1
 356c8-d3.   
2
 See LSJ’s entry for !", A. I. 6.   
3
 354e7-8.   
4
 313a6-9.  Contrast Hippocrates’ use of this construction at 310d8-9.   
5
 356c8-d3.   
6
 356d3.   
7
 356e2: kai esôsen an ton bion; 356e3-4: hêmas tên metrêtikên sôzein an technên; 356e5-6: ei en tê[i] tou perittou 
kai artiou hairesei hêmin ên hê sôtêria tou biou (“if the saving of our life depended on the choice of odd or even”); 
356e8-9: esôizen hêmin ton bion; 357a5-7: epei de dê hêdonês te kai lupês en orthê[i] tê[i] hairesei ephanê hêmin 
hê sôtêria tou biou ousa (“since we have found that the salvation of our life depends on making a right choice of 
pleasure and pain”).  
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which may well have been familiar to Plato, in which the construction estin en tini is used 
together with a form of the word sôtêr (Oedipus is speaking):  
 
Teiresias, you are versed in everything . . . . 
You have no eyes but in your mind you know 
with what a plague our city is afflicted.  
My lord, in you alone we find a champion,  
in you alone one that can rescue us (sôtêra). 
. . . Do not begrudge us oracles from birds,  
or any other way of prophecy  
within your skill; save yourself and the city,  
save me . . . . 
We are in your hands (en soi gar esmen) . . . .1  
 
Why such dramatic language at this point in the demonstration?  Evidently, Socrates is trying to 
make the many feel that they are in a life-or-death situation,
2
 that they therefore need to be very 
careful about the choices they make, and that it is imperative that they follow the most 
trustworthy guide they can find—in this case, as Socrates will soon point out to them, a kind of 
‘measuring’ knowledge.  The link made in the Protagoras between finding oneself in a perilous 
situation and looking to knowledge as one’s savior anticipates the following passage from the 
Theaetetus, in which Socrates is speaking in an apostrophe to, of all people, Protagoras:  
 
[T]here isn’t anyone who doesn’t believe that he’s wiser than others in some respects, whereas 
others are wiser than him in other respects.  In the greatest of dangers (en ge tois megistois 
kindunois), when people are in trouble on campaigns, or in diseases, or at sea, they treat the 
leading men in each sphere like gods, expecting them to be their saviours (sôtêras sphôn 
                                                
1
 Lines 300-314 (David Greene’s translation, University of Chicago Press).   
2
 Cf. how Socrates speaks to Hippocrates about his decision to study under Protagoras (313a-c); Socrates makes it 
out to be a matter of spiritual life or death. 
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prosdokôntas), because they’re superior precisely in respect of knowledge (tôi eidenai).1   
 
Socrates next sharpens his question by presenting the many with a choice between two 
alternatives.  We are supposing, counterfactually, that our welfare in this life depends on 
choosing larger and avoiding smaller magnitudes.  In making such choices, which is the guide 
that will lead us to safety: the power of appearance (hê tou phainomenou dunamis) or the 
measuring art (hê metrêtikê technê)?  When he describes the operation of the power of 
appearance, Socrates recalls the answers that the many gave a moment ago (at 356c) about 
perspectival illusion.  This kind of illusion makes the same things seem (at different times, from 
different perspectives) bigger or smaller (or thicker or thinner, etc.) than they are.  Socrates now 
says that the power of appearance makes us change our minds, regret what we did a minute ago, 
waver and vacillate, etc.
2
  The power of appearance, in other words, is what is responsible for 
perspectival illusion.  The art of measurement, by contrast, does the following three things: (i) it 
strips the appearance of its authority (lit., it renders it ‘without authority’: hê de metrêtikê akuron 
men an epoiêse touto to phantasma), (ii) it makes clear what the truth is (dêlôsasa de to alêthes), 
                                                
1
 170ab, John McDowell’s Oxford translation.  Compare as well this passage from the Euthydemus (Socrates is 
speaking to Cleinias):  
     Well, then, suppose you were on a campaign, with which kind of general would you prefer to share both the peril 
and the luck—a wise one, or an ignorant?  
     With a wise one.   
     Well, then, supposing you were sick, with which kind of doctor would you like to venture yourself—a wise one, 
or an ignorant one? 
     With a wise one.   
     And your reason, I said, is this, that you would fare with better fortune in the hands of a wise one than of an 
ignorant one? 
     He assented.  (279e-280a; W. R. M. Lamb’s translation, Loeb Classical Library.)   
2
 356d3-7: “Is it not the [power of appearance] that leads us astray, as we saw (hêmas eplana), and many a time 
causes us to take things topsy-turvy (kai epoiei anô te kai katô pollakis metalambanein tauta) and to have to change 
our minds (kai metamelein) both in our conduct and in our choice of great or small (kai en tais praxesi kai en tais 
hairesesi tôn megalôn te kai smikrôn)?” 
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and (iii) it gives rest and peace to the soul (hêsouchian an epoiêsen echein tên psuchên menousan 
epi tôi alêthei) through doing (i) and (ii).1 
The word I have translated ‘without authority’ is akuron.  LSJ lists the following 
meanings: “without authority, opp. to kurios, hence,  I. of laws, sentences, etc., invalid, 
unratified, obsolete . . .  II. of persons, having no right or power . . .     2. of things, #$%&'(!&# 
$&)*)+ less trustworthy decision . . . .”  What Socrates seems to be trying to say with this word at 
this point is that although the appearance in question remains, complete with its urgent call 
(“Believe me, follow me!”), the agent has come to the realization “I don’t have to listen to you; 
you have no authority over my choices,” and so is able to brush it away or calmly ignore it, as 
one might ignore a ‘No Trespassing’ sign that one knows to be invalid.  Yet the agent in this case 
has only been able to recognize the unauthoritativeness and untrustworthiness of the power of 
appearance because he has grown to trust, and to consider to be authoritative, another source of 
guidance, namely the art of measurement.  In other words, the agent has escaped from under the 
sway of an old guide by growing to trust a new one.
2
  
How is this idea of learning to trust a new guide connected to the idea of knowledge? 
Consider a student who tentatively guesses the answer to a geography question but then loses 
confidence and goes with another answer instead.  When informed that the answer he went with 
is wrong, but that his first guess was right, the student may say, “I knew it!”  “Yes,” his teacher 
might reply, “you may have had the answer in mind, all right, but you didn’t know it.  If you had 
known the answer, you would have trusted it and gone with it.”  Socrates appears to share this 
                                                
1
 356d7-e2.  Cf. the discussion of perspectival illusion and the saving power of measurement in Book X of the 
Republic (602c-603a): that which in us “puts its trust in measurement and reckoning (metrôi ge kai logismôi 
pisteuon)” is a distinct part of the soul, so Socrates leads Glaucon to agree, from that which “opines in contradiction 
of measurement (para ta metra . . . doxazon)”.  In the Protagoras, by contrast, there is no talk of parts of the soul.    
2
 Cf. Euthyprho 7bc, where people are described as agreeing to settle disputes about numbers, magnitudes, and 
weights by resorting to the decisions rendered by [the arts of] arithmetic, measurement, and weighing, respectively.  
In this case, the peace made possible by the common recognition of an authority to settle certain kinds of disputes is 
contrasted with the enmity and anger that arise when no such common authority is recognized. 
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basic conception of knowledge.  For him it is not enough to possess a set of true notions about 
how it is best to behave, to esteem these notions highly, or even to consider them (in some flimsy 
way) to be true.  Rather, for Socrates, part of what it is to have knowledge is to understand the 
truth in such a way that one feels ‘safer’ or more confident going with it than going with any 
other alternative, and that one actually does go with it, whatever other feelings may be running 
through one at the time.
1
  In a classroom setting this may mean feeling confident enough to stick 
by one’s original answer; in a military setting it may mean feeling confident enough to stay at 
one’s post.  
Socrates describes the knowledgeable person as having a calm and serene soul, abiding in 
the truth (menousan epi tôi alêthei).2  I have suggested that this truth-oriented serenity involves a 
deep kind of trust or confidence.  Recall the first courage-wisdom argument, in which wisdom 
was linked to a feeling of confidence.  Socrates seems to me to be saying here, as he was hinting 
there already, that a deep, perhaps even the deepest source of feelings of boldness or confidence 
is a kind of ‘epistemic’ trust, i.e., a kind of trust that a person can tap into only from within a 
knowledge-oriented frame of mind. 
In order to have such serenity, must one succeed within a knowledge-oriented frame of 
mind and actually acquire knowledge, or is it possible within this frame of mind to achieve such 
serenity with something less than knowledge?  A person who occupies the epistemic frame of 
mind but does not have knowledge will clearly not have the kind of serenity that comes from 
grasping the truth.  Whereas the sophos3 is at rest in this respect, the philosophos4 is restless.  
                                                
1
 In other words, knowledge on this view ensures correct action, not just correct choice.  Cf. EN 1111b (Book III, ch. 
2), where Aristotle says that the akratês acts not as he chooses to act but as he desires to act.      
2
 356e1-2.   
3
 I.e., the one who knows. 
4
 I.e., the one who fully inhabits the epistemic frame of mind but does not know.   
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Nevertheless, the latter may be said to share with the former a deep trust in the epistemic 
approach, and this itself may bring a certain kind of psychic serenity.    
  
After the many agree that it is the measuring art that would ‘save’ us in such a case,
1
 a 
second counterfactual question is asked:  If our salvation in life depended on our choice of the 
odd or the even, what would save our life?
2
  The many agree that it would be a kind of 
measuring (metrêtikê) knowledge (epistêmê), namely arithmetic (arithmêtikê).3 
Having asked the many to imagine two unreal situations in which they would approach 
their decisions with great care, with a view to their life as a whole, trusting in a measuring art to 
save their life, Socrates now leads them to see that they ought to apply exactly this kind of 
approach to the situation in which they actually find themselves.
4
  The saving of their life, 
Socrates tells the many, has appeared to them to depend on the correct choice of pleasure and 
pain, and the standard of correctness here, as the many themselves have agreed, is nothing other 
than relative quantity.  Therefore, the guide that the many should trust to lead them to safety is 
evidently a guide that renders authoritative judgments on questions of relative quantity, i.e., 
some sort of ‘measuring’ guide.  But any such guide must surely be a kind of art (technê) or 
knowledge (epistêmê).   
Now the many are finally ready to hear the answer to their original question.  Their 
question was:  ‘What do you (Protagoras and Socrates) say is responsible for akratic behavior?’  
The answer is:  ‘Ignorance (amathia),’5 or ‘The greatest ignorance (amathia hê megistê).’1  
                                                
1
 356e.   
2
 356e-357a.   
3
 357a.   
4
 Cf. Adam and Adam’s note on 357a (p. 187): “eien—epei de dê.  The MSS read epeidê de, but after eien Plato 
regularly uses de dê in coming to the application of a train of reasoning or illustrations . . . .”  This emendation is 
accepted by Burnet. 
5
 357d1.  
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The reasoning here is not fully spelled out.  Here is how I understand it:  The many have 
agreed that akratic behavior is a kind of erring or ‘going wrong’ with respect to one’s choices of 
pleasures and pains (i.e., good things and bad things).  The many have also effectively agreed 
that ‘faring well’ in life consists in making correct choices of pleasures and pains.
2
  What is 
more, the many have come to see that because the standard of correctness in this case is nothing 
other than relative quantity, the guide that will lead them to ‘fare well’ in life must be a kind of 
‘measuring’ knowledge.  Assuming, then, that the possession of knowledge necessarily involves 
having confidence in and being willing to follow the guidance of knowledge (recall my 
‘classroom’ example), it seems clear that anyone who possesses this particular kind of measuring 
knowledge will make correct choices of pleasures and pains.  Whoever fails to make such 
choices must not possess this kind of knowledge.  But the akratic is a person who typically fails 
to make correct choices of pleasures and pains.  So the akratic must not have this kind of 
knowledge; if he had it, he would not behave akratically.  Now if the possession of some thing 
(e.g., knowledge) prevents a certain kind of behavior (e.g., akratic behavior), the lack of that 
same thing may be said to be in some sense responsible for the behavior.  It is in this sense that 
lack of knowledge, i.e., ignorance, may be said to be responsible for akratic behavior.
3
  
 
In an addendum to the demonstration, Socrates tells the many that the reason why they 
fare badly (kakôs prattein) in private and in public life is because they falsely think that what is 
                                                                                                                                                       
1
 357e2.   
2
 Assuming, that is, that the circumstances of one’s life are not so bleak that no matter what choices one makes, one 
will not fare well.  
3
 C. C. W. Taylor says that Socrates’ argument “commits the fallacy of denying the antecedent”: “[E]ven if 
consistently correct choice requires the employment of a technique, it does not follow that incorrect choice . . . 
implies failure to employ a technique, since it may equally well consist in failure to act on the result which is 
reached by correct employment of the technique.” (p. 192)  I think that my earlier talk of the possession of 
knowledge as essentially involving confidence in and willingness to ‘go with’ the guidance of knowledge allows me 
to reject this view of the argument. 
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responsible for their erring behavior is something other than ignorance (to oiesthai allo ti ê 
amathian einai), i.e., because they are living under the false impression that the solution to their 
practical problems is not a teachable thing (hôs ou didaktou ontos).1  If what is immediately 
responsible for akratic behavior is the lack of a certain kind of ‘measuring’ knowledge, what 
keeps the akratic stuck in his rut is his failure to try to acquire this kind of knowledge.  And the 
reason why he fails to try is that he does not realize that what is responsible for akratic behavior 
is the corresponding kind of ignorance.  In other words, if what is immediately responsible for 
akratic behavior is a kind of ignorance, what is responsible at a deeper level is ignorance of (or, 
ignorance of the significance of) this ignorance.  
 
Third Part: Socrates questions the sophists (358a-359a) 
 
In the abovementioned addendum, Socrates phrases his conclusion in such a way as to 
flatter the sophists.  Because the many falsely think that the solution to their practical problems is 
not a teachable thing nor a kind of knowledge, Socrates says, they do not go themselves and they 
do not send their children to go to the people who profess to teach this knowledge, specifically 
Protagoras, Prodicus, and Hippias; what the many really ought to be doing is learning from and 
paying money to these sophists.
2
  Socrates thus charms the sophists “by appealing, so to speak, 
to their pocketbook.”
3
  After the demonstration is over and Socrates gives them an opening to 
take issue with what has been said, not one of them says: “That’s not the explanation I would 
give of akratic behavior.  Would you like to hear how I would explain it?”4  On the contrary, all 
three sophists, including Protagoras, indicate that what Socrates has said seems “marvelously 
                                                
1
 357e.   
2
 357e.  Patrick Coby (Socrates and the Sophistic Enlightenment,  p. 162) calls this “heavy-handed flattery”.  
3
 Kahn, p. 242.   
4
 Cf. the point where, after Socrates has given his explanation of Simonides’ poem, Hippias wants to give his 
explanation (347ab).   
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true” to them (huperphuôs edokei hapasin alêthê einai ta eirêmena).1  Socrates’ strategy appears 
to have worked.  He has ‘teamed up’ with Protagoras in leading the many down an epistemic line 
of thought about akratic behavior; an epistemic way of thinking about human behavior has been 
sinking in with Protagoras all the while; and now that Socrates has turned to ask Protagoras (and 
the others), “Do I seem to you to speak the truth?”, Protagoras is ready to endorse not only a 
Socratic claim about the impossibility of knowledge-akrasia but also a Socratic way of arguing 
for it.
2
   
But what, exactly, is it that seems true to the sophists?  The phrase “the things that had 
been said” (ta eirêmena) is vague.  Is it that the sophists think that this is how one ought to 
demonstrate to the many what is responsible for akratic behavior?  Is it that they think that the 
hedonistic moral-psychological model accepted in the course of the demonstration accurately 
simulates the many’s own psychology?  Or is it that the sophists think that this model fits all 
people, including the noble and virtuous (kaloi kai agathoi)?  This last option seems like the 
right one.  Not only will the sophists soon endorse a kind of hedonism, they will also go on to 
call all actions noble (kalai) that promote a life lived painlessly and pleasantly (epi tou alupôs 
zên kai hêdeôs).3  And Protagoras and Socrates will then proceed to apply this moral-
psychological model to the coward and courageous man alike.   
 
I said before that by the end of the section on akrasia Socrates has led Protagoras to 
endorse the following six claims: (1) that no one ever acts against his knowledge of what is best; 
(2) that no one ever willingly goes for what he thinks is bad; (3) that the pleasant is [the] good; 
(4) that noble actions are good; (5) that what a person fears, he believes to be bad; and (6) that 
                                                
1
 358a.   
2
 The flattery didn’t hurt, either. 
3
 358b. 
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when ‘being weaker than oneself’ is said to be nothing other than ignorance, what is meant by 
‘ignorance’ is having false opinions and being mistaken about matters of great importance.  By 
the end of the demonstration to the many, Socrates has secured Protagoras’s agreement to the 
first of these six.  It is in the exchange with the sophists that Socrates leads Protagoras, along 
with Hippias and Prodicus, to endorse the other five claims.  With almost no argumentation, and 
in quick succession, Socrates secures their agreement to claims (3), (4), (6), (2), and (5).  Claim 
(2) is most important for my purposes.    
Socrates leads up to (2) by securing the sophists’ agreement to a pair of related claims: 
one, that if the pleasant is [the] good, then no one who knows or believes (oudeis oute eidôs oute 
oiomenos) that there are better (doable) things than the things he is [used to] doing (alla beltiô 
einai ê ha [e]poiei, kai dunata),1 then does those things (i.e., persists in doing them) (epeita poiei 
tauta), it being open to him to do the better ones (exon ta beltiô)2; two, that ‘being weaker than 
oneself’ (to hêttô einai hautou) is nothing other than ignorance (amathia) and that ‘being 
stronger than oneself’ (kreittô heautou) is nothing else but wisdom (sophia).3  The idea that 
‘being weaker than oneself’ is ignorance and ‘being stronger than oneself’ is wisdom is derived 
directly from the demonstration to the many, but the idea that no one ever acts against his belief 
about what is best was never raised explicitly in the demonstration.  And yet it certainly does 
seem as if Socrates is presenting the denial of belief-akrasia here as if it were nothing new.  What 
sense are we to make of this?  
One way to try to make sense of it is by considering how claim (2) is used in the 
conclusion of the courage-wisdom section.  Socrates apparently foresees that a claim of the form 
                                                
1
 Burnet accepts Heindorf’s emendation from epoiei to poiei, but I fail to see why the present tense is to be preferred 
to the imperfect.  
2
 358b6-c1.   
3
 358c1-3.   
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‘no one ever willingly goes for what he thinks is bad’ would be a useful premise in the final 
argument.  Yet he also realizes that the demonstration to the many was about knowledge, not 
belief.  So in the hopes of exploiting the sophists’ good cheer, he slides from ‘knows’ to ‘knows 
or believes’ without drawing attention to what he is doing, making sure to end his question with 
the old opposition of ignorance (amathia) and wisdom (sophia).  When the sophists fall for this, 
Socrates is emboldened to frame another question exclusively in terms of belief:  
 
Then surely . . . no one willingly goes after evil or what he thinks to be evil (epi ge ta kaka oudeis 
hekôn erchetai oude epi ha oietai kaka einai); it is not in human nature, apparently, to do so—to 
wish to go after what one thinks to be evil in preference to the good (epi ha oietai kaka einai 
ethelein ienai anti tôn agathôn) . . . .1 
 
Charles Kahn appears to think that the only sense to be made of this shift is that it is just such a 
ploy, “a cunning stratagem designed to serve the more fundamental purpose of the argument, 
namely, to equate virtue with knowledge . . . and demonstrate the unity of the virtues.”
2
  Kahn 
goes so far as to say that Socrates himself does not stand behind this denial of belief-akrasia: “I 
suggest that Socrates is here deluding the sophists with a rationalist theory of choice, just as he 
has deluded them with Laconic philosophy in the interpretation of Simonides’ poem . . . . He is 
no more committed to . . . the rationalist decision theory than he is to the virtuoso interpretation 
of Simonides’ poem.”
3
  Presumably Kahn would explain away the subsequent line “We were all 
agreed on all these points (hapanta tauta sunedokei hapasin hêmin)”4 either by pointing out that 
an insincere endorsement by Socrates here is no more troubling than his outrageous statements 
about Laconic philosophy at 342aff., or else by pointing out that twice already in this dialogue 
Socrates has raised the possibility that a member of the present company might have made an 
                                                
1
 358cd.   
2
 Kahn, p. 238. 
3
 Ibid., p. 242. 
4
 358d4.   
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insincere response as a way of testing (apopeirasthai) someone else.1  While I agree with Kahn 
that the move from knowledge-akrasia to belief-akrasia is an effective dialectical ploy, I would 
prefer, if possible, to make sense of this denial of belief-akrasia as more than just a ploy.  
C. C. W. Taylor suggests that ‘belief’ here may mean ‘true belief’ and that at the time of 
writing the Protagoras Plato may not have distinguished clearly between true belief and 
knowledge: 
 
[T]he previous argument has said nothing whatever about the impossibility or otherwise of acting 
against one’s belief about, as distinct from one’s knowledge of, the best thing to do.  Hence if 
Plato intends here merely to represent the sophists as accepting something which has already been 
agreed by the common man, he is seriously mistaken.  The mistake is readily explicable if (a) 
Plato has true belief exclusively in mind and (b) when writing the Protagoras he had not yet 
arrived at a clear distinction between true belief and knowledge.  Both hypotheses are plausible; 
(b) is not excluded by 356d-357a, where the contrast is not between knowledge and true belief, but 
between scientific knowledge and confusion produced by uncritical reliance on perceptual data.
2
   
 
Gregory Vlastos, by contrast, suggests that this passage  
 
could scarcely have been meant to suggest that in the absence of knowledge true opinion would do 
as well for the purposes of Socrates’ thesis.  What it probably means is that we cannot act contrary 
to what we believe when we do have knowledge.  If it did mean more than this, we would not 
know what weight to attach to the claim; we would have to treat it as dogma unsupported by 
argument, since all Socrates attempts to prove in the argument he has just concluded is that we 
cannot act contrary to our knowledge of good.3   
 
 
                                                
1
 341d8 (apopeirasthai);  349c8-9 (apopeirômenos).   
2
 C. C. W. Taylor, pp. 202-3.   
3
 Vlastos (1969), p. 72-3.   
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In a paper entitled “Socrates on the Strength of Knowledge: Protagoras 351b-357e”1 
Terry Penner has proposed yet another reading of this passage.  Penner says that while Socrates 
thinks that  
(1) no one ever acts against his knowledge of what is best 
and that  
(2) no one ever acts against his belief about what is best,  
he does not hear claim (1) in such a way as to make it a consequence of claim (2).  This 
contradicts what Penner calls the “Direct Corollary View,” a view which he says has gone 
largely unchallenged in the literature.  According to the Direct Corollary View, Socrates 
understands claim (1) to follow from claim (2), by the following reasoning.  If somebody knows 
something, he also believes it; so if somebody knows that it is best for him to do some thing, he 
also believes that it is best for him to do that thing.  This means that if someone acts against his 
knowledge of what is best, he also acts against his belief about what is best, and that therefore if 
(2) no one ever acts against his belief about what is best, (1) no one ever acts against his 
knowledge of what is best.
2
  
 Against the Direct Corollary View, Penner argues that a temporal distinction ought to be 
drawn between two kinds of belief-akrasia and between two kinds of knowledge-akrasia.  There 
is, on the one hand, belief- or knowledge-akrasia of the synchronic variety (“synchronic belief-
akrasia,” “synchronic knowledge-akrasia”), which is action against one’s cognitive state (belief 
                                                
1
 Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie (79), 1997, pp. 117-149. 
2
 In other words, the impossibility of belief-akrasia implies the impossibility of knowledge-akrasia.  Cf. my 
introductory chapter, p. 4, n. 1. 
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or knowledge) “at the instant of action”.
1
  On the other hand, there is belief- or knowledge-
akrasia of the diachronic variety (“diachronic belief-akrasia,” “diachronic knowledge-akrasia”), 
which is action against one’s cognitive state (belief or knowledge) throughout most, but not 
necessarily all, of the time containing “the period of immediately prior deliberation, the moment 
of action, and the period of immediate retrospect and regret or satisfaction at what one has 
done.”
2
  Penner thinks that Socrates denies diachronic knowledge-akrasia while allowing 
diachronic belief-akrasia; he also thinks that Socrates denies both types of synchronic akrasia.
3
  
 On Penner’s view, if claim (1)—no one ever acts against his knowledge of what is best—
and claim (2)—no one ever acts against his belief about what is best—were offered to Socrates 
for his approval, he would endorse them both; but if pressed to say precisely what he took to be 
being denied in each, he would make clear (albeit not in Penner’s terminology) that it is 
diachronic knowledge-akrasia that he takes to be being denied in claim (1) and synchronic 
belief-akrasia that he takes to be being denied in claim (2).  Remember that according to Penner, 
claim (1) as Socrates hears it is not a ‘direct corollary’ of claim (2).  The proposition that no one 
acts against the knowledge (of what is best) that he has throughout most of the period 
                                                
1
 Penner, op. cit., p. 121.   
2
 Ibid., pp. 121-2. 
3
 To understand better what Penner means, imagine a motorist driving a car along a highway and believing for miles 
that it would be best to take Exit 9.  As the motorist nears Exit 8, still thinking it would be best to take Exit 9, he 
panics and thinks suddenly that maybe Exit 8 is better and, not having time to deliberate further, takes Exit 8.  A few 
moments later he sees his mistake: it would have been best to take Exit 9.  As I understand Penner, this is a case of 
diachronic belief-akrasia, for while the motorist acts in accordance with his cognitive state at the moment of action 
(viz., the belief that it would be best to take Exit 8), he acts against the cognitive state that he has throughout most of 
the period immediately surrounding the action (viz., the belief that it would be best to take Exit 9).  Penner thinks 
that Socrates acknowledges this kind of akratic behavior.  One may change this into a case of diachronic knowledge-
akrasia by supposing that the motorist not only believes but knows that taking Exit 9 is best, then somehow loses this 
knowledge at the critical juncture, believing for a moment that it would be best to take Exit 8 and taking it, only to 
regain his former knowledge a few moments later.  If such sudden, short-lived loss of knowledge strikes one as 
impossible, one sees, according to Penner, what Socrates saw: that there is no such thing as diachronic knowledge-
akrasia.  To change this into a case of synchronic belief-akrasia, suppose that even though at the moment of action 
the motorist believes that it would be best to take Exit 9, something that it is in his power to do, he intentionally 
takes Exit 8 anyway, flying in the face of his own cognitive state.  Substitute “knows” for “believes” and it becomes 
a case of synchronic knowledge-akrasia.  Penner thinks that Socrates denies the existence of both these kinds of 
akratic behavior. 
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immediately surrounding his action (but not necessarily at the moment of action) does not 
logically follow from the proposition that no one acts against the belief (about what is best) that 
he has at the moment of action. 
 Penner’s distinction provides a plausible explanation of the emphasis on knowledge in 
the akrasia section of the Protagoras and of the ambiguous stance on belief-akrasia.  Knowledge 
is emphasized because only knowledge makes a person immune to diachronic akrasia; mere 
belief cannot do this for one.  The ambiguous stance on belief-akrasia reflects the view that of 
the two kinds of belief-akrasia, synchronic and diachronic, one is impossible, the other possible.  
What Penner’s account does not do, as I have already pointed out, is make sense of the apparent 
fact that Socrates managed to rid himself of the kind of inner resistance that plagues the akratic, 
without, however, acquiring the relevant knowledge.   
 One strength of my account, as I have also already said, is that it does make sense of this 
fact.  Another virtue of my account, I think, is that it makes its own sense of what Terry Penner’s 
account explains so neatly, viz., the emphasis on knowledge in the akrasia section of the 
Protagoras and the ambiguous stance on belief-akrasia.  According to my account, knowledge is 
to be privileged over belief in a discussion of akratic behavior because it is knowledge, not 
belief, that is the governing ideal of the epistemic frame of mind, and it is this frame of mind that 
is the key to ridding oneself of what I call ‘akratic resistance’.  As for the ambiguous stance on 
belief-akrasia, I make sense of this ambiguity in much the same way as Penner does: by 
distinguishing between two kinds of belief-akrasia, one of which is possible, the other of which 
is impossible.  But whereas on Penner’s account it is possible to act diachronically against one’s 
belief about what is best, though impossible to act synchronically against it, on my account it is 
possible to act (synchronically) against a ‘non-epistemic’ belief about what is best, though 
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impossible to act (synchronically) against an ‘epistemic’ belief about what is best.  This way of 
making sense of the passage is perhaps most closely akin to the reading of Gregory Vlastos.  
Whereas Vlastos proposed that the belief against which it is impossible to act be understood as 
that of a person with knowledge, I propose that this belief be understood as that of a person who 
fully inhabits a knowledge-oriented frame of mind.  
 
3.2. Part Two: Correspondences between my account and this section 
 
 Before I relate my account of akratic behavior to this part of the text, let me briefly 
restate it.  I have drawn a distinction between different modes of thinking-feeling-acting, one of 
which I have called the ‘epistemic frame of mind’, another of which I have called the ‘semi-
organized hodgepodge frame of mind’ (largely a combination of the ‘animal’ and ‘manly’ frames 
of mind).  I have said that a person who fully inhabits the epistemic frame of mind with regard to 
the activities of living a human life and of thinking about what is good will never act against his 
belief (which is of an ‘epistemic’ form) about what is best, while the person who inhabits the 
‘semi-organized hodgepodge’ frame of mind with regard to these activities may act against his 
belief (which is of a ‘non-epistemic’ form) about what is best.  I have suggested, in addition, that 
typical akratic behavior is chiefly due to ignorancee, i.e., failure to fully inhabit the epistemic 
frame of mind (with regard to the activity of living a human life); and I have also spoken of the 
failure to recognize that one ought to inhabit this frame of mind (with regard to this activity).  I 
will now relate my account of akratic behavior to the section on akrasia and its immediate 
context, first by discussing some ways in which it does not seem to fit this part of the text, then 
by discussing some ways in which it does.  
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3.2.1. Incongruities  
 
One way in which my account of akratic behavior seems not to fit this part of the text is 
that while talk of ‘frames of mind’ is essential to my account, none of the characters in the 
Protagoras speak about frames of mind, let alone about the ‘epistemic’, ‘manly’, ‘animal’, or 
‘semi-organized hodgepodge’ frames of mind.  It may be true that Plato’s dramatizations of the 
dialogue’s characters exemplify these frames of mind, and that Socrates may be usefully 
understood as trying to lead certain characters out of one frame of mind and into another, but this 
does not amount to an explicit recognition in the Protagoras of frames of mind as such.  If 
Socrates speaks from within the epistemic frame of mind, he does not speak explicitly about it, 
nor does he speak about other frames of mind.  Another way in which my account of akratic 
behavior seems not to fit this part of the text is that while I distinguish between different kinds or 
‘forms’ of belief (beliefs of an ‘epistemic’ form, of a ‘manly’ form, etc.), Socrates draws no such 
distinction.  He does distinguish stable knowing from volatile believing, but that is as close as he 
comes.  Also, while I explicitly make room for a kind of belief-akrasia, Socrates does not 
(though he also does not rule it out categorically in his own voice).  Finally, if Socrates privately 
thinks that akratic behavior is due to a combination of different kinds of ignorance—failure to 
excel within the epistemic frame of mind, failure to inhabit this frame of mind fully, failure to 
recognize that one ought to inhabit this frame of mind—he is content to leave this unsaid and to 
lump these different kinds of failure together under the general label of ‘ignorance’.  By contrast, 
my account depends essentially upon the distinction between failure within and failure to dwell 
in the epistemic frame of mind.  
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3.2.2. Congruities 
 
One way in which my account of akratic behavior does harmonize with this part of the 
text is that the three pairs of value terms that figure so prominently in this part of the dialogue 
(hêdu/aniaron, kalon/aischron, and agathon/kakon) imply three different sources of motivation 
that correspond fairly well to the animal, manly, and epistemic frames of mind.  It is only 
through a careful manipulation of these value terms—making heavy use of ‘manly’ language in 
order to lead Protagoras to deny knowledge-akrasia, omitting all such language when leading the 
many to endorse a vulgar form of hedonism, uniting all three value terms in the final courage-
wisdom argument—that Socrates is able to carry his line of questioning to its conclusion.  
Indeed, the three most prominent characters in this part of the dialogue—Socrates, Protagoras, 
and ‘the many’—roughly correspond to the epistemic, manly, and animal frames of mind, 
respectively.  The many are depicted as the lowly, childish mass of mankind who are easily led 
to agree that all they really care about are pleasure and pain; Protagoras is depicted as a person 
who looks down on the many with a superior air, responds strongly to ‘manly’ language, and 
insists that courage or manliness (andreia), the manly virtue par excellence, is not a kind of 
knowledge; while Socrates is portrayed by Plato as pushing for an epistemic unification of all 
three values—pleasant, noble, and good—and of the five conventionally-recognized human 
virtues, all of which he wishes to identify with a single kind of knowledge.
1
  Consider in addition 
that the many do not normally see themselves as ultimately caring only about the total balance of 
pleasure over pain in their lives as a whole, but that this is something Socrates must bring them 
to see.  If, as I earlier argued, Socrates is able to lead the many in this hedonistic direction only 
on account of their moral-motivational confusion, a confusion which also makes it possible for a 
                                                
1
 Cf. 361a7-b2.   
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skillful questioner like Socrates to lead them down a ‘manly’ path, where honor and shame are 
most prominent, then the many themselves may be said to inhabit what I have called a ‘semi-
organized hodgepodge’ frame of mind.  
Another way in which my account of akratic behavior harmonizes with this part of the 
text is that although Socrates does not explicitly distinguish ignorancee from ignorancek, he does 
suggest that both are involved in akratic behavior.  Not only does Socrates clearly state that 
knowledge (epistêmê) will prevent the kind of flip-flopping that characterizes certain kinds of 
akratic behavior,
1
 he also says that part of the many’s problem is that they do not even occupy a 
knowledge-oriented frame of mind with regard to their problem:   
 
Accordingly “to be overcome by pleasure” means just this—ignorance in the highest degree 
(amathia hê megitstê), which Protagoras here and Prodicus and Hippias profess to cure.  But you, 
through supposing it to be something else than ignorance (dia to oiesthai allo ti ê amathian einai), 
will neither go yourselves nor send your children to these sophists, who are the teachers of those 
things—you say it cannot be taught (hôs ou didaktou ontos); you are chary of your money and will 
give them none (kêdomenoi tou arguriou kai ou didontes toutois), and so you fare badly both in 
private and in public life (kakôs prattete kai idia[i] kai dêmosia[i]).2 
      
The reference to the sophists here is clearly tongue-in-cheek, but if one replaces the playful ‘You 
ought to be paying money to the sophists’ with its earnest Socratic equivalent, ‘You ought to be 
spending your days in the pursuit of wisdom,’
3
 Socrates’ overall diagnosis begins to look 
somewhat like mine:  Akratics “fare badly” not just because they lack epistêmê, i.e., not just 
because they fail within the epistemic frame of mind (insofar as they may be said to inhabit it), 
                                                
1
 See 356de.  Cf. Terry Penner’s discussion of this passage, op. cit.     
2
 357e2-8.   
3
 Cf. the end of the initial appeal to Cleinias in the Euthydemus 282a-d.  Cf. esp. 282cd: “How good of you to relieve 
me of a long inquiry into this very point, whether wisdom is teachable or not teachable!  So now, since you think it 
is both teachable and the only thing in the world that makes men happy and fortunate, can you help saying that it is 
necessary to pursue wisdom (anangkaion einai philosophein) or intending to pursue it yourself (autos en nôi echeis 
auto poiein)?” (W. R. M. Lamb’s translation, Loeb Classical Library.) 
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but also because they do not even try to acquire epistêmê, i.e., because they do not even (fully) 
inhabit this frame of mind.  As for failing to realize that one ought to inhabit the epistemic frame 
of mind (with regard to a given activity), that is included here, too.  The many do not try to 
acquire epistêmê, because they falsely think that what will fix their problem is not a teachable 
thing (didakton) and that therefore epistêmê will not help them.1     
Another implied distinction between inhabiting the epistemic frame of mind and actually 
possessing knowledge may be found in the first courage-wisdom argument.  Socrates speaks of 
people who dive boldly into wells on account of their knowledge.  He also speaks of people who 
dive boldly into wells on account of their radical ignorance; Protagoras calls them mad.  The 
people who are obviously inbetween are those who recognize that this is an activity that is 
properly governed by knowledge but do not take themselves to have that knowledge, and so 
approach the activity with a healthy sense of ‘epistemic’ fear.  Like the expert divers, such 
people inhabit the epistemic frame of mind with regard to the activity of diving, but like the 
‘mad’ divers, they lack the knowledge that properly governs the activity. 
Consider as well the distinction that Socrates draws between the measuring art and the 
power of appearance.  Someone who uses the measuring art as his guide to making choices in 
life will carefully assess the pros and cons of each of his options, make the necessary 
calculations, and act in accordance with the results.  He will try to live a knowledge-guided life, 
and he will succeed.  What about the person who uses the power of appearance as his guide?  
Will he assess the pros and cons of each of his options, make careful calculations, and act in 
accordance with the results which he thinks come closest to knowledge?  In other words, does 
the person who uses the power of appearance as his guide to his choices in life possess the 
meticulous knowledge-oriented habits of thinking, feeling, and acting that characterize an 
                                                
1
 Recall the terms in which the many state their original claim: many people often act against their epistêmê.   
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inhabitant of the epistemic frame of mind?  If so, Socrates has failed to describe the typical 
akratic, who surely does not have these habits.  If not, Socrates’ contrast between the measuring 
art and the power of appearance is not so much a contrast within the epistemic frame of mind as 
a contrast between an epistemic and a non-epistemic frame of mind.    
 Finally, consider what Socrates is trying to bring the many themselves to see.  Socrates is 
trying to make the many realize that the only thing they ultimately care about is maximizing 
pleasure and minimizing pain over the course of their lives as a whole; that the best way to do 
this is by calculating relative quantities of pleasure and pain by means of a measuring art; and 
that what they therefore ought to do is place all their trust in the guidance of this art, i.e., this 
technical knowledge.  Is this the kind of argument that Socrates would bother making to people 
who already inhabited a knowledge-oriented frame of mind with regard to the activity of living a 
human life?  Or is the intended effect of this argument precisely to bring the many to inhabit this 
frame of mind with regard to this activity?  If so, this suggests that one of the things that Socrates 
thinks is responsible for the many’s misunderstanding of akratic behavior—and, not incidentally, 
for their own akratic behavior—is their failure to inhabit an epistemic frame of mind with regard 
to the activity of living a human life.    
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4. THE PROTAGORAS 
 
In chapter 3 I traced some correspondences between my account of akratic behavior and 
the section on akrasia.  I will now relate my account to the Protagoras as a whole.  In the first 
part of this chapter I argue that ingredients in my account are to be found throughout the 
dialogue excluding the section on Simonides’ poem (338e-348a).  In the second part I argue that 
ingredients in my account are to be found throughout this section.  Why set aside the section on 
Simonides’ poem for separate treatment at the end?  Of all the sections in the Protagoras the 
section on Simonides’ poem is the one whose raison d’être is the hardest to explain and whose 
omission would seem to do the least damage to the dialogue as a whole.  Yet some of my most 
telling evidence lies in this section, and if I mixed it in with the rest of my evidence, my whole 
argument might seem to depend on a weird or inessential part of the dialogue.  By making a 
strong enough argument in the first part of this chapter without yet bringing in evidence from this 
section, I can forestall this misimpression.  Also, discussing this section separately at the end will 
help impress upon the reader just how important a section it is and just how well it meshes with 
my account and with the rest of the Protagoras.    
 
4.1. Part One: The Protagoras minus 338e-348a 
 
4.1.1. Three pairs of portraits 
 
Central to my account is the distinction between an ‘epistemic’ mode of thinking-feeling-
acting and certain kinds of ‘non-epistemic’ modes.  Where may one find similar distinctions in 
the Protagoras?  One place is in the three pairs of portraits sketched in succession over the 
course of the dialogue: (1) the double-portrait of Alcibiades and Protagoras (309a-310a); (2) the 
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more detailed double-portrait of Hippocrates and Socrates at Socrates’ house (310a-314c); (3) 
the complex double-portrait of Protagoras and Socrates at Callias’s house (314c-362a).  A reader 
of the Protagoras will naturally ask how these two vignettes and this third longer scene fit 
together.  One thing that unites them, I believe, is a common contrast between ‘epistemic’ and 
‘non-epistemic’ ways of thinking, feeling, and acting.
1
  
 
4.1.1.1. Alcibiades and Protagoras 
 
Two aspects of the dialogue’s opening frame are somewhat peculiar: (1) the description 
of Alcibiades as young enough to retain the bloom of youth and fill men with erotic desire but 
old enough to have a beard and be considered a ‘man’ himself
2
; (2) the fact that Socrates has just 
experienced something strange (atopon . . . ti): while conversing with Protagoras3 he was led to 
ignore Alcibiades and at times forget all about him.
4
  First consider aspect (1).  Even as the 
nameless Friend expresses an interest in the erotic ‘hunting’ (kunêgesiou) of Alcibiades, he also 
seems to be warning Socrates, as a friend to a friend, that Alcibiades is past the age where it is 
socially appropriate to be openly in love with him.  The sexual interest is characteristically 
‘animal’; the warning, with its sensitivity to social norms and to the distinction between boy and 
man, is characteristically ‘manly.’  Now consider aspect (2).  Here a distinction is drawn between 
being attracted to what a beautiful, rich, aristocratic teenager has to offer and being attracted to 
what a wise man has to offer.  Socrates’ heedlessness of Alcibiades’ charms when a far more 
‘epistemically-attractive’ person is present resembles the dismissiveness with which members of 
                                                
1
 By the time we reach the third pair of portraits there is no longer a straightforward correspondence between the 
contrasting ways and the contrasting characters; ‘epistemic’ and ‘non-epistemic’ ways are intertwined in both 
Protagoras and Socrates.  
2
 309a1-2: . . . apo kunêgesiou tou peri tên Alkibiadou hôran; 309a3-5: kalos men ephaineto anêr . . . anêr mentoi, ô 
Sôkrates, hôs g’en autois hêmin eirêsthai, kai pôgonos êdê hupopimplamenos.   See also 309b1-2: . . . hos ephê 
chariestatên hêbên einai tou <prôton> hupênêtou, hên nun Alkibiadês echei; 
3
 A detail which is later divulged between 309c1 and 309d2.   
4
 309b7-9.   
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the Athenian assembly (when dealing with a matter they consider to be technical) are said to 
brush away the advice of anyone who they think lacks the requisite knowledge, “no matter how 
handsome and wealthy and well-born he may be (k’an panu kalos ê[i] kai plousios kai tôn 
gennaiôn) . . . .”1  As in this later passage, so in the present one we have at least the germ of a 
distinction between inhabiting an ‘animal-manly’ frame of mind, in which the sexy, wealthy, 
noble Alcibiades seems more beautiful, and inhabiting an epistemic frame of mind, in which the 
(seemingly) wise Protagoras seems more beautiful.  As for Socrates’ nameless friend, a similar 
distinction seems to be being suggested in his case: he goes from speaking about Alcibiades in an 
‘animal-manly’ way to eagerly wanting to hear about a conversation with the ‘wise’ Protagoras.
2
   
 
4.1.1.2. Hippocrates and Socrates 
 
The contrast in the dialogue’s second scene between Hippocrates and Socrates is almost 
too striking.  Hippocrates knocks violently on Socrates’ door before sunrise,
3
 full of manly spirit 
and passionate excitement (tên andreian kai tên ptoiêsin),4 in such a way as to prompt Socrates 
to ask him, first, whether he has some bad news to report,
5
 and then a little later whether he has 
been wronged in some way.
6
  Hippocrates, in other words, is exhibiting the kind of spirited 
behavior typical of people who are spreading urgent news or who are filled with righteous 
anger.
7
  Add to this Hippocrates’ red-faced admission
8
 that he would be ashamed to present 
                                                
1
 319c3-4.  This account of an immunity to the power of appearance itself resembles Socrates’ later description of 
the person who possesses the art of measurement (356de). 
2
 See 309c13-310a6. 
3
 310a9-b1: . . . eti batheos orthrou . . . tên thuran têi baktêria[i] panu sphodra ekroue . . . .  
4
 310d2-3.   
5
 310b5: mê ti neôteron angelleis;    
6
 310d4: môn ti se adikei Prôtagoras;   
7
 Cf. Paul Revere’s predawn behavior on April 19, 1775. 
8
 312a2: kai hos eipen eruthriasas . . . .   
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himself before the Greeks as a sophist,
1
 along with Socrates’ later suggestion that what is 
motivating Hippocrates to associate with Protagoras is a desire to “gain consideration in the city” 
(ellogimos genesthai en tê[i] polei),2 and the portrait that emerges is of someone in the grip of 
the manly frame of mind. 
Whereas Hippocrates is vehement and spirited, Socrates is cautious and deliberate.  He 
persuades Hippocrates with good reasons to linger awhile at his house
3
; he speaks of deliberating 
for days with friends and family about whether one ought to entrust one’s body to some doctor
4
; 
he talks about consulting an expert before consuming any food or drink bought from a peddler
5
; 
and he believes that Hippocrates, in rushing to entrust his soul to a person of whom he is almost 
wholly ignorant, is staking his life in a foolish gamble.
6
  Socrates is depicted here as thinking 
that certain activities (the consumption of food, the care of the body, the care of the soul) ought 
ideally to be governed by the knowledge proper to each and that any other guide cannot be 
trusted.  He is portrayed, in short, as a model inhabitant of the epistemic frame of mind.  In this 
second scene, then, as in the first, there is a contrast corresponding to my distinction between 
‘epistemic’ and ‘non-epistemic’
7
 ways of thinking, feeling, and acting.  
 
4.1.1.3. Protagoras and Socrates 
 
In by far the most elaborate scene of the dialogue Plato takes the character who occupied 
the ‘epistemic’ side of the first scene’s double-portrait (Protagoras) and shows him interacting 
with the character who occupied the equivalent place in the second scene (Socrates).  Both men 
                                                
1
 312a5-7: . . . ouk an aischunoio eis tous Hellênas sauton sophistên parechôn;  —Nê ton Dia, ô Sôkrates, eiper ge 
ha dianooumai chrê legein.   
2
 See 316bc.   
3
 311a.   
4
 313a.   
5
 314a.   
6
 312b7-c2; 313a-c; 313e5-314a1.   
7
 In this case, specifically ‘manly’.   
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appear as champions of the intelligent, careful approach to human affairs; both men also come 
across as partly under the sway of the manly frame of mind.
1
  Of the two, however, it is 
Protagoras (as I will now try to show) who is more caught up in the manly frame of mind and 
Socrates who is more deeply rooted in the epistemic. 
 
From his ‘Great Speech’ alone
2
—a brilliant, logical, convincing response to a difficult 
challenge—it is apparent that Protagoras, though he does not know all that he thinks he knows, 
possesses many mental traits conducive to the acquisition of knowledge.  Among these is his 
smart cautiousness.  Protagoras tells Socrates that sophists run the risk of becoming the object of 
public ill-will, and that sophists must therefore be careful (chrê eulabeisthai)3; indeed, he says, it 
was for this reason that earlier sophists, among them Homer and Hesiod, attempted to disguise 
their true profession.
4
  But Protagoras takes what he says is a better precaution (eulabeian . . . 
beltiô): he openly confesses that he is a sophist.5  This counterintuitive strategy, together with 
other precautions against suffering anything terrible on account of admitting that he is a sophist 
(kai allas pros tautê[i] eskemmai, hôste . . . mêden deinon paschein dia to homologein sophistês 
einai),6 has worked well for Protagoras.  He has managed to survive into old age as a practicing 
sophist.
7
   
                                                
1
 Protagoras is also portrayed as exhibiting certain ‘animal’ tendencies.  Cf. in particular his profit-motive, as 
brought to mind at 310d6-8, 311d1-4, 313cff., 328bc, 349a3-4, and 357e7.  Cf. as well his uneasy relationship to 
hedonism.  But as Plato seems to focus on the ‘epistemic’/‘manly’ distinction, so will I.  
2
 320c-328d.   
3
 316d1.   
4
 316d3ff.   
5
 317b3-6.   
6
 317b6-c1.   
7
 317c1-2.  Cf. the self-consciously safe and prudent answer Protagoras gives at 351cd: “I cannot tell, Socrates, . . . 
whether I am to answer, in such absolute fashion as that of your question, that all pleasant things are good and 
painful things bad: I rather think it safer (asphalesteron) for me to reply, with a view not merely to my present 
answer (ou monon pros tên nun apokrisin) but to all the rest of my life  (alla kai pros panta ton allon bion ton 
emon), that some pleasant things are not good, and also that some painful things are not bad . . . .” 
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Another thing that makes Protagoras an ‘epistemic’ man is the fact that he assigns a 
central place to knowledge in human life.  Protagoras makes it his business to persuade young 
men that in order to succeed as citizens they need a kind of technical expertise, an expertise 
which he himself can transmit to them.  Indeed, he agrees with Socrates that no one ever acts 
against his knowledge of what is best; he says that it would be shameful for him of all people to 
deny that wisdom and knowledge (sophian kai epistêmên) are “the most powerful forces in 
human activity” (kratiston . . . tôn anthrôpeiôn pragmatôn).1    
 But despite such genuinely epistemic leanings, Protagoras is partly caught up in the 
manly frame of mind.  After comparing himself favorably with such early ‘sophists’ as Homer, 
Hesiod, and Simonides, he makes Socrates think that he wants to show off in front of his present-
day rivals Prodicus and Hippias.
2
  Protagoras casts a glance at Hippias (kai hama eis ton Hippian 
apeblepse) as he says that whereas other sophists would mistreat Hippocrates by dragging him 
back into arithmetic, astronomy, geometry, and other arts, he will give him nothing else but what 
he has come for.
3
  In a later display of professional competitiveness, Protagoras describes 
himself as excelling all others in the ability to assist someone in becoming a fine, upstanding 
man (diapherontôs an tôn allôn anthrôpôn onêsai tina pros to kalon kai agathon genesthai) and 
as more than worthy of the fee which he charges (kai axiôs tou misthou hon prattomai kai eti 
pleionos).4  This boast provides the fuel for an ironic roasting by Socrates:   
 
. . . I regard you as the best person to investigate in general any matters that a sensible man may be 
expected to examine, and virtue in particular.  Whom else should I choose but you?  Not only do 
you consider yourself a worthy gentleman, like sundry other people, who are sensible enough 
                                                
1
 352cd (Stanley Lombardo and Karen Bell’s translation).    
2
 317c: “. . . I suspected that he wished to make a display before Prodicus and Hippias (hupôpteusa . . . boulesthai 
auton tôi te Prodikôi kai tôi Hippia[i] endeixasthai), and give himself airs on the personal attachment shown by our 
coming to him (kai kallôpisasthai, hoti erastai autou aphigmenoi eiêmen) . . . .” 
3
 318d7-e5.   
4
 328b1-5.   
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themselves, but cannot make others so; but you are both good yourself and have the gift of making 
others good.  And you are so confident of yourself (houtô pepisteukas sautôi) that, while others 
make a secret of this art, you have had yourself publicly proclaimed to all the Greeks with the title 
of sophist, and have appointed yourself preceptor of culture and virtue (seauton apephêsas 
paideuseôs kai aretês didaskalon), and are the first who has ever [deemed himself worthy of 
exacting] (axiôsas arnusthai) a regular fee for such work.1     
 
Protagoras apparently conceives of the present discussion as a contest of words (agôna 
logôn) in which his reputation is in danger of being tarnished.2  When he senses that things are 
not going well for him in the debate, he starts to lose his temper.
3
  He tries more than once to 
avoid answering Socrates’ questions,
4
 and when he is forced to answer,
5
 he sometimes does so 
only grudgingly.
6
  After the argument is over, even as he generously compliments the person 
who has just made him look bad, Protagoras again betrays a tendency to focus on reputation by 
saying he would not be surprised if Socrates came to be one of those men who are ‘held in 
account’ for their wisdom (tôn ellogimôn . . . andrôn epi sophia[i]).7  It seems that for 
Protagoras, it is good to be wise, but it is very good to be known for one’s wisdom. 
 
 Yet if Protagoras is partly caught up in the manly frame of mind, is he any more caught 
up in it than Socrates?  When Protagoras accuses Socrates of asking his questions out of a love of 
victory, the charge is not a groundless one.
8
  Whereas the followers of Protagoras are extremely 
                                                
1
 348d-349a (Loeb Classical Library translation, my substitution in brackets).     
2
 See 335a4-8: “Socrates, I have undertaken in my time many contests of speech (agôna logôn), and if I were to do 
what you demand, and argue just in the way that my opponent (ho antilegôn) demanded, I should not be held 
superior to anyone (oudenos an beltiôn ephainomên) nor would Protagoras have made a name among the Greeks 
(oud’ an egeneto Prôtagorou onoma en tois Hellêsin).”  
3
 331e6-332a4; 333e1-5; 335a9-b1.   
4
 333d1-3; 348b1-2; 360d6-8.   
5
 See especially 348bc, where Alcibiades shames Protagoras into agreeing to be questioned again by Socrates.   
6
 333b3-4 (mal’ akontôs); 338e3-4 (panu men ouk êthelen, homôs de ênangkasthê homologêsai erôtêsein . . . .); 
348c3-4 (mogis); 360d3-4 (panu mogis entautha epeneusen); cf. also 335b1-2 (ouk ethelêsoi hekôn einai 
apokrinomenos dialegesthai).   
7
 361e.   
8
 360e.   
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careful not to be an impediment to him,
1
 Socrates appears to relish being just such an 
impediment.  He is not afraid to get ‘personal’ with Protagoras
2
; he does not refrain from asking 
the kind of pointed question that makes it embarrassingly obvious that Protagoras has worked 
himself into an inconsistent position.
3
  Even some of his ostensible compliments are 
transparently ironic.
4
  Gregory Vlastos writes: 
 
[Socrates] is not a wholly attractive figure in this dialogue.  His irony, so impish in the Hippias 
Major, breathtaking in its effrontery in the Hippias Minor, somber, even bitter, yet under perfect 
control, in the Euthyphro, seems clumsy, heavy-handed here.  His fulsome compliments to 
Protagoras, continued after they have lost all semblance of plausibility, become a bore. . . . [H]is 
handling of Protagoras is merciless, if not cruel.  The steel-trap quality of his arguing might be 
excused by the infinite importance he attaches to its method and results. . . . But when the job is 
done and the mortal stab has been delivered, is it necessary to make the victim himself give one 
more twist to the knife?
5
  
But for all his pugnacious audacity, the Socrates of the third scene of the Protagoras (not 
to mention the Socrates of the second scene) is a less ‘manly’ and more ‘epistemic’ figure than 
Protagoras.  Whereas Socrates twice assures Protagoras, apparently sincerely, that his only 
motive in this debate is that of the honest inquirer,
6
 Protagoras fails to return the sentiment.  On 
the contrary (as previously noted), he suggests by word and deed that he regards this 
conversation as a contest.
7
  Consider also Socrates’ change to a gentler tone of voice at 333e: 
 
Here Protagoras seemed to me to be in a thoroughly provoked and harassed state (tetrachunthai te 
kai agôniân), and to have his face set against answering (paratetachthai pros to apokrinesthai): so 
                                                
1
 315b2-8:  “[W]hen I saw their evolutions I was delighted with the admirable care they took (hôs kalôs êulabounto) 
not to hinder Protagoras at any moment by getting in front (mêdepote empodôn en tôi prosthen einai Prôtagorou); 
but whenever the master turned about and those with him, it was fine to see the orderly manner in which his train of 
listeners split up into two parties on this side and on that, and wheeling round formed up again each time in his rear 
most admirably.”    
2
 Cf. 319a8-10, 333c.   
3
 Cf. 333a, 360c-e.   
4
 In addition to 348e-349a, which I cited just now, cf. 335bc.   
5
 Vlastos, 1956, pp. xxiv-xxv. 
6
 348c5-7; 360e6-8.   
7
 Cf. especially 335a.   
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when I saw him in this mood (epeidê oun heôrôn auton houtôs echonta) I grew wary 
(eulaboumenos), and went gently with my questions (hêmera êromên).1          
 
Does Socrates ever get visibly upset, so as to give Protagoras occasion to soften the tone of his 
voice?  Consider as well that after a lengthy discussion, full of bends and turns, Socrates is still 
“most anxious” (pasan prothumian echô) to continue the investigation into what virtue is (tên 
aretên hoti estin) and whether or not it is teachable.2  Protagoras, for his part, though he praises 
Socrates’ “zeal” (Egô men, . . . ô Sôkrates, epainô sou tên prothumian), does not wish at present 
to pursue the matter further.
3
  And when one does look back to the purely ‘epistemic’ portrait of 
Socrates in the second scene, together with the decidedly ‘non-epistemic’ portrait of sophists in 
that same scene
4
 (portraits which are surely meant to color the subsequent scene), Socrates 
emerges as more ‘epistemically-minded’ and less ‘manly’ than Protagoras.  At any rate, it is safe 
to conclude that in this third pair of portraits, as in the first two, distinctions are to be found that 
are akin to my distinction between ‘epistemic’ and ‘non-epistemic’ modes of thinking-feeling-
acting.  
  
4.1.2. Living a human life     
 
My account of akratic behavior does not just involve a distinction between epistemic and 
non-epistemic frames of mind; it also involves the idea of inhabiting a frame of mind with regard 
to the activity of living a human life.  Likewise, in addition to the distinctions that resemble my 
distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic frames of mind, one of the main ideas in the 
Protagoras is that a cautious, clever, methodical approach, as opposed to an impulsive, intuitive 
one, is the key to success in life.  This idea finds expression in at least four places: (1) in the 
                                                
1
 333e2-5.   
2
 361c.   
3
 361d7-8; e6.   
4
 See especially 313c-314a.     
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promise of success held out by sophists like Protagoras to young men like Hippocrates; (2) in 
Protagoras’s myth about early humanity; (3) in the demonstration to the many; (4) in Socrates’ 
own ideas concerning the care of the self.   
 
4.1.2.1. The sophist’s promise 
 
To young men like Hippocrates, it seems, success in life is largely a matter of coming to 
be ‘held in account’ by one’s fellow man (ellogimos genesthai en tê[i] polei).1  The great danger 
in life is that one will make a poor showing in front of others and be looked down upon as a 
nobody.  According to this view, salvation for a human being is the art of impressing his fellows 
and winning them over, primarily through spoken words.  Hippocrates appears to think that the 
key to his own success is to become a wise (sophos) or clever speaker and that the way in which 
to do so is by studying under Protagoras.
2
  Michael Frede observes:   
 
[Young men like Hippocrates] seem somehow aware that a traditional education is insufficient to 
deal with the problems a citizen of Athens faces in the second half of the fifth century.  They sense 
that traditional ways are inadequate, that one must approach problems in an enlightened, rational 
way, and that there should be a special competence, an expertise, in dealing with them.
3
  
 
Hippocrates apparently thinks that he needs a kind of technê or epistêmê in order to succeed in 
life.  He says, perhaps with some exaggeration, that he is ready to part with all his money and 
property in order to get it.4  Here, then, is one place where the idea that an ‘epistemic’ approach 
is the key to success in life crops up in the Protagoras.  
 
                                                
1
 316c1.  This is Socrates’ phrase.    
2
 Cf. 310e5-7 (alla gar, ô Sôkrates, pantes ton andra epainousin kai phasin sophôtaton einai legein); 310d5-6 
(monos esti sophos, eme de ou poiei); 312d5-7 (Ti an eipoimen auton einai, ô Sôkrates, ê epistatên tou poiêsai 
deinon legein;).   
3
 Introduction to Hackett edition of Protagoras, p. xii.   
4
 See 310de.     
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4.1.2.2. Protagoras’s myth 
 
 According to Protagoras’s myth, the great danger facing the earliest human beings was 
extinction.
1
  Epimetheus, through lack of careful planning, had given so many powers to 
preserve the non-rational animal species that there was nothing left for man.
2
  What ultimately 
saved our skin (which at this point was virtually all that we had to protect us) was technical 
knowledge.
3
  “[W]isdom in the arts together with fire (tên entechnon sophian sun puri),”4 stolen 
for us by Prometheus, gave people a means of material sustenance,
5
 while another technê, the 
‘political’ or ‘civic’ art, enabled us to live together in cities and win the war against the beasts.
6
  
In other words, whereas other things save other animals’ lives, what saves our life is wisdom.7  
Here, then, is another version of the same idea: that an ‘epistemic’ approach is the key to success 
in life—in this case, the life of the species.    
  
4.1.2.3. The demonstration to the many 
 
If to early human beings success meant survival, while to such men as Hippocrates 
success means making a name for oneself, to most people (according to Socrates and Protagoras) 
success means living out one’s life as pleasantly and painlessly as possible.
8
  And as animal 
instinct was an inadequate guide to primitive man, while a conventional Greek education is an 
                                                
1
 322c1: “So Zeus, fearing that our race was in danger of utter destruction (Zeus oun deisas peri tôi genei hêmôn mê 
apoloito pan) . . . .” 
2
 321b6-c3.  Cf. 320e3: “ . . . for preservation (eis sôtêrian).” 
3
 Cf. 321c5-6: “. . . naked, unshod, unbedded, unarmed (gumnon te kai anupodêton kai astrôton kai aoplon) . . . .” 
4
 321d1-2.   
5
 321d4 (bion) ; 322a1 (biou); 322b3 (trophên).    
6
 Cf. 322b: “[A]lthough their skill in handiwork (hê dêmiourgikê technê) was a sufficient aid in respect of food, in 
their warfare with the beasts it was defective; for as yet they had no civic art (politikên . . . technên), which includes 
the art of war (hês meros polemikê).  So they sought to band themselves together and secure their lives by founding 
cities.  Now as often as they were banded together they did wrong to one another (êdikoun allêlous) through the lack 
of civic art (tên politikên technên), and thus they began to be scattered again and to perish.”  
7
 Cf. the use of sôtêria at 321c8.  Cf. also 321a1 (esôizen), 321b6 (sôtêrian), 322b6 (sôizesthai).   
8
 Cf. 355a2-3: “Is it enough for you to live out your life (katabiônai ton bion) pleasantly, without pain?” 
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inadequate guide to Hippocrates, so the power of appearance (hê tou phainomenou dunamis) is 
not a sufficiently trustworthy guide for the masses.
1
  In order to get what they want in life, the 
many, too, need technical knowledge, in their case a measuring art (metrêtikê technê).2  It is 
specifically their life that Socrates says this knowledge will save.3  Again, the idea is that the key 
to success in life is the adoption of an ‘epistemic’ approach.     
 
4.1.2.4. Socratic care of self 
 
 In his demonstration to the many Socrates talks as if the chief thing to avoid in life were 
the failure to maximize pleasure and minimize pain; but when speaking to Hippocrates and 
sounding more like himself, Socrates talks as if the chief thing to avoid in life were the 
corruption of one’s soul.
4
  Socrates warns Hippocrates that the success or failure of everything 
else that belongs to him depends on the goodness or badness of his soul (tên psuchên, en hôi 
pant’ estin ta sa ê eu ê kakôs prattein, chrêstou ê ponêrou autou genomenou), and that therefore 
he must think long and hard, in consultation with friends and family, about to whom or to what 
he will entrust the direction of his soul.
5
  In such deliberations it is good to ask such basic 
questions as these: “What is it for a human soul to be in good condition?” (“What is aretê?”); 
“How, practically speaking, are human souls brought into good condition?” (“Is aretê a 
teachable thing, or is it acquired in some other way?”).  It is just such questions as these, of 
course, that habitually occupy Socrates.  Indeed, Socrates himself says at the end of the dialogue 
that spending time investigating these matters is a way in which he takes forethought “over [his] 
life as a whole”:   
                                                
1
 356d4.  
2
 See 357a5-b4.   
3
 Cf. 356d3 (biou); e2 (bion); e6 (biou); 357a1 (bion); a7 (biou).   
4
 The two thoughts are not necessarily incompatible.   
5
 313a-c.   
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. . . I would like us, having come this far, to continue until we come through to what virtue is in 
itself (tên aretên hoti estin), and then to return to inquire about whether it can or cannot be taught 
(eite didakton eite mê didakton), so that Epimetheus might not frustrate us a second time in this 
inquiry . . . . I like the Prometheus character in your story better than Epimetheus.  Since I take 
promethean forethought over my life as a whole (promêthoumenos huper tou biou tou emautou 
pantos), I pay attention to these things (panta tauta pragmateuomai), and if you are willing . . . I 
would be pleased to investigate them along with you.
1  
 
In this final example, as in the first three, we find the idea of a prudent, intelligent approach (the 
‘promethean’ or ‘epistemic’ approach) applied to the activity of living a whole human life.  But 
whereas in those cases the approach was applied in the service of some independently 
determined conception of the goal of the activity (becoming a famous statesman, perpetuating 
the species, experiencing maximum pleasure), in this case it is used to call those very 
conceptions into question and to help us reach a better understanding of what the goal in life 
really is.
2
  I said in chapter 2 that one might speak of different versions of the epistemic frame of 
mind, some cruder, some more refined, through which people progress as they learn to inhabit 
this general mode of thinking-feeling-acting.
3
  Socrates’ application of the epistemic frame of 
mind to the activity of living a human life may in this sense be said to be less crude or more 
‘pure’ than the others just mentioned.    
 
4.1.3. Thinking about what is good 
 
 In addition to the idea of inhabiting a certain frame of mind with regard to the activity of 
living a human life, my account of akratic behavior also involves the idea of inhabiting this or 
that frame of mind with regard to the activity of forming and revising one’s beliefs about what is 
                                                
1
 361cd (Stanley Lombardo and Karen Bell’s translation).    
2
 Cf. chapter 2, section 2.1.2, final paragraph.   
3
 Section 2.2.2.3, third paragraph.   
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good.  Granted that there are distinctions drawn in the Protagoras that mirror my distinction 
between epistemic and non-epistemic approaches to living, does the Protagoras also contain 
something like a distinction between different approaches to thinking about what is good?  
 
4.1.3.1. The discussion at Callias’s house  
 
Consider first the mode and subject matter of the discussion at Callias’s house.  Clearly 
one reason why Callias and his guests are so eager to witness this conversation—a debate 
between two brilliant thinkers both of whom are also highly entertaining speakers, one a sort of 
rising star,
1
 the other the current doyen of Greek intellectuals,
2
 held in front of a prestigious 
gathering of other wisdom-loving men
3
—is because they think it promises to be great philosophy 
and great theater.4  Indeed, it is hard to name another place in Plato’s works where the 
conversational modes of competitive spectacle and philosophical inquiry are more exquisitely 
combined.  As for subject matter, the topic throughout the discussion (except when the 
discussion itself is the topic) is human goodness (aretê).  In other words, engaging in this 
discussion is itself an example of thinking (out loud) about what is good.  On the one hand, then, 
                                                
1
 Cf. 361de: “I approve your zeal, Socrates, said Protagoras, and the way you develop your arguments (tên diexodon 
tôn logôn) . . . . Indeed, I have told many people how I regard you—as the man I admire far above any that I meet, 
and as quite an exception to men of your age; and I say I should not be surprised if you won high repute for 
wisdom.” 
2
 Cf. 317c: “And yet many long years have I now been in the profession, for many in total are those that I have lived: 
not one of you all, but in age I might be his father (oudenos hotou ou pantôn an humôn kath’ hêlikian patêr eiên)” ;  
cf. also 320c: “. . . but shall I, as an old man speaking to his juniors (hôs presbuteros neôterois) . . . .” 
3
 Cf. Hippias’s comment at 337d: “[W]e . . . being the wisest of the Greeks (sophôtatous de ontas tôn Hellênôn), and 
having met together for the very purpose in the very sanctuary of the wisdom of Greece (kai kat’ auto touto nun 
sunelêluthotas eis auto to prutaneion tês sophias), and in this the greatest and most auspicious house of the city of 
cities . . . .”  See also 314bc: “[P]rotagoras is not the only one there; we shall find Hippias of Elis and . . . Prodicus 
of Ceos, and numerous other men of wisdom besides.”  
4
 Cf. 317d: “Then do you agree, said Callias, to our making a session of it, so that we may sit at ease for our 
conversation?  The proposal was accepted: and all of us, delighted at the prospect of listening to wise men (asmenoi 
de pantes hêmeis, hôs akousomenoi andrôn sophôn), took hold of the benches and couches ourselves . . . .”  Cf. also 
335d: “. . . Callias laid hold of my arm with his right hand, and grasped this cloak of mine with his left, and said: We 
will not let you go, Socrates; for if you leave us our discussions [will not be the same] (ouch homoiôs hêmin esontai 
hoi dialogoi).  I beg you therefore to stay with us, for there is nothing I would rather hear than an argument between 
you and Protagoras (egô oud’ an henos hêdion akousaimi ê sou te kai Prôtagorou dialegomenôn).  Come, you must 
oblige us all.”  (W. R. M. Lamb’s translation, my emendation in brackets).   
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the conversation’s participants are engaging in the activity of thinking about what is good, while 
on the other, the conversation’s mode is a cross between philosophical inquiry and competitive 
spectacle.  Already one can see at least the hint of a distinction between ‘epistemic’ and ‘non-
epistemic’ ways of approaching the activity of thinking about what is good.  
But it is one thing for a conversation to occupy a certain mode; it is another for the 
conversation’s participants to be aware of the mode as such and to ask explicitly, “What will be 
the mode of our discussion?”  Remarkably, this is just what happens halfway through the 
Protagoras: the topic of conversation shifts from human goodness to the mode of the present 
discussion itself.  Socrates distinguishes a brief way and a long way of answering questions 
(brachulogia vs. makrologia) and requests that Protagoras limit himself to the brief way.1  
Protagoras presses Socrates to make his request more precise,2 then refuses to comply with the 
request.  He would never have become the famous sophist that he is, he says to Socrates, had he 
allowed his opponents to fix the mode of discussion.
3
   
It is only with help from the minor characters that the dispute is resolved.  After Callias 
has had his say,
4
 Alcibiades displays a keen understanding of the nature of the dispute,
5
 while 
                                                
1
 334c7-d5; 334e4-335a3; 335b7-c2.  Cf. 328e-329b, where Socrates uses the image of brazen vessels that ring like 
bells to illustrate a distinction between answering a question at interminable length and answering it briefly.  Cf. also 
Gorgias 449c, 461d. 
2
 334de: “Well, what do you mean by short answers? he asked: do you want me to make them shorter than 
they should be?   
  Not at all, I said. 
  As long as they should be? he asked.  
  Yes, I said.   
  Then are my answers to be as long as I think they should be, or as you think they should be?”  
3
 335a: “Socrates, . . . if I were to do what you demand, and argue just in the way that my opponent demanded (hôs 
ho antilegôn ekeleue me dialegesthai, houtô dielegomên), I should not be held superior to anyone nor would 
Protagoras have made a name among the Greeks.” 
4
 335d (cited above); 336b: “[Y]ou must see that Protagoras is quite justified in asking for the same right to argue his 
points in the manner he chooses (dialegesthai hopôs bouletai) as you yourself are.” (B. A. F. Hubbard and E. S. 
Karnofsky’s translation.)  
5
 336b8-d2: “Socrates admits that long speeches are beyond him (mê meteinai hoi makrologias), and concedes to 
Protagoras on that score.  But when it comes to dialectical discussion (tou de dialegesthai) and understanding the 
give and take of argument (logon te dounai kai dexasthai), I would be surprised if he yields to anyone.  Now, if 
Protagoras admits that he is Socrates’ inferior in dialectic (phauloteros einai Sôkratous dialechthênai), that should 
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Critias, for his part, criticizes Alcibiades for the competitive way in which he has defended 
Socrates,
1
 reminding the company that contentious support for one side or the other is out of 
place in a discussion of this kind.
2
  As for Prodicus and Hippias, each draws an explicit contrast 
between different forms of discussion; indeed, Hippias uses the very word eidos to refer to a 
‘form’ of speaking, while Prodicus comes close to drawing a Platonic distinction between eristic 
and philosophy.
3
  But perhaps the most incisive distinction between different forms of speaking 
is drawn by Socrates himself:  
 
 Otherwise what is to be our mode of discussion (tis ho tropos estai tôn dialogôn)?  For I thought 
that to hold a joint discussion (to suneinai . . . allêlois dialegomenous) and to make a harangue (to 
dêmêgorein) were two distinct things.4 
 
By allowing so many of his characters to make so many remarks about the mode of the 
discussion, and by placing these remarks at the center of his dialogue, Plato seems to me to be 
advising his reader to attend not just to the different beliefs that a person might hold or express 
about human goodness but also to the different modes of thinking and conversing within which 
such beliefs are held and expressed.     
                                                                                                                                                       
be enough for Socrates (exarkei Sôkratei).  But if he contests the point, let him engage in a question-and-answer 
dialogue (dialegesthô erôtôn te kai apokrinomenos) and not spin out a long speech every time he answers (mê eph’ 
hekastê[i] erôtêsei makron logon apoteinôn), fending off the issues because he doesn’t want to be accountable 
(ekkrouôn tous logous kai ouk ethelôn didonai logon), and going on and on until most of the listeners have forgotten 
what the question was about (apomêkunôn heôs an epilathôntai peri hotou to erôtêma ên hoi polloi tôn akouontôn) . 
. . .”  (Stanley Lombardo and Karen Bell’s translation.) 
1
 336e1-2:  Alkibiadês de aei philonikos esti pros ho an hormêsê[i] . . . .  
2
 336e2-3: “It is not for us to contend (sumphilonikein) on either side for Socrates or for Protagoras . . . .” 
3
 Prodicus says at 337a6-b3: “I on my part . . . call upon you to accede to our request, and to dispute (amphisbêtein), 
but not to wrangle (erizein), with each other over your arguments (peri tôn logôn): for friends dispute with friends, 
just from good feeling (amphisbêtousi men gar kai di’ eunoian hoi philoi tois philois); whereas wrangling is 
between those who are at variance and enmity with each other (erizousin de hoi diaphoroi te kai echthroi allêlois).”    
Hippias says at 338a: “[Y]ou, Socrates, must not require that precise form of discussion (to akribes touto eidos tôn 
dialogôn) with its extreme brevity (to kata brachu lian) . . . ; nor must you, Protagoras, let out full sail . . . and so 
escape into the ocean of speech . . . .” 
4
 336b1-3.   
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As for the distinction between ‘epistemic’ and ‘non-epistemic’, the dispute over 
dialectical ground rules in the Protagoras is essentially a dispute over whether the conversation 
at Callias’s house will be a knowledge-oriented conversation, the goal of which is to arrive at a 
true understanding of the matters in question, or a display-oriented conversation, the goal of 
which is to cut a superior figure in front of an audience.
1
  Makrologia better suits the latter, 
brachulogia better suits the former.  In other words, not only does Plato distinguish in this 
dialogue between different ways of approaching the activity of thinking about what is good; he 
distinguishes specifically between what I call ‘epistemic’ and ‘non-epistemic’ ways of 
approaching this activity.  Thus in the mode and subject matter of the discussion at Callias’s 
house lies the seed of an idea at the heart of my account of akratic behavior: that beliefs about 
what is good that have their home in an ‘epistemic’ mode of thinking about what is good and 
beliefs about what is good that have their home in a ‘non-epistemic’ mode, quite apart from any 
differences in propositional content, are importantly different in kind.   
   
4.1.3.2. Moral education in the Great Speech 
 
  Consider as well the contrast between Protagoras’s description of the traditional course of 
a Greek youth’s moral education
2
 and the richest moral-philosophical sections of the Protagoras 
itself.  The kind of thinking about what is good that Protagoras says is instilled in youths by 
traditional Greek education is in many ways a ‘manly’ kind of thinking.  It involves accepting as 
good what one’s superiors tell one is good,
3
 admiring the ‘manly’ heroes of old as models of 
                                                
1
 No one puts it quite this way, but compare Socrates’ distinction at 336b, Prodicus’s distinction at 337ab, 
Protagoras’s accusation at 360e, Socrates’ statements of purpose at 348c and 360e, and Socrates’ observation of 
Protagoras at 317cd.     
2
 325c-326e.   
3
 325d3-5: “This is just, that is unjust; this is noble, that is shameful; this is pious, that is impious—do these, don’t 
do those! (to men dikaion, to de adikon, kai tode men kalon, tode de aischron, kai tode men hosion, tode de anosion, 
kai ta men poiei, ta de mê poiei).” (My translation.) 
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virtue,
1
 and letting the laws and customs of one’s city be one’s guide to moral conduct.
2
  It does 
not involve inquiring philosophically into what it is about good conduct that makes it good.  
Moreover, the educational system achieves its results through a combination of physical force 
and social pressure, playing on a young person’s fear of being treated harshly by others.
3
  By 
contrast, the kind of thinking about what is good exemplified in the richest philosophical sections 
of the Protagoras itself is an ‘epistemic’ kind of thinking.4  Here, then, is another way in which 
‘epistemic’ and ‘non-epistemic’ modes of thinking about what is good are distinguished in the 
Protagoras.   
  
4.1.4. Merely inhabiting the epistemic frame of mind 
 
In my account of akratic behavior I distinguish between merely inhabiting the epistemic 
frame of mind and actually possessing knowledge.  In addition to a distinction between 
‘epistemic’ and ‘non-epistemic’ ways of thinking, does the Protagoras’s author also draw this 
‘intra-epistemic’ distinction?  One simple answer is “Yes, of course, he draws it in the character 
of Socrates.”  And surely this is right, for Plato does depict Socrates as inhabiting a knowledge-
                                                
1
 325e-326a: “[T]he children . . . are furnished with works of good poets to read as they sit in class . . . : here they 
meet with many admonitions, many descriptions and praises and eulogies (pollai men nouthetêseis . . . pollai de 
diexodoi kai epainoi kai engkômia) of good men in times past (palaiôn andrôn agathôn), that the boy in envy 
(zêlôn) may imitate them and yearn to become even as they.” 
2
 326cd: “[T]he city next compels them (anangkazei) to learn the laws and to live according to them as after a 
pattern, that their conduct may not be swayed by their own light fancies (hina mê autoi eph’ hautôn eikê[i] 
prattôsin), but just as writing-masters first draw letters in faint outline with the pen for their less advanced pupils, 
and then give them the copy-book and make them write according to the guidance of their lines, so the city sketches 
out for them the laws devised by good lawgivers of yore, and constrains them to govern and be governed according 
to these (kata toutous anangkazei kai archein kai archesthai).”   
3
 Cf. 325d: “If he readily obeys,—so; but if not, they treat him as a bent and twisted piece of wood (hôsper xulon 
diastrephomenon kai kamptomenon) and straighten him with threats and blows (euthunousin apeilais kai plêgais).”  
Cf. also 326de: “[The city] punishes anyone who steps outside these borders (hos d’ an ektos bainêi toutôn, kolazei), 
and this punishment . . . is called a Correction (euthunai).”  
4
 The demonstration to the many (353c-357e) is perhaps the clearest example of this. 
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oriented frame of mind with regard to the activity of living a human life,
1
 even as he also depicts 
him as lacking and actively seeking the knowledge that properly governs this activity.
2
  Through 
his dramatic portrayal of Socrates, then, Plato may be said to distinguish between merely 
inhabiting a knowledge-oriented frame of mind and actually possessing knowledge.  Still, it 
would be nice if there were also some specific phrase in Plato that at least partially captured the 
distinction between ‘inhabiting the epistemic frame of mind’ and ‘possessing knowledge’.  Is 
there some such phrase, or are we forced to conclude that while Plato did grasp this distinction, it 
was only through his dramatic portrayal of characters that he chose to or was able to express it?   
There is no piece of Platonic terminology in the Protagoras that corresponds exactly to 
‘inhabiting the epistemic frame of mind with regard to ———’.  There is, however, a form of 
words that corresponds to it partially: oiesthai ——— en technê[i] einai, ‘to think that ——— 
[is an activity whose success] depends on technical knowledge’.
3
  This phrase is used in 
connection with the more common phrase oiesthai [or hêgeisthai] ——— didakton einai (‘to 
think [or hold, consider, believe] that ——— is a teachable thing/a thing taught’), and it occurs 
in Socrates’ description of the Athenian assembly.
4
  Socrates says that members of the assembly 
call in experts to advise them when it comes to technical city projects: 
 
Now I observe, when we are collected for the Assembly, and the city has to deal with an affair of 
building (peri oikodomias ti), we send for builders to advise us on what is proposed to be built; 
and when it is a case of laying down a ship (peri naupêgias), we send for shipwrights; and so in all 
other matters which are considered learnable and teachable (kai t’alla panta houtôs, hosa 
hêgountai mathêta te kai didakta einai) . . . .5  
 
                                                
1
 As I have already suggested, this comes out most clearly in the early conversation between Hippocrates and 
Socrates.  
2
 See, e.g., 348cff. and 360eff.    
3
 See 319c7-8.  This is yet another example of the construction I discussed in chapter 3, p. 108: estin en tini.  
4
 319b-d.   
5
 319bc. 
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Although the people who call in the experts do not themselves possess the knowledge in 
question, this does not seem to make them any less confident in dismissing anybody they 
consider to be a layman who is trying to advise them on a matter they consider to be technical: 
 
[B]ut if anyone else, whom the people do not regard as a craftsman (hon ekeinoi mê oiontai 
dêmiourgon einai), attempts to advise them (epicheirê[i] autois sumbouleuein), . . . they merely 
laugh him to scorn and shout him down (katagelôsi kai thorubousin), until either the speaker 
retires from his attempt, overborne by the clamour, or the tipstaves pull him from his place or turn 
him out altogether (auton aphelkusôsin ê exarôntai) . . . . Such is their procedure in matters which 
they consider professional (peri . . . hôn oiontai en technê[i] einai).1   
 
Here we have a clear example of people who firmly believe that something is the province of a 
kind of technical knowledge but who do not believe that they themselves possess the knowledge 
in question. 
I said that this phrase “partially” corresponds to my idea of inhabiting the epistemic 
frame of mind, because inhabiting this frame of mind is not just a matter of holding certain 
views, or of thinking certain thoughts, but a matter of thinking and feeling and acting in certain 
ways.  The phrase oiesthai ——— en technê[i] einai refers only to the ‘thinking’ part of 
inhabiting the epistemic frame of mind, not (or at least not directly) to the ‘feeling’ and ‘acting’ 
parts.  Even so, when it is combined with Socrates’ lively description of the scornful laughter and 
forced removal of an assembly member (cf. the ‘feeling’ and ‘acting’ parts of my concept), this 
phrase comes pretty close to serving my purpose.  
I think, then, that there are distinctions drawn in the Protagoras that roughly correspond 
to my distinction between inhabiting a knowledge-oriented frame of mind with regard to some 
activity and possessing the knowledge that properly governs that activity.  In light of this and all 
the other evidence presented so far in this chapter, I think it is fair to conclude, ignoring now the 
                                                
1
 319c.  
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section on Simonides’ poem, that ingredients in my account of akratic behavior are to be found 
throughout the Protagoras.    
 
4.2. Part Two: The section on Simonides’ poem (338e-348a) 
 
 Before attempting to relate my account of akratic behavior to the section on Simonides’ 
poem, I will provide a brief sketch of the section itself.   
 
When the section on Simonides’ poem begins, an agreement has been reached: 
Protagoras will ask Socrates questions and Socrates will try to make his answers exemplify 
brachulogia; then, when Protagoras is done asking questions, Socrates will once again question 
Protagoras, who in turn will give brief answers.
1
  Protagoras decides to question Socrates about 
poetic composition in general and about a poem by Simonides in particular, a poem whose theme 
appears to have been the imperfection (difficulty, fragility, rarity) of human goodness.
2
  Socrates 
soon finds himself in the position of having either to explain away a seeming contradiction in 
Simonides’ poem or to take back one of his previous answers.  He turns to Prodicus for help, in 
order (as he tells his nameless Friend) to buy some time.
3
  Two explanations follow, both of 
which Protagoras rejects.  Socrates then sets out an explanation of his own, based on a distinction 
between ‘becoming’ (genesthai) and ‘being’ (einai),4 prefaced by a fanciful account of archaic 
philosophy, and supported with a far-fetched reading of the entire poem.  After being praised for 
                                                
1
 See 338c6-e5.  See in particular 338d1-3 (egô de apokrinoumai, kai hama peirasomai autôi deixai hôs egô phêmi 
chrênai ton apokrinomenon apokrinesthai) and 338e4-5 (kai epeidan hikanôs erôtêsê[i], palin dôsein logon kata 
smikron apokrinomenos).    
2
 Although much of the poem is quoted, some lines are left out.  We know the poem only through the Protagoras.  
Cf. Adam and Adam, p. 194: “Plato is seldom careful to make his quotations accurate, and the perverse exposition 
of the meaning of this particular poem is hardly calculated to increase our confidence in his verbal accuracy here.  
Nevertheless, Plato is our sole authority for the poem in question . . . .” 
3
 339e3-5.   
4
 Emmenai is used for einai in the poem.  See, e.g., 339c4-5, 344c4. 
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this display, Socrates recommends that he and Protagoras leave off poetic analysis and return to 
testing each other directly in a common search for the truth.  
 
 Why include this section at all?  What does it add to the rest of the dialogue, other than a 
change of pace and comic relief?  And why this particular poem?  Why choose a text that 
emphasizes the difficulty and imperfection of human goodness, rather than one that touches more 
directly on the unity or teachability of virtue?  In the Meno (95d-96a) Socrates quotes a pair of 
passages from Theognis, one suggesting that virtue is teachable, the other that it is not.
1
  Why not 
pick a pair of fragments such as these?  And why this interpretation of the poem?  Why the two 
false starts?  Why the elaborate preface about the Spartans and Spartanizers?  Why depict 
Simonides as attacking Pittacus’s saying throughout the poem in an attempt to win fame for his 
wisdom?
2
  
I will not attempt to answer these questions here, nor will I attempt to give a 
comprehensive account of this section.  In keeping with my plan, I will merely try to point out 
links between this section and my account.  In particular, I will try to show (1) that some of the 
                                                
1
 See especially 96a3-4: “You notice how in the second passage he contradicts himself on the same point (autos 
hautôi . . . peri tôn autôn t’anantia legei)?” (W. R. M. Lamb’s translation, Loeb Classical Library.)   
2
 Questions such as these have been receiving more scholarly attention in recent years.  A tendency to characterize 
the section on Simonides’ poem as little more than entertaining parody has given way to an interest in demonstrating 
its hidden significance.  For an example of the former tendency, cf. A. E. Taylor, p. 251: “I think we should take the 
whole of this long interlude as intended mainly to be humorous ‘relief,’ a gay picture of the manners of cultivated 
Athenian society in the later years of the Periclean age, and not much more.”  For examples of the newer interest, cf. 
Dorotea Frede, “The Impossibility of Perfection:  Socrates’ Criticism of Simonides’ Poem in the Protagoras,” 
Review of Metaphysics, (39), 1986; Raphael Woolf, “The Written Word in Plato’s Protagoras,” Ancient Philosophy 
(19), 1999; Francisco J. Gonzales, “Giving Thought to the Good Together: Virtue in Plato’s Protagoras,” in 
Retracing the Platonic Text, 2000; and Wolfgang-Rainer Mann, The Discovery of Things, 2000, pp. 75-107.  Mann 
writes (p. 92, n. 24): “This entire part of the dialogue . . . is something of a puzzle.  Since Socrates ends the 
discussion by saying that they ought to dismiss the interpretation of poetry, and since a great deal of his exegesis of 
the poem seems far-fetched, commentators have frequently thought that the whole episode is to be regarded as a 
parody of the Sophists’ educational program, a reductio ad absurdum of one of their favorite instructional devices—
the interpretation of poetry.  It seems that because this is the general view of the passage, readers of the dialogue 
often neither look for, nor expect to find, anything of serious philosophical interest here.  The implied dichotomy 
between parody and serious philosophy is surely much too primitive.”  Mann adds that he discusses this section 
more fully in his forthcoming Fighting with Words: Dialectic and Eristic in Plato’s Protagoras and Euthydemus. 
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distinctions drawn in this section correspond to my distinction between ‘epistemic’ and ‘manly’ 
ways of thinking, feeling, and acting; (2) that other distinctions drawn in this section correspond 
to my distinction between ‘epistemic’ and ‘non-epistemic’ modes of thinking about what is 
good; (3) that the distinction drawn in this section between ‘becoming’ (genesthai) and ‘being’ 
(einai), together with the related distinction between the human and the divine, is akin to my 
distinction between merely inhabiting the epistemic frame of mind with regard to the activity of 
living a human life and actually possessing the knowledge that properly governs this activity.   
 
4.2.1.  ‘Epistemic’ vs. ‘manly’ 
 
Three contrasts in this section each correspond fairly well to my distinction between 
‘epistemic’ and ‘manly’ ways of thinking, feeling, and acting.  Two are drawn by Socrates, the 
first in his description of the Spartans and Cretans, the second in his characterization of 
Simonides; the third is drawn by Plato in his representation of Socrates.   
4.2.1.1. Spartans and Cretans 
 
Socrates says that what seems to be responsible for the Spartans and Cretans’ political 
success—indeed, what they purposely lead others to think is responsible—is their fighting (to 
machesthai) and ‘manliness’ (andreia),1 but that what is actually responsible is wisdom 
(sophia).2  Spartan and Cretan citizens associate with the numerous sophists who secretly live in 
                                                
1
 342b4-5.  Andreia is Socrates’ standard word for the full-fledged virtue of courage.  At 310d1-2, however, Socrates 
attributes andreia  to Hippocrates (kai egô gignôskôn autou tên andreian kai tên ptoiêsin), hardly a possessor of ‘the 
knowledge of what is and what is not to be feared’ (360d).  ‘Manliness’ or ‘manly spirit’ seems a better translation 
here, as in the present passage.    
2
 342ab: “[B]ut the people . . . make pretence of ignorance (schêmatizontai amatheis einai), in order to prevent the 
discovery that it is by wisdom (sophia[i]) that they have ascendancy over the rest of the Greeks . . . ; they prefer it to 
be thought that they owe their superiority to fighting and valour (tôi machesthai kai andreia[i]), conceiving that the 
revelation of its real cause would lead everyone to practice this wisdom (hêgoumenoi, ei gnôstheien hôi perieisi, 
pantas touto askêsein, tên sophian).  In Book VIII of the Republic Socrates identifies the ‘spirited’ or timocratic 
constitution with the constitutions of Sparta and Crete (544c).  In the Laws, a dialogue in which an elderly Athenian 
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their midst; all the citizens, male and female, learn from the sophists; the citizens love wisdom.
1
  
The Spartans are so effective at concealing the secret of their success that the people who most 
admire them and try hardest to imitate them—the ‘Spartanizers’ (hoi lakônizontes)—go about it 
all wrong: rather than philosophize, they merely dress in Spartan clothes and engage in violent 
physical exercise, failing to match the success of the Spartans, and maiming themselves in the 
process.
2
 
This curious description may be reexpressed in the terms of my conceptual framework.
3
  
The Spartans and Cretans are able to bring off a certain kind of performance: achieving political 
dominance.  Certain other Greeks are so impressed by this performance that they want to imitate 
it.  They ask themselves, “How can we be as successful as the Spartans?  What is responsible for 
their excellent performances?”  But the Spartans are jealous of this information
4
: they know that 
the secret to their success is a philosophical approach, but they delude other Greeks into thinking 
that their success is due to an unintellectual virile approach.  In other words, the Spartans trick 
the Spartanizers into adopting a ‘manly’ approach to the activity in question, when what is really 
called for is an ‘epistemic’ approach.  Accordingly, the Spartanizers fail to move smoothly and 
easily towards their goal, as witnessed by their broken ears, black eyes, etc.   That is, they 
encounter resistance, and they do not know what is causing it.  Perhaps the Spartanizers will be 
                                                                                                                                                       
converses with a Spartan and a Cretan, the Athenian redescribes the laws of Sparta and Crete as having been 
directed not at fostering military valor—as Megillus (the Spartan)  and Clinias (the Cretan) say—but at fostering the 
whole of human virtue, of which wisdom, he says, is the chief or guiding part (630d-632d). 
1
 342a7-b1; d1-2; e5-7.   
2
 342bc: “So well have they kept their secret that they have deceived the followers of the Spartan cult in our cities 
(tous en tais polesi lakônizontas), with the result that some get broken ears by imitating them (hoi men ôta te 
katagnuntai mimoumenoi autous), bind their knuckles with thongs, go in for muscular exercises, and wear dashing 
little cloaks, as though it were by these means that the Spartans were the masters of Greece (hôs dê toutois 
kratountas tôn Hellênôn tous Lakedaimonious).”   
3
 Chapter 2, Part One.   
4
 Cf. 327ab, where Protagoras speaks of craftsmen who refuse to share their trade secrets with potential competitors:  
“[N]o one now thinks of grudging or reserving his skill in what is just and lawful as he does in other expert 
knowledge (tôn dikaiôn kai tôn nomimôn oudeis phthonei oud’ apokruptetai hôsper tôn allôn technêmatôn); for our 
neighbors’ justice and virtue, I take it, is to our advantage, and consequently we all tell and teach one another what 
is just and lawful . . . .”     
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smart enough to ask themselves, “Are we continuing to fail because we are not trying hard 
enough along the lines of our current approach, or is it that we need to change our approach?”  
But if they fail to realize that it is their misguided approach that is responsible for their problems, 
and that “the Spartan cult (to lakônizein) is much more the pursuit of wisdom (philosophein) than 
of athletics (philogumnastein),”1 then the Spartanizers may be said to suffer from the “distinctive 
kind of ignorance” mentioned in chapter 2, i.e., the ignorance of a person who fails to realize that 
the resistance he is encountering is due to his own wrongheaded approach.
2
    
Socrates’ diagnosis of what is wrong with the Spartanizers resembles my diagnosis of 
what is wrong with the typical akratic.  Both the Spartanizer and the akratic adopt a ‘non-
epistemic,’ largely ‘manly’ approach to the activity in question; both fail to realize that what they 
need to do is adopt a better approach, not try even harder along the lines of their current 
approach; and both end up struggling against unnecessary resistance as a result.  
4.2.1.2. Simonides 
 
Consider how Simonides is characterized by Socrates:  
 
Then Simonides, ambitious to get a name for wisdom (hate philotimos ôn epi sophia[i]), 
perceived that if he could overthrow this saying (ei katheloi touto to rêma), as one might some 
famous athlete (hôsper eudokimounta athlêtên), and become its conquerer (kai perigenoito autou), 
he would win fame himself amongst men of that day (autos eudokimêsei en tois tote anthrôpois).  
Accordingly it was against this saying (eis touto oun to rêma), and with this aim (kai toutou 
heneka), that he composed the whole poem as a means of covertly assailing and abasing this 
maxim (toutôi epibouleuôn kolousai auto hapan to a[i]sma pepoiêken) . . . .3 
 
This is a portrait combining one-upmanship, desire for fame, and athletic imagery, all 
characteristically ‘manly’ elements.  But it is also a ‘wisdom-oriented’ portrait: Simonides is 
                                                
1
 342e5-7.     
2
 Section 2.1.4. 
3
 343bc.   
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ambitious (philotimos, ‘honor-loving’) specifically with regard to wisdom (epi sophia[i]).  He is 
trying to outdo an older rival, but that rival is a wise man,
1
 and Simonides is trying to outdo him 
in point of wisdom.  And even as Socrates describes Simonides as being vehemently intent on 
refuting and reproaching his opponent,
2
 he reads into Simonides’ poem some of his own most 
‘epistemic’ views (‘Virtue is knowledge’; ‘No one errs willingly’).
3
  Like the larger discussion in 
which it occurs, Socrates’ characterization of Simonides is an uneasy union of ‘manly’ and 
‘epistemic’ elements.  
 
4.2.1.3. Socrates 
 
I argued in Part One that while conversing with Protagoras, Socrates is somewhat caught 
up in the manly frame of mind, even as he also inhabits the epistemic frame of mind.  In arguing 
for this claim I did not help myself to any evidence from the section on Simonides’ poem, yet 
this section contains some of the strongest evidence.  Observe how Socrates reacts when he 
seems to the audience to have been refuted: 
 
This speech of his won a clamorous approval from many of his hearers (eipôn oun tauta pollois 
thorubon pareschen kai epainon tôn akouontôn); and at first I felt as though I had been struck by a 
skilful boxer (hôsperei hupo agathou puktou plêgeis), and was quite blind and dizzy (eskotôthên te 
kai ilingiasa) with the effect of his words and the noise of their applause.”4 
  
                                                
1
 339c3-4: “Nor does the saying of Pittakos / have, in my view, the ring of truth, though spoken by a wise man 
(kaitoi sophou para phôtos eirêmenon) . . . .” (Andrew Miller’s translation in Greek Lyric, Hackett, 1996.)  At 343a 
Pittacus is included in a list of the Seven Sages. 
2
 344b: “[L]et us go over its general outline and intention, which is assuredly to refute Pittacus’s saying (hoti pantos 
mallon elengchos esti tou Pittakeiou rêmatos), throughout the ode.”  345d: “[A]nd in this vehement tone (houtô 
sphodra) he pursues the saying of Pittacus (epexerchetai tôi tou Pittakou rêmati) all through the poem . . . .”  346e-
347a: “Hence I should never reproach you, Pittacus, if you would only speak what is moderately reasonable and 
true.  But as it is, since you lie so grievously about the greatest matters with an air of speaking the truth (sphodra gar 
kai peri tôn megistôn pseudomenos dokeis alêthê legein), on this score I reproach you (dia tauta se egô psegô).”      
3
 Cf. 345b5, 345d9-e4.   
4
 339d10-e3.   
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Socrates describes himself, perhaps ironically, as having been thrown into a different state of 
mind, a state of mind in which he cannot see clearly or find his bearings.  From within this 
altered state of consciousness Socrates experiences what has just taken place in characteristically 
‘manly’ terms: ‘A violent act of athleticism directed against me has won my opponent vociferous 
praise from the crowd.’  If an author wished to dramatize the experience of slipping suddenly 
into the manly frame of mind, it would be hard to compose a more perfect description.  
Consider as well two passages in which Socrates uncharacteristically masks a lack of 
sure-footedness:  
 
  Then do you think the second agrees with the first?   
  So far as I can see, it does, I replied (at the same time, though, I was afraid there was something 
in what he said [kai hama mentoi ephoboumên mê ti legoi]).  Why, I asked, does it not seem so to 
you (atar, ephên egô, soi ou phainetai)?1 
 
Then—to tell you the honest truth (hôs ge pros se eirêsthai t’alêthê)—in order to gain time for 
considering the poet’s meaning (hina moi chronos engenêtai tê[i] skepsei ti legoi ho poiêtês), I 
turned to Prodicus . . . .
2   
 
Normally Socrates pretends to be less dialectically capable than he actually is.3  Here it certainly 
looks as if, for fear of coming off badly in the debate, he is pretending the opposite.  Now, it may 
be that Socrates is purposely going out on a ‘manly’ limb in order to achieve a larger ‘epistemic’ 
goal (e.g., protecting Hippocrates from Protagoras).  But presumably Socrates could have found 
a graceful way of confessing that he did not have a ready answer.  As for the first passage, 
Socrates might have adapted a line of his own from an earlier point in the dialogue:  
 
                                                
1
 339c7-9.     
2
 339e3-5.   
3
 Cf. 334cd, where Socrates calls himself “a forgetful sort of person,” a comment which Alcibiades later dismisses 
(336d) as playful pretence.  
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I . . . believe that virtue is not teachable [substitute: ‘that Simonides does not contradict himself’]: 
but when I hear you speak thus, I am swayed over (kamptomai), and suppose there is something in 
what you say (oimai ti se legein) . . . .1 
 
That Socrates behaves as he does suggests to me that (with regard to the activity of conversing 
with Protagoras) he has at this point fallen more fully under the sway of the manly frame of 
mind. 
But in the very section in which he comes across as most ‘manly’ and out of character, 
Socrates also expresses his most ‘epistemic’ and characteristically Socratic views about 
knowledge.
2
  Thus the section on Simonides’ poem only strengthens the case for a claim made in 
Part One of this chapter: that while conversing with Protagoras, Socrates is somewhat caught up 
in a manly frame of mind, even as he also inhabits a knowledge-oriented frame of mind.
3
 
                                                
1
 320b4-6.  
2
 As I noted just now, he attributes these views to Simonides (345b5, 345d9-e4).   
3
 Patrick Coby, among others, has pointed out several similarities between Socrates and Pittacus and between 
Protagoras and Simonides (“Protagoras has so much in common with Simonides that it may be warranted . . . to treat 
Simonides as a surrogate for Protagoras”—Patrick Coby, Socrates and the Sophistic Enlightenment, p. 111).  But 
few scholars seem to have noticed that Simonides is in some sense standing in for Socrates and that Pittacus is in 
some sense standing in for Protagoras.  Protagoras, like Pittacus, is an older ‘wise man’ whose reputation for 
wisdom is already established.  Socrates, like Simonides (at the time of writing his poem, according to Socrates), is a 
younger man who has yet to make much of a name for himself.  Socrates says (343c1) that Simonides is “ambitious 
to get a name for wisdom (hate philotimos ôn epi sophia[i])”.  Protagoras says (361e4-5) to Socrates, “I say I should 
not be surprised if you won high repute for wisdom (ei tôn ellogimôn genoio andrôn epi sophia[i]).”  In the final 
line that Socrates puts into the mouth of Simonides (346e-347a) it is hard not to hear a Socratic rebuke of 
Protagoras: “Hence I should never reproach you, Pittacus, if you would only speak what is moderately reasonable 
and true.  But as it is, since you lie so grievously about the greatest matters with an air of speaking the truth (sphodra 
gar kai peri tôn megistôn pseudomenos dokeis alêthê legein), on this score I reproach you (dia tauta se egô psegô).”  
For what it is worth, both ‘Simonides’ and ‘Socrates’ start with sigma, while ‘Protagoras’ and ‘Pittacus’ start with 
pi.  It is probably going too far to claim that just as Simonides is attacking a famous dictum of Pittacus’s, so Socrates 
(and through him, Plato) is attacking a famous dictum of Protagoras’s (e.g., his ‘man-measure’ dictum, quoted by 
Socrates in the Theaetetus, 152a: “Man is the measure of all things: of the things which are, that they are, and of the 
things which are not, that they are not.”).  Nevertheless, the idea is not as far-fetched as it seems.  At 361ab, when 
the personified ‘upshot’ (exodos) of the argument is charging Socrates with self-contradiction (cf. Simonides’ 
seeming self-contradiction), it says that Socrates has been trying to show that “all things are knowledge” (panta 
chrêmata estin epistêmê).  This, as Adam and Adam point out, is something of an exaggeration, “as if Socrates held 
!,)*(-µ- to be the #&.- of the universe . . . .” (Adam and Adam, p. 192).  C. C. W. Taylor writes that this “is 
surely intended to recall, and to signify Plato’s rejection of Protagoras’s famous dictum ‘Man is the measure of all 
things’ (pantôn chrêmatôn metron estin anthrôpos).” (C. C. W. Taylor, p. 214.)  Whether or not this supposed 
allusion exists in the Protagoras, there is an allusive passage in the Laws (716c) that is clearly intended to recall, 
and to signify Plato’s rejection of, this dictum: “Now, God is the measure of all things (ho dê theos hêmin pantôn 
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To summarize:  In light of Socrates’ description of the Spartans and Cretans, his 
characterization of Simonides, and his own behavior, it is fair to say that multiple distinctions in 
this section correspond to my distinction between ‘epistemic’ and ‘manly’ ways of thinking, 
feeling, and acting.    
 
4.2.2. Modes of conversing about what is good 
 
I think that in the section on Simonides’ poem there are two distinctions that clearly 
correspond to my distinction between ‘epistemic’ and ‘non-epistemic’ modes of thinking about 
what is good.  I will first discuss the more specific distinction and then the more general one.  
Even though the makrologia/brachulogia debate has already been resolved in his favor 
before this section begins, Socrates cannot help putting in another good word for brachulogia.  
He praises Spartan brevity at 342de,
1
 and at 343b he explicitly says that a sort of Spartan 
brachulogia (brachulogia tis Lakônikê) was the mode or style (tropos) of doing philosophy 
                                                                                                                                                       
chrêmatôn metron) in a sense far higher than any man could be, as the common saying affirms (kai polu mallon ê 
pou tis, hôs phasin, anthrôpos).” (Benjamin Jowett translation.)  And the supreme elevation of god over man that 
characterizes this passage also characterizes Simonides’ poem and Socrates’ interpretation of it (cf. the crucial line, 
quoted twice by Socrates, “God alone can have this privilege” [341e, 344c]).  So might it actually be true that just as 
Socrates views Simonides’ poem as a “work of very elegant and elaborate art” whose “intention [is] assuredly to 
refute Pittacus’s saying, throughout the ode” (344b), so Plato views the Protagoras as a work of elaborate art whose 
intention is to refute Protagoras’s saying?  The obvious objection is that Plato does indeed present an extended 
refutation of Protagoras’s ‘man-measure’ dictum in the Theaetetus, but that no such refutation is to be found in the 
Protagoras.  But although it is true that Protagoras’s radical relativism is conspicuously absent in the Protagoras 
(not even at 333e-334c do we get a real example of it), his broadly ‘man-oriented’ approach to thinking and 
conversing about human goodness, as contrasted with Socrates’ ‘knowledge-oriented’ approach, is on display 
throughout the dialogue.  In this sense the Protagoras might possibly be viewed as an extended indictment, not of 
the subtle metaphysical-epistemological theory that lies behind Protagoras’s famous dictum, but of its ‘manly’ or 
‘man-oriented’ spirit. (I have benefited greatly from discussing this topic with Paul Muench.) 
1
 342d6-e4: “[I]f you choose to consort with the meanest of Spartans, at first you will find him making a poor show 
in the conversation; but soon, at some point or other in the discussion, he gets home with a notable remark, short and 
compressed (brachu kai sunestrammenon)—a deadly shot that makes his interlocutor seem like a helpless child 
(hôste phainesthai ton prosdialegomenon paidos mêden beltiô).”   
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favored by such men as the Seven Sages.
1
  Indeed, Socrates says that his description of Spartan 
brevity is meant to demonstrate that Spartans “have the best education in philosophy and 
argument (pros philosophian kai logous arista pepaideumenai).”2  If, as I have argued, Socrates’ 
distinction between brachylogia and makrologia in the debate over dialectical ground rules 
(334c-338e) is essentially a distinction between an ‘epistemic’ and a ‘non-epistemic’ mode of 
conversing about what is good, then Socrates’ recollection of the same distinction here is one 
more example of a distinction between ‘epistemic’ and ‘non-epistemic’ modes of thinking about 
what is good.     
Now for the more general distinction.  When this section begins, the roles of questioner 
and answerer have been reversed and Protagoras is in the driver’s seat.  But because of the 
agreement to stick to brachulogia and because the only person who can now give long, evasive 
answers is Socrates, there is good reason to expect a conversation in a broadly Socratic mode.  
Indeed, one might expect Protagoras to grill Socrates in just the same way in which Socrates had 
been grilling him.  Instead, Protagoras turns what had been a direct investigation of virtue itself 
into a discussion of the compositional merits of a poem about virtue, thus shifting the 
conversation—albeit still within the general mode of brachulogia—into a less Socratic ‘sub-
mode’ more to his liking.  As Protagoras puts it, his line of questioning will be about the same 
thing as before (peri tou autou men peri houper egô te kai su nun dialegometha), namely virtue 
(peri aretês); the “only difference” will be that the discussion will have been carried over into the 
field of poetry (metenênegmenon d’ eis poiêsin· tosouton monon dioisei).3  Protagoras thus 
                                                
1
 343b3-5: “To what intent do I say this?  To show how the ancient philosophy had this style of laconic brevity (hoti 
houtos ho tropos ên tôn palaiôn tês philosophias, brachulogia tis Lakônikê) . . . .”  Socrates mentions the Seven 
Sages at 343a.   
2
 342d4-6.   
3
 339a3-6.  This is not, of course, the “only difference.”  Cf. Friedländer, p. 23: “[W]hen Protagoras claims that the 
poem deals with the subject under discussion, the obvious objection is that it does indeed deal with aretê but not 
with the questions of whether it is ‘teachable’ or whether it is ‘one’.”   
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comes close to saying: ‘The subject matter of our discourse will remain the same.  The mode 
alone will change.’  
If the whole discussion of Simonides’ poem may be seen as an exercise in a different 
mode of conversing about human goodness, is it a ‘non-epistemic’ mode?  Recall the end of this 
section (347b-348a), where Socrates explicitly criticizes the mode of literary criticism itself.  
Socrates compares this way of conversing and the way in which he would prefer to converse to 
two different ways in which people might associate (suneinai, ‘be together’) at drinking-parties.  
Vulgar and uneducated people, he says, pay large sums of money to be diverted at their 
gatherings by the alien voice of a flute, whereas noble and well-educated dinner guests associate 
directly with each other by means of their own voices.1  Socrates says that rather than distracting 
themselves by conversing about what some poet meant, something which cannot be ‘put to the 
proof’ (ho adunatousi exelenxai),2 he and Protagoras should deal directly with each other, testing 
each other in turn as they inquire into the truth of some matter.3  If the mode of poetic analysis is 
better suited to impressing a sophisticated audience and testing how clever a student of poetry 
somebody is,4 Socrates’ preferred mode of conversing seems better suited to testing how well 
people’s characters square with their thoughts about human goodness, and to testing how well 
these thoughts measure up to the standard of knowledge.5  When viewed in these terms, the 
                                                
1
 347cd.  
2
 347e6-7.   
3
 348a1-6: “[M]en of culture . . . prefer to converse directly with each other (autoi d’ heautois suneisin di’ heautôn), 
and to use their own way of speech in putting one another by turns to the test (en tois heautôn logois peiran allêlôn 
lambanontes kai didontes).  It is this sort of person that I think you and I ought rather to imitate; putting the poets 
aside, let us hold our discussion together in our own persons (autous di’ hêmôn autôn pros allêlous tous logous 
poieisthai), making trial of the truth and of ourselves (tês alêtheias kai hêmôn autôn peiran lambanontas).”  
4
 Cf. 338e6-339a1: “I consider, Socrates, that the greatest part of a man’s education (andri paideias megiston meros) 
is to be skilled in the matter of verses (peri epôn deinon einai) . . . .”; 341e8-342a2: “But I should like to tell you 
what I take to be Simonides’ intention in this ode, if you care to test my powers (ei boulei labein mou peiran hopôs 
echô), as you put it, in the matter of verses (peri epôn) . . . .” 
5
 Cf. Laches, 187e-188c (Nicias speaking): “You strike me as not being aware that, whoever comes into close 
contact with Socrates and has any talk with him face to face, is bound to be drawn round and round by him in the 
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entire section on Simonides’ poem, from Protagoras’s introduction of a literary-critical mode of 
conversing to Socrates’ harsh critique of this mode, looks like one long contrast between 
‘epistemic’ and ‘non-epistemic’ modes of thinking and conversing about what is good.1 
 
4.2.3. Being and becoming 
 
I will now try to show that the distinctions drawn in the section on Simonides’ poem 
between ‘becoming’ (genesthai) and ‘being’ (einai) and between the human and the divine are 
akin to my distinction between merely inhabiting the epistemic frame of mind and actually 
possessing knowledge.  In order to do this, I need to explain how I understand the 
‘being/becoming’ distinction.     
Michael Frede and Wolfgang-Rainer Mann, among others, have observed that the 
distinction drawn in this section between ‘becoming’ (genesthai) and ‘being’ (einai) is rooted in 
a fairly common Greek idiom, in accordance with which the phrase ‘become + [adj.]’ means 
roughly ‘display the kind of behavior that a [adj.] person would display.’
2
  On this reading, the 
                                                                                                                                                       
course of the argument—though it may have started at first on a quite different theme—and cannot stop until he is 
led into giving an account of himself (eis to didonai peri hautou logon), of the manner in which he now spends his 
days (hontina tropon nun te zê[i]), and of the kind of life he has lived hitherto (kai hontina ton parelêluthota bion 
bebiôken); and when once he has been led into that, Socrates will never let him go until he has thoroughly and 
properly put all his ways to the test (basanisê[i] tauta eu te kai kalôs hapanta). . . . [I]n fact, I knew pretty well all 
the time that our argument would not be about the boys if Socrates were present (ou peri tôn meirakiôn hêmin ho 
logos esoito Sôkratous parontos), but about ourselves (alla peri hêmôn autôn).” 
1
 For an interesting discussion of Socrates’ critique of literary criticism and how it may be reconciled with Plato’s 
own presentation of the Protagoras to a reading public, see Raphael Woolf, “The Written Word in Plato’s 
Protagoras,” Ancient Philosophy, 19 (1999), pp. 21-30.    
2
 See Michael Frede’s “Being and Becoming in Plato,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary 
Volume, 1988, pp. 37-52, esp. pp. 46-8.  Cf. his introduction to the Hackett edition of Plato’s Protagoras, 1992, p. 
xiii: “The curious phrase “becoming good,” as we can see from, for example, its repeated use in Thucydides (II, 87, 
9; III, 64, 2 and 4; VII, 77, 7), refers to the kind of behavior a virtuous person would display, where it is left open, or 
even questioned, whether in the case at hand it actually is produced by virtue.  When, in his speech (320c ff.), 
Protagoras claims that, and explains how, all Athenians teach virtue, what he largely seems to have in mind is a kind 
of conditioning which, by threat or lure, manages to make people, by and large, exhibit the kind of behavior thought 
admirable.  But this, at best, constitutes “becoming good,” rather than being good.”  See also Wolfgang Mann, The 
Discovery of Things, pp. 104-5: “[I]f we look at various Greek authors more closely, we find that ‘becomes’ is used 
rather frequently in the sense of ‘display’, ‘manifest’, ‘take on a role’, or ‘act in a certain way’, and so on”; p. 101: 
“[F]rom the fact that a soldier performs brave acts, we cannot conclude that he is brave or good (where this is to be 
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phrase ‘to become good’ (in some context, in some respect, at some time) should be understood 
here roughly in the sense of ‘to display the kind of behavior that a good person would display’ 
(in that context, in that respect, at that time).  The idiom implies a gap between truly possessing 
some attribute and displaying the kind of behavior that someone who truly possessed that 
attribute would display, though its use does not necessarily suggest that the person in question 
does not truly possess the attribute in question.  In other words, to say that a man ‘became good’ 
in battle is not necessarily to suggest that he merely acquitted himself well on the battlefield 
without actually being a good man.  That said, when someone uses the phrase ‘become good’ in 
explicit opposition to the phrase ‘be good’, as Socrates does in this section, there is this further 
suggestion.   
But what does Socrates mean by being good, as opposed to merely displaying the kind of 
behavior that a good person would display?  The answer ought to line up with what Socrates says 
is the critical point of Simonides’ poem: that when it comes to goodness, to ‘become’ is human, 
to ‘be,’ divine.  While a human being can, with difficulty, become good, being good is not a 
human possibility: “Only a god could possess that prize (theos an monos tout’ echoi geras).”1   
 
But if ‘being good’ is something that could only apply to a god, what could be meant by 
‘being good’?  Consider the following two possibilities:   
 
(A) possessing the knowledge (epistêmê) of how to live well and living in accordance 
with this knowledge; 
                                                                                                                                                       
understood as something like: is the sort of person who does brave acts because he is brave or virtuous; or is the sort 
of person who does them in the way the brave or virtuous person would do them; and, perhaps, is the sort of person 
who will be brave and good in all circumstances, from all points of view).”  Cf. also Adam and Adam, p.164: “[B]y 
andr’ agathon men genesthai alatheôs [Simonides] meant only ‘that a man should prove himself truly good’, i.e., 
quit himself like a perfect man: compare Hdt. VII 224 Leônidês—piptei anêr genomenos aristos, . . . . The usage is 
thoroughly idiomatic.”  
1
 341e2 (Andrew Miller’s translation in Greek Lyric, Hackett, 1996).  See also 344bc.    
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(B) possessing the quality ‘goodness’ as a constitutive part of one’s being, i.e., being 
essentially good.1 
 
On the one hand, I am inclined to accept reading (B), since in his exegesis of Simonides, 
Socrates talks as if (A) is not out of the reach of human beings.  Socrates suggests that learning 
(mathêsis) makes a person good (i.e., enables a person to display good behavior?)2 and that no 
human being can remain in a state of ‘having become good’ (i.e., continue indefinitely to display 
good behavior?),
3
 in part because epistêmê is never a secure human possession,4 in part because 
epistêmê does not make a human being infinitely resourceful (e.g., there will always be certain 
adverse conditions in which even the expert steersman cannot save his ship or in which the 
expert farmer cannot save his crop).
5
  Such talk suggests that while (A) is difficult and precarious 
for a human being, it is possible.  By contrast, (B) is humanly impossible: not even the most 
                                                
1
 It is this second sense of ‘being good’ that Wolfgang-Rainer Mann suggests Plato is reaching for in this context, 
albeit inchoately.  Mann glosses (I) ‘X is Y’ and (II) ‘X becomes Y’ as follows (p. 77): 
 
“(I) ‘X is Y’ is true, because being y is (part of) what being x is; or alternatively, because x is y in virtue of its own 
nature. 
 
(II) ‘X is Y’ is true, because x is y, even though being y is not (part of) what being x is; or alternatively, because x is 
y, but not in virtue of its own nature.” 
 
Cf. Mann’s reformulation on p. 97: “The general distinction, then, that Socrates is gesturing towards is the 
following.  On the one hand, there is taking on (at some time or in some circumstances) certain characteristics or 
features.  But these features are not constitutive of the thing whose features they are; for the thing could just as well 
lack them—for example, at other times or in other circumstances.  On the other hand, there is having features or 
characteristics in such a way that the thing whose features they are could not just as well lack them.” 
2
 345a.   
3
 344b8-c2: genomenon de diamenein en tautê[i] tê[i] hexei kai einai andra agathon . . . adunaton kai ouk 
anthrôpeion . . . .  
4
 Cf. 345b, where Socrates suggests that time (chronos) or hard labor (ponos) or sickness (nosos) or some other such 
thing can deprive a person of epistêmê.   
5
 344de: “A great storm breaking over a steersman will render him helpless (ton kubernêtên megas cheimôn 
epipesôn amêchanon an poiêseien), and a severe season will leave a farmer helpless (geôrgon chalepê hôra 
epelthousa amêchanon an theiê), and a doctor will be in the same case . . . [S]o that when an irresistible mischance 
(amêchanos sumphora) overthrows him who is resourceful, wise, and good (eumêchanon kai sophon kai agathon), 
he cannot but be bad.”  Cf. James Allen, “Failure and Expertise in the Ancient Conception of an Art,” in Scientific 
Failure, edited by Tamara Horowitz and Allen I. Janis, 1994, pp. 81-106. 
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idealistic believer in the perfectibility of human nature would seriously entertain the idea that 
human beings are necessarily good in virtue of their nature.   
On the other hand, I think that (B) is a bit too ‘metaphysical’ for the present context
1
 and 
that perhaps (A), or something very much like (A), will do after all.  For Socrates’ reading of 
Simonides’ view might be reformulated in this way:  ‘While it may be possible for a human 
being to acquire knowledge of how to live well and so become good, no human being can rest 
secure in his possession of this knowledge and thereby be good.  On the contrary, human 
‘possession’ of knowledge, if that is the right word for it, is a continuous struggle to remind, 
renew, and repair oneself, a kind of endless maintenance job.
2
  Now, this is surely not the way in 
which the gods possess knowledge.  To possess it as they do—without danger of loss, without 
anxious care—is not a human possibility.’  One might also point to passages in other Platonic 
dialogues in which Socrates seems to put (A) quite out of the reach of mere human beings.  I 
summarize these passages as follows:  ‘No human being whom I have yet met has seemed to me 
to possess the knowledge of how to live well.  If ever I met such a person, I would be inclined to 
call him a god, or else to classify him as an altogether different sort of person, related to the rest 
of us as a living man is to the dead.’
3
   
                                                
1
 Socrates says nothing in the Protagoras about being ‘necessarily’ or ‘essentially’ good.  Cf. Mann, p. 98: “[T]he 
Protagoras passage cannot represent a fully worked-out presentation of Plato’s later thoroughgoingly metaphysical 
distinction between being and becoming.” 
2
 Cf. Symposium 207d-208b, where Diotima suggests that while epistêmê may be said to save the life of a human 
being, it is a human being’s own meletê (‘painstaking care’) that saves his epistêmê.  Cf. also Laws 732b. 
3
 See Apology 23ab:  “[B]ut the fact is, gentlemen, it is likely that the god is really wise (tôi onti ho theos sophos 
einai)  and by his oracle means this: ‘Human wisdom is of little or no value (hê anthrôpinê sophia oligou tinos axia 
estin kai oudenos).’  And it appears that he does not really say this of Socrates, but merely uses my name, and makes 
me an example, as if he were to say: ‘This one of you, O human beings, is wisest (houtos humôn . . . sophôtatos 
estin), who, like Socrates, recognises that he is in truth of no account in respect to wisdom (egnôken hoti oudenos 
axios esti tê[i] alêtheia[i]  pros sophian).’ (Harold North Fowler’s translation, Loeb Classical Library.)  See also 
Meno 99e-100a: “At the moment, if through all this discussion our queries and statements have been correct, virtue 
is found to be neither natural nor taught (oute phusei oute didakton), but is imparted to us by a divine dispensation 
without understanding (theia[i] moira[i] paragignomenê aneu nou) in those who receive it, unless there should be 
somebody among the statesmen capable of making a statesman of another (ei mê tis eiê toioutos tôn politikôn 
andrôn hoios kai allon poiêsai politikon).  And if there should be any such, he might fairly be said to be among the 
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Though it is hard to determine just what is meant when Socrates speaks here of ‘being 
good,’ as opposed to ‘becoming good,’ I will assume that he means either (A) or something very 
much like (A): securely possessing the knowledge of how to live well and living in accordance 
with this knowledge, as opposed to displaying (in some context, in some respect, at some time) 
the kind of behavior that would be displayed (in that context, in that respect, at that time) by 
someone who had (secure) knowledge of how to live well.  Having offered a rough interpretation 
of the ‘being/becoming’ distinction, I will now attempt to show what is already, I hope, partly 
visible: that the distinctions drawn in the section on Simonides’ poem between ‘becoming’ and 
‘being’ and between the human and the divine are akin to my distinction between merely 
inhabiting the epistemic frame of mind and actually possessing knowledge.   
 
When laying out my conceptual framework in chapter 2, Part One, I distinguished 
between a good performance of some kind and the different approaches by which a person might 
attempt to bring off a good performance of that kind.  This was, roughly speaking, a distinction 
between a certain kind of behavioral display and the different ways in which one might try to 
produce such a display.  Later I focused on a special kind of performance—the living of a good 
human life—and described three different approaches by which a person might try to bring off 
this kind of performance: (1) by inhabiting the animal frame of mind (sc. with regard to the 
activity of living a human life); (2) by inhabiting the manly frame of mind; (3) by inhabiting the 
epistemic frame of mind.  Each of these approaches may (in certain contexts, in certain respects, 
at certain times) enable a person to display the kind of behavior that a good human being would 
                                                                                                                                                       
living what Homer says Teiresias was among the dead—‘He alone has comprehension; the rest of us are flitting 
shades.’  In the same way he on earth, in respect of virtue, will be a real substance among shadows (hôsper para 
skias alêthes an pragma eiê pros aretên).” (W. R. M. Lamb’s translation, Loeb Classical Library.)  Cf. Phaedrus 
278cd.  
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display (in that context, in that respect, at that time).  In other words, each approach may enable a 
person to become good to some degree.  The ideal approach to ‘becoming good’ is, of course, by 
‘being good’ (i.e., as I understand it, by securely possessing knowledge of how to live well and 
living in accordance with this knowledge).  So long as one remains human, however, the ‘being 
good’ approach is not an option.  What, then, is the best approach available to human beings?  
The Platonic answer, presumably, is whichever approach allows us to ‘become’ good in a way 
that most closely approximates ‘being’ good, i.e., that comes closest to securely possessing the 
knowledge of how to live well and living in accordance with this knowledge.    
Which approach is that?  I think it is the ‘epistemic’ approach, for two reasons.  For one 
thing, a person who is self-consciously oriented towards living a life that is guided by knowledge 
is, all else being equal, more likely to make the kinds of observations and self-corrections that 
will lead him ever closer to living such a life than someone who is not self-consciously trying to 
live such a life.
1
  Second, even when a person who adopts a ‘non-epistemic’ approach to his life 
ends up leading a life that in other respects bears a close resemblance to a life that is guided by 
knowledge, the fact that he is not self-consciously oriented towards this goal will always 
constitute an essential lack of resemblance between him and the person whose life is guided by 
knowledge, whereas even when a person who adopts an ‘epistemic’ approach to his life ends up 
leading a life that in other respects does not bear a close resemblance to a life that is guided by 
knowledge, the fact that he is self-consciously oriented towards the goal of a knowledge-guided 
life will always constitute an essential point of resemblance.  Recall the passage from Plato’s 
Laws in which two types of doctor are contrasted: the free doctor, who approaches the activity of 
healing in an ‘epistemic’ manner, and the slave doctor, so-called, who by years of empirical 
observation as a free doctor’s assistant has developed an ability to treat patients tolerably well by 
                                                
1
 Cf. my comparison to a heliotropic plant in chapter 1, p. 11.    
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‘non-epistemic’ imitation.
1
  On the one hand, it seems that as an experienced slave doctor may 
treat more patients more successfully than a person in the early stages of learning to be a free 
doctor, so an experienced person who adopts a ‘non-epistemic’ approach to his life may do better 
at ‘becoming good’ than a relatively inexperienced person who adopts an ‘epistemic’ approach 
to his life.  On the other hand, as a promising first-year medical student whose approach to his 
studies is properly ‘epistemic’ already bears an essential resemblance to the free doctor that is 
not shared by the slave doctor, so a person who adopts an ‘epistemic’ approach to his life already 
bears an essential resemblance to a wholly good (i.e., perfectly knowledgeable) being, a 
resemblance which is not shared by a person who adopts a ‘non-epistemic’ approach.  In this 
respect, at least, the ‘epistemic’ approach is better than ‘non-epistemic’ approaches at enabling 
human beings to ‘become good’ in a way that most closely approximates to ‘being good.’ 
But there is also a simpler way in which the distinctions drawn by Socrates between 
‘becoming’ and ‘being’ and between the human and the divine may be said to be akin to my 
distinction between merely inhabiting the epistemic frame of mind and actually possessing 
knowledge.  Actually possessing knowledge is to being (and to divinity) as merely inhabiting the 
epistemic frame of mind is to becoming (and to humanity).  On the one hand, there is the ideal, 
on the other, the creature who strives towards the ideal: (i) on the one hand, knowledge, on the 
other, the ‘epistemically-minded’ person who strives towards knowledge; (ii) on the one hand, 
divinity, on the other, the human being who strives to be like the god; (iii) on the one hand, being 
good, on the other, the creature whose best imitation of being good is to become good (to some 
degree, in some respect, at some time).  The analogy only extends so far, but there is enough 
similarity here, I think, as well as enough substance in my previous observations, to justify the 
claim that the distinctions drawn in the section on Simonides’ poem between ‘becoming’ and 
                                                
1
 Laws 720a-e. 
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‘being’ and between the human and the divine are akin to my distinction between merely 
inhabiting the epistemic frame of mind and actually possessing knowledge. 
  
4.2.4. Conclusion  
 
Given that the section on Simonides’ poem contains multiple distinctions that resemble 
my distinction between ‘epistemic’ and ‘manly’ frames of mind, others that resemble my 
distinction between ‘epistemic’ and ‘non-epistemic’ modes of thinking about what is good, and 
two more distinctions (between ‘becoming’ and ‘being’ and between the human and the divine) 
that are akin to my distinction between merely inhabiting the epistemic frame of mind and 
actually possessing knowledge, I think it is fair to conclude that ingredients in my account of 
akratic behavior are to be found throughout this section.  And so I think that it is also fair to 
conclude, combining this result with the conclusions of the first part of this chapter and of the 
second part of chapter 3, that ingredients in my account of akratic behavior are to be found 
throughout the Protagoras.  
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